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Scalar multiplication is the basic operation in elliptic curve cryptography that can 
be performed by many algorithms. These algorithms multiply a scalar value K with an 
elliptic curve base point P. One of the crucial decisions when implementing an efficient 
elliptic curve cryptosystem is deciding which point coordinate system to use. The point 
coordinate system used for addition and doubling of points on the elliptic curve 
determines the efficiency of these routines, and hence the efficiency of the basic 
cryptographic operation, scalar multiplication. Although using a fixed coordinate system 
enhances the performance of the scalar multiplication, (by removing the intermediate 
inversion operations), it becomes a security weakness since it can be exploited by 
projective coordinates leak attacks to reveal some secure information. Therefore, finding a 
coordinate system that can enhance the performance of the scalar multiplication and being 
secure against such attacks is desired goal. 
This thesis introduces a new approach called Dynamic Projective Coordinate 
(DPC) system. DPC provides a framework that automates the selection of the projective 
coordinate system and uses a single mathematical formulation/software code to 
  xvii
implement different projective coordinate systems. This framework allows the 
computing/encrypting device to select the projective coordinate either at random, or 
according to a certain rule. 
DPC uses dynamic transformation functions to convert coordinates of any point on 
the elliptic curve to any projective coordinates by using the same mathematical formula. 
These transformation functions are used to develop dynamic addition and doubling 
formulas for elliptic curve over the prime field GF(p) and over the binary field GF(2m). 
Also, this thesis proposes a new classification method for Side Channel Attacks 
(SCA). This classification is based on the type of information being leaked which can be 
Operation-dependent, Data-dependent , Address-dependent or any combination of them. 
New countermeasures for data-dependent, data-and-operation dependent and address-
dependent attacks are proposed. These countermeasures are based on the fact that DPC 
lends itself to randomize both the data being manipulated and the number of operations 
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ﻭﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻁﺭﻴﻘﺔ ﺘﺴﺘﺨﺩﻡ ﻤﻌﺎﺩﻟﺔ ﺭﻴﺎﻀﻴﺔ ﻤﻭﺤﺩﺓ ﻭﺒﺎﻟﺘﺎﻟﻲ ﺒﺭﻤﺠﻴﺎﺕ ﻤﻭﺤﺩﺓ ﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﺇﻀـﺎﻓﺔ . ﻋﺭﻀﺔ ﻟﻼﺨﺘﺭﺍﻕ 
ﻭﻜﺫﻟﻙ ﺘﺴﺘﺨﺩﻡ ﻤﻌﺎﺩﻟﺔ ﺭﻴﺎﻀﻴﺔ ﻤﻭﺤﺩﺓ ﻭﺒﺎﻟﺘﺎﻟﻲ ﺒﺭﻤﺠﻴﺎﺕ ﻤﻭﺤﺩﺓ ﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﺇﻀﺎﻓﺔ ﻨﻘﻁﺔ . ﻨﻘﻁﺘﻴﻥ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺒﻌﻀﻬﻤﺎ 
ﺒﺫﻟﻙ ﻴﻤﻜﻥ ﻤﻥ ﺨﻼل ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﺎﺩﻻﺕ ﺍﻟﺭﻴﺎﻀﻴﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﺒﺭﻤﺠﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﻭﺤﺩﺓ ﺘﻤﺜﻴل ﺇﻱ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻹﺤﺩﺍﺜﻴﺎﺕ ﻭ. ﺇﻟﻰ ﻨﻔﺴﻬﺎ 
ﺍﻹﺴﻘﺎﻁﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﺭﻭﻓﺔ ﺩﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﺤﺎﺠﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﺴﺘﺨﺩﺍﻡ ﻤﻌﺎﺩﻟﺔ ﺭﻴﺎﻀﻴﺔ ﻤﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻭﺒﺭﻤﺠﻴـﺎﺕ ﻤـﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻟﻜـل ﻨﻅـﺎﻡ 
  .ﺇﺤﺩﺍﺜﻴﺎﺕ
ﻠـﻰ ﻨـﻭﻉ ﻭﺘﻘﺩﻡ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺭﺴﺎﻟﺔ ﺃﻴﻀﺎﹰ ﻁﺭﻴﻘﺔ ﺠﺩﻴﺩﺓ ﻟﺘﺼﻨﻴﻑ ﻁﺭﻕ ﺍﺨﺘﺭﺍﻕ ﺃﻨﻅﻤﺔ ﺍﻟﺘﺸﻔﻴﺭ ﺒﻨـﺎﺀ ﻋ 
ﻜﺈﻀـﺎﻓﺔ ﻨﻘﻁﺘـﻴﻥ ﺃﻭ )ﻓﻤﻨﻬﺎ ﻤﺎ ﻴﻌﺘﻤﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻨﻭﻉ ﺍﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﻤﻨﻔﺫﺓ . ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻠﻭﻤﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﺘﻐﻠﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﺍﻻﺨﺘﺭﺍﻕ 
، ﻭﻤﻨﻬﺎ ﻤﺎ ﻴﻌﺘﻤﺩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺒﻴﺎﻨﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﻤﺩﺨﻠﺔ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻨﻅﺎﻡ ﺍﻟﺘﺸﻔﻴﺭ، ﻭﻤﻨﻬﺎ ﻤﺎ ﻴﻌﺘﻤـﺩ ﻋﻠـﻰ ﻤﻭﺍﻗـﻊ (ﻤﻀﺎﻋﻔﺔ ﻨﻘﻁﺔ 
ﻑ، ﻓﺈﻥ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻟﺭﺴﺎﻟﺔ ﺘﻘﺩﻡ ﻁﺭﻕ ﺠﺩﻴﺩﺓ ﻭﺒﻨﺎﺀ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﺫﺍ ﺍﻟﺘﺼﻨﻴ . ﺘﺨﺯﻴﻥ ﺍﻟﻤﻌﻠﻭﻤﺎﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺫﺍﻜﺭﺓ ﺃﺠﻬﺯﺓ ﺍﻟﺘﺸﻔﻴﺭ 
ﻭﺘﻌﺘﻤﺩ ﻁﺭﻕ ﺍﻟﻤﻘﺎﻭﻤـﺔ . ﻟﻤﻘﺎﻭﻤﺔ ﻫﺫﻩ ﺍﻷﻨﻭﺍﻉ ﻤﻥ ﺍﻻﺨﺘﺭﺍﻗﺎﺕ ﺒﺎﺴﺘﺨﺩﺍﻡ ﻨﻅﺎﻡ ﺍﻹﺤﺩﺍﺜﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺤﺭﻜﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﻘﺘﺭﺡ 
ﺍﻟﻤﻘﺘﺭﺤﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺨﺎﺼﻴﺔ ﻤﻬﻤﺔ ﻟﻨﻅﺎﻡ ﺍﻹﺤﺩﺍﺜﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻹﺴﻘﺎﻁﻴﺔ ﺍﻟﺤﺭﻜﻲ ﻭﻫﻲ ﺇﻤﻜﺎﻨﻴﺔ ﺍﺨﺘﻴﺎﺭ ﻨﻅـﺎﻡ ﺍﻹﺤـﺩﺍﺜﻴﺎﺕ 
ﻤﻤـﺎ ( ﻙ)ﻭﺍﺕ ﻀﺭﺏ ﻨﻘﻁﺔ ﻤﻥ ﻨﻘﺎﻁ ﺍﻟﻤﻨﺤﻨﻰ ﺒﺎﻟﻌﺩﺩ ﺍﻟـﺴﺭﻱ ﺍﻹﺴﻘﺎﻁﻴﺔ ﺒﺸﻜل ﻋﺸﻭﺍﺌﻲ ﻭﺁﻨﻲ ﺨﻼل ﺨﻁ 








Cryptography provides methods of providing privacy and authenticity for remote 
communications and data storage. Privacy is achieved by encryption of data, usually using 
the techniques of symmetric cryptography (so called because the same mathematical key 
is used to encrypt and decrypt the data). Authenticity is achieved by the functions of user 
identification, data integrity, and message non-repudiation. These are best achieved via 
asymmetric (or public-key) cryptography.  
 In particular, public-key cryptography enables encrypted communication between 
users that have not previously established a shared secret key between them. This is most 
often done using a combination of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography: public-key 
techniques are used to establish user identity and a common symmetric key, and a 
symmetric encryption algorithm is used for the encryption and decryption of the actual 
messages. The former operation is called key agreement. Prior establishment is necessary 
in symmetric cryptography, which uses algorithms for which the same key is used to 
encrypt and decrypt a message. Public-key cryptography, in contrast, is based on key pairs. 
A key pair consists of a private key and a public key. As the names imply, the private key 
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is kept private by its owner, while the public key is made public (and typically associated 
to its owner in an authenticated manner). In asymmetric encryption, the encryption step is 
performed using the public key, and decryption using the private key. Thus the encrypted 
message can be sent along an insecure channel with the assurance that only the intended 
recipient can decrypt it. 
 User identification is most easily achieved using what are called identification 
protocols. A related technique, that of digital signatures, provides data integrity and 
message non-repudiation in addition to user identification.  
 The public key is used for encryption or signature verification of a given message, 
and the private key is used for decryption or signature generation of the given message. 
Koblitz [1] and Miller [2] proposed a method by which public key cryptosystems 
can be constructed on a group of points of an elliptic curve. This group comes from a 
setting called finite fields (chapter 2).  
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) relies upon the difficulty of the Elliptic Curve 
Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) to provide its effectiveness as a cryptosystem. 
Using multiplicative notation, ECDLP can be described as (section 4.2): given elliptic 
curve points P and Q in the group, find a number K such that PK=Q; where K is called the 
discrete logarithm of Q to the base P. Using additive notation, the problem becomes: 
given two points P and Q in the group, find a number K such that KP=Q.  
 In an ECC, the large integer K is kept private and is often referred to as the secret 
key. The point Q together with the base point P are made public and are referred to as the 
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public key. The security of the system, thus, relies upon the difficulty of deriving the 
secret K, knowing the public points P and Q. The main factor that determines the security 
strength of such a system is the size of its underlying finite field. In a real cryptographic 
application, the underlying field is made so large that it is computationally infeasible to 
determine K in a straightforward way by computing all the multiples of P until Q is found.  
The core of the elliptic curve cryptography is an operation called scalar 
multiplication which computes KP by adding together K copies of the point P. Thus, the 
efficiency of elliptic curve cryptosystems heavily depends on the implementation of the 
scalar multiplication. The scalar multiplication is performed through a combination of 
point-doubling and point-addition operations. The point-addition operation adds two 
distinct points together and the point doubling operation adds two copies of a point 
together. To compute, for example, 11P = (2*(2*(2P)))+3P = Q, it would take 3 point-
doublings and 1 point-addition. 
Point addition and doubling operations require field inversion operations which 
usually have very high cost (i.e. number of finite field operations required) compared to 
the multiplication operation (see section 5.1). Its cost ranges from 9 to 30 field 
multiplications for a field element with bit length grater than 100 [23]. Moreover, it must 
be (without projective coordinate) performed in each iteration of the scalar multiplication. 
Therefore, it is important to represent elliptic curve points using projective coordinates. 
The idea of projective coordinates is based on transferring the point coordinates into 
another coordinates that can eliminate the inversion operation while performing addition 
and doubling operations. By this way, the intermediate inversions within the scalar 
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multiplication iterations are eliminated. However, still we need one final inversion to 
return back to the affine coordinates after completion of the scalar multiplication.  
Transferring any elliptic curve point to projective coordinates can be achieved by 
using transformation functions. Different projective coordinates use different 
transformation functions [23], [24], [25]. In this thesis, the sentence “projective 
coordinate system” is used when referring to the transformation functions as well as the 
coordinates generated by these functions, and the sentence “projective coordinates” is 
used when referring the values of coordinates of a point. 
Every computing device acts also as a source of additional information usually 
called side channel leak information. Depending on its internal computations, it consumes 
different amounts of power, emits different amounts of electromagnetic emanations, needs 
different running times or even produces different types of error messages or sounds. All 
these additional types of information can and have already been exploited in attacking the 
cryptodevices.  
In the execution of ECC, side channel attacks have become serious threat. One of 
the most side channel attacks is the power analysis attacks, first introduced in [26], [27]. 
Power analysis attacks monitor power consumption and exploit the leakage information 
related to power consumption to reveal bits of a secret key K although K is hidden inside 
the cryptodevice.  Thus, it is a serious issue that the implementation should be resistant 
against SPA and DPA, and many countermeasures have been proposed in [28] – [37]. We 
may note here that almost all public key cryptosystems including RSA and DLP-based 
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cryptosystems also execute an exponentiation algorithm with a secret-key exponent, and, 
thus, they also suffer from both SPA and DPA in the same way as ECC. Recently, in the 
case of elliptic curve cryptosystems, DPA is further improved to the Refined Power 
Analysis (RPA) in [28], which exploits a special point with a zero value and reveals a 
secret key. An elliptic curve happens to have a special point (0, y) or (x, 0), which can be 
controlled by an adversary because the order of base point is usually known. RPA utilizes 
such a feature that the power consumption of 0 is distinguishable from that of an non-zero 
element. Although ECC are vulnerable to RPA, RPA are not applied to RSA or DLP-
based cryptosystems because they don‘t have such a special zero element. Furthermore, 
RPA is generalized to Zero-value Point Attack (ZPA) in [29]. ZPA makes use of any 
zero-value register used in the addition formula. To make matters worse, some previous 
efficient countermeasures of the randomized-projective-coordinate method (RPC) [32] are 
neither resistant against RPA nor ZPA because, a special point (0, y) or (x, 0) has still a 
zero value even if it is converted into (0, ry, r) or (rx, 0, r) by using RPC.  
In 2004, Nigel Smart et. al. [42] showed that it is possible to leak some 
information about the secret key (scalar K) through the projective representation of elliptic 
curve points. Giving that Q = KP is the elliptic-curve double-and-add scalar 
multiplication of a public base point P by a secret K, they showed that allowing an 
adversary access to the projective representation of Q, obtained using a particular double 
and add method, may result in information being revealed about K. A countermeasure for 
such an attack is proposed also in [42] but they assume that the attacker knows the 
projective coordinate system used and that the coordinate system is fixed.  
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1.1 Scope of the Thesis 
The existing projective coordinate systems and the countermeasures based on 
them lack the following issues that can be used to enhance the security and/or 
performance of the scalar multiplication.  
First, issues related to the efficiency of the scalar multiplication:   
1. Each coordinate system needs its own mathematical formulation/software code 
and if a different coordinate system is used, it is required to change the microcode 
of the scalar multiplication. 
2. It is a costly operation to convert from one coordinate system to another during the 
scalar multiplication since this requires an inversion operation.  
Second, issues related to the security:   
1. The available projective coordinate systems are very limited in number.  
2. Vulnerability to RPA, ZPA and projective coordinate leak [31]. 
3. Existing countermeasures for power analysis attacks that use randomization of 
projective coordinates such as those introduced in [32] and the countermeasure 
proposed in [42] for projective coordinate leakage assume that projective 
coordinate system is fixed and they do not pursue the direction of changing the 
projective coordinate system randomly during the scalar multiplication due to the 
efficiency problems mentioned above.  
This thesis introduces a new approach for scalar multiplication called dynamic 
projective coordinate (DPC) system. We mean by dynamic projective coordinate system, 
is a system that automates the selection of the projective coordinate system and uses a 
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single mathematical formulation/software code to implement different projective 
coordinate systems. Also, DPC allows projective coordinates hopping at any time during 
the scalar multiplication with taking into account the efficiency and security issues 
mentioned above. 
Different projective coordinates are implemented by using two projecting parameters 
where one parameter defines the projection of the x-coordinate and a second parameter 
defines the projection of the y-coordinate of an elliptic curve point. This allows different 
projective coordinates to be used within the same mathematical formulation in calculating 
the scalar multiplication. 
These parameters are used to define dynamic transformation functions that can be 
used to convert any affine point to any projective coordinates using the same 
mathematical formula. These transformation functions are used to develop dynamic 
addition and doubling formulas for elliptic curve over the prime field GF(p) and elliptic 
curve over binary field E/GF(2m).  
In this thesis a survey of side channel attacks for ECC is presented in chapter 6. Based 
on that survey, we introduce a new classification of side channel attacks that can help in 
providing new countermeasures to cover the weaknesses of the existing ones. The 
proposed classification is based on the type of information being leaked. It divides all 
known attacks into three classes: Class A: Operation-dependent attacks that depend on the 
type of operation being performed (multiply, square, addition, doubling, etc…) such as 
simple power analysis attacks [26]. Class B: Data-dependent attacks that are based on the 
data being manipulated by the cryptodevice such as fault attacks [34]-[45] and projective 
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coordinate leaks [42]. Class C: Address-dependent attacks that are based on the addresses 
(locations) of the data being processed such as address-bit differential power analysis 
attacks [38]. There are, however, some attacks, called data-and-operation dependent 
attacks, that are both operation-dependent and data-dependent such as timing [27]  and 
DPA [26] attacks. 
However, an important feature of DPC is that by randomizing the projecting 
parameters (mentioned above) in addition and doubling DPC formulas, both the data 
being manipulated and the number of operations being performed are randomized. This 
fact is used to propose new countermeasures for data-dependent, data-and-operation 
dependent and address-dependent attacks. 
 
1.2 Organization of the Thesis 
The rest of this thesis is divided into 9 chapters. Chapter 2, presents an 
introduction to finite fields arithmetic. There are two kinds of finite fields that are 
especially preferred for the efficient implementation of elliptic curve cryptosystems. 
These fields are the prime field, GF(p), and the binary field )2( mGF . This chapter 
presents the definition of these fields and the basic arithmetic operations that can be 
performed on their elements. Also, various algorithms to perform arithmetic operations in 
the prime and binary finite fields are addressed in this chapter. 
Chapter 3 discusses the mathematical background of elliptic curves over finite 
fields. Curve arithmetic is defined in terms of underlining field operations. This includes 




Chapter 4 presents the principles of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). It includes 
definition of the underlining hard problem, Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem 
(ECDLP), that the security of ECC is based on. Also, it illustrates the domain parameters 
that are required to set up an ECC and the basic principles of symmetric and public key 
ECC . Finally, different scalar multiplication algorithms are addressed in this chapter.  
Chapter 5 surveys the existing projective coordinate systems, namely, Affine (A), 
Homogenous Projective (H), Jacobian (J), Chudnovsky-Jacobian (C), Modified (M) and 
mixed coordinate systems. We start this chapter by showing the cost of inversion 
operation in some recommended curves to show the motivation behind using projective 
coordinates. Also, this chapter presents the cost (in terms of the number of field 
multiplications and squaring) of point addition and doubling for each coordinate system. 
Furthermore, it gives the cost of converting a point from one projective coordinate to 
another. 
In chapter 6, we survey different types of side channel attacks and the various 
countermeasures known at the time of writing. Also, the classification methods of the 
attacks found in the literature are discussed. Based on that, we propose a new 
classification method according to the type of information being leaked. This 
classification method is used to classify and analyze both the attacks and countermeasures.  
Chapter 7 introduces the proposed dynamic projective coordinate (DPC) system for 
ECC over both finite fields GF(p) and GF(2m). In this chapter, we start by defining 
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dynamic transformation functions which are used to develop dynamic addition and 
doubling formulas for elliptic curve over the prime field GF(p) and elliptic curve over 
binary field E/GF(2m). 
Chapter 8 analyzes the performance and discusses the use of DPC. To analyze the 
performance of DPC, the number of field operations in each formula of the formulas 
presented in chapter 7 is calculated. We provide the method by which we can calculate the 
number of field operations in any DPC formula. Also, the issue of how the DPC can be 
used is discussed in this chapter. 
In chapter 9, we propose and analyze countermeasures for operation-and-data 
dependent, data-dependent and address-dependent attacks. All the proposed 
countermeasures are based on using the DPC system as the coordinate system. This is 
because the DPC system lends itself to randomization simply by randomizing the 
projecting parameters. For each countermeasure, we provide  the security and complexity 
analysis. 
Finally, conclusions are drawn in chapter 10. This includes a summary of the results 
obtained in this thesis. Suggestions for further work are also recommended at the end of 






Finite Field Arithmetic 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Cryptographic mechanisms based on elliptic curves depend on arithmetic 
involving the points of the curve. Curve arithmetic is defined in terms of underlining field 
operations which its efficiency is essential. From a practical point of view, the 
performance of ECC depends on the efficiency of finite field computations and fast 
algorithms for elliptic scalar multiplications (section 4.5). In addition to the numerous 
known algorithms for these computations, the performance of ECC can be sped up by 
selecting particular underlying finite fields and/or elliptic curves. Thus, a fast 
implementation of a security application based on ECC requires several choices, any of 
which can have a major impact on the overall performance. 
This chapter introduces finite fields and the various algorithms to perform 
arithmetic operations in these fields. An introduction to groups and finite fields is 
provided in Section 2.2. There are tow kinds of finite fields that are especially prefer for 
the efficient implementation of elliptic curve cryptosystems. These fields are the prime 
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field, GF(p),and the binary field )2( mGF . Sections 2.3 and 2.4 present the definition of 
these fields and the basic arithmetic operations that can be performed in each of them. 
Finally, conclusions are presented in section 2.5. 
 
2.2 Finite Fields 
In this section we present the definition of groups and finite fields. These 
mathematical structures are fundamental for the construction of an elliptic curve 
cryptosystem. 
A group is an algebraic system consisting of a set G together with a binary operation ◊ 
defined on G satisfying the following axioms:  
• Closure: for all x , y in G we have x ◊ y ∈ G. 
• Associativity: for all x , y and z in G we have (x ◊ y) ◊ z =  x ◊ (y ◊ z). 
• Identity: there exists an e in G such that x ◊ e = e ◊ x = x for all x in G. 
• Inverse: for all x in G there exists y in G such that x ◊ y = y ◊ x = e. 
If in addition, the binary operation ◊ satisfies the abelian property:  
• abelian: for all x , y in G we have x ◊ y = y ◊ x,  
Then we say that the group G is abelian. 
A finite field is an algebraic system consisting of a finite set F together with two 
binary operations + and ¯, defined on F satisfying the following axioms:  
• F  is an abelian group with respect to “+”. 
• F \ {0} is an abelian group with respect to “¯” 
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• distributive: for all x, y and z in F we have:  
)()()( zxyxzyx ×+×=+×  
)()()( zyzxzyx ×+×=×+ . 
The order of a finite field is the number of elements in the field. A fundamental 
result on the theory of finite fields [6] that characterizes the existence of finite field is the 
following: there exists a finite field of order p if and only if p is a prime. In addition, if p 
is a prime, then there is essentially only one finite field of order p. this field is denoted by 
GF(p) (or Fp). However, there are many ways of representing the elements of GF(p), and 
some representations may lead to more efficient implementations of the field arithmetic in 
hardware or in software.  
if mqp =  where q is a prime and m is a positive integer, then q is called the 
characteristic of GF(p) and m is called the extension degree of GF(p). Most standards 
which specify ECC restrict the order of the underlying finite field to be an odd prime (p = 
q, i.e. m=1) which result in GF(p) finite field, or restrict the order to a power of 2 ( mp 2= , 
i.e. q=2) which result in what called characteristic two finite field and denoted by 
)2( mGF . In the following sections, we will describe these two finite fields and present the 
basic algorithms for performing arithmetic operations in each of them. 
 
2.3 Finite Field GF(p) 
Definition 2.1: Prime Field GF(p). 
Let p be a prime number. The integers modulo p, consisting of the integers {0, 1, 2, 
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…, p – 1} with addition and multiplication performed modulo p, is a finite field of order p 
called prime field and denoted by GF(p). The prime number p is called the modulus of 
GF(p).  
 
2.3.1 Finite Field Arithmetic in GF(p) 
This section presents algorithms for performing arithmetic in the prime file GF(p). 
The algorithms presented here are well suited for software implementation. We assume 
that the implementation platform has a W-bit architecture where W is a multiple of 8. Let 
⎡ ⎤pm 2log=  be the bit length of p, and ⎡ ⎤Wmt /=  be its word length. Figure 2.1 
illustrates a binary representation of a field element A as an array of W-bit words. As an 
integer, 
 ]0[]1[2]2[2......]2[2]1[2 2)2()1( aaatataA WWWtWt ++++−+−= −− . 
 
a[t-1] … a[2] a[1] a[0] 
Figure 2. 1: Representation of A ∈GF(p) as an array of W-bits 
 
The following notation is used in algorithms for multiword integers. An 
assignment of the form "(ε,Z) Å A" for an integer A means: 
  Z = A mod 2W, and 
  ε = 0 if A in [0, 2W – 1], otherwise ε = 1. 
ε is called the carry bit from single word addition. 
Addition: If a,b ∈ GF(p), then a + b = r, where r is the remainder of the division of (a+b) 
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by p and 0 ≤  r ≤  p – 1. This operation is called addition modulo p. To perform addition 
operation for multi-word integers in GF(p), we first perform multiprecision addition 
followed by an additional step for reduction modulo p. The following two algorithms 
present multiprecision addition and reduction modulo p respectively. 
 
Input: integers A,B ∈ [0,2Wt – 1] 
Output: (ε,C) where C = A + B mod 2Wt  
1. (ε,c[0]) Å a[0] + b[0] 
2. for i = 1 to t-1 do 
             (ε,c[i]) Å a[i] + b[i] + ε 
3. return (ε,C) 
Algorithm 2. 1: Multiprecision addition 
 
Modular addition in GF(p), (C = A + B mod p), is adapted directly from the 
corresponding multiprecision addition algorithm with an additional step for reduction 
modulo p. 
 
Input: modulus p and integers A,B ∈ [0, p – 1] 
Output: C = (A + B) mod p  
1. Use algorithm 2.1 to obtain (ε,C) where C = A + B mod 2Wt and ε 
is the carry bit. 
2. if (ε = 1 or C ≥ p) then 
                C = C – p       // subtract modulus. 
3. return (ε,C) 
Algorithm 2. 2: Addition in GF(p) 
 
Subtraction: If a,b ∈ GF(p), then a - b = r, where r is the remainder of the division of (a-
b) by p and 0 ≤  r ≤  p – 1. This operation is called subtraction modulo p. To perform 
subtraction operation for multi-word integers in GF(p), we first perform multiprecision 
subtraction followed by an additional step for reduction modulo p. Note that we need a 
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reduction step here because we may have a negative result which must be reduced to the 
range [0, p – 1]. We mean by reduction here is adding the modulus p to the negative result 
if any. The following two algorithms present multiprecision subtraction and reduction-for-
subtraction modulo p respectively. 
 
Input: integers A,B ∈ [0,2Wt – 1] 
Output: (ε,C) where C = A – B mod 2Wt  and ε is the borrow bit  
1. (ε,c[0]) Å a[0] – b[0] 
2. for i = 1 to t-1 do 
             (ε,c[i]) Å a[i] – b[i] – ε 
3. return (ε,C) 
Algorithm 2. 3: Multiprecision subtraction 
 
Modular subtraction in GF(p), (C = A – B mod p), is adapted directly from the 




Input: modulus p and integers A,B ∈ [0, p – 1] 
Output: C = (A + B) mod p  
1. Use algorithm 2.3 to obtain (ε,C) where C = A – B mod 2Wt and ε 
is the borrow bit. 
2. if (ε = 1) then 
                C = C + p       // add modulus. 
3. return (ε,C) 
Algorithm 2. 4: Subtraction in GF(p) 
 
Multiplication: If a,b ∈ GF(p), then a . b = s, where s is the remainder of the division of 
(a.b) by p and 0 ≤  s ≤  p – 1. This operation is called multiplication modulo p. 
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The basic method for performing a multiplication in GF(p) is the "shift-and-add" 
method. Given A ∈ GF(p), the shift-left operation, (A << 1) mod p can be performed as 
modulo addition of A to itself using algorithm 2.2. That is: A = (A + A) mode p. The steps 
of the "shift-and-add" multiplication method are given below. 
 
Input: A,B ∈ GF(p) and the modulus p 
Output: C = A×B mod p 
1. set C = 0 
2. for i = m-1 to 0 do 
        C = C + C mod p          //shift left    
         If 0≠ib  then C = C + A   //use algorithm 2.2   
3. return (C) 
Algorithm 2. 5: Shift-and-add method for modular multiplication in GF(p). 
 
Inversion: The inverse of a nonzero element a ∈ GF(p), denoted 1)( −a  mod p or 
simply 1)( −a , is the unique element in GF(p) such that a.x = 1 in GF(p), i.e. a.x = 1 (mod 
p). The basic algorithm for computing multiplicative inverses in GF(p) is the extended 
Euclidean algorithm as shown below. 
 
Input: A ∈ GF(p), (A ≠ 0) and the modulus p 
Output: C = A-1 mod p 
1. set U = A, V = p 
          set X1 = 1, X2 = 0 
2. while U ≠  1 do 
         Q = ⎣V/U⎦ ,  R = V – QU,    X = X2 – Q X1. 
          V = U,    U = R,   X2 = X1 ,    X1 = X. 
3. return (X1 mod p) 
Algorithm 2. 6: Inversion using extended Euclidean algorithm in GF(p). 
 
However, several techniques for implementing the finite field arithmetic in pF  are 
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described in details in [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], and [12]. 
 
2.4 Finite Field GF(2m) 
Definition 2.2: Binary Field )2( mGF  
The finite field )2( mGF , called a binary finite field, can be viewed as a vector 
space of dimension m over GF(2). That is, there exist a set of m elements 








iiaa α  where, ia  ∈ {0,1}. 
The set { 110 ,...,, −mααα }  is called a basis of )2( mGF over GF(2). We can then 
represent a as a binary vector ( 110 ,...,, −maaa ). In the sequel, we introduce the most 
common basis: polynomial basis.  
 
Polynomial basis 
Let ∑ −=+= 10)( mi iim xfxxF  where if  ∈ {0,1}, for i = 0,1, …, m-1 be an  irreducible 
polynomial1 of degree m over GF(2). F(x) is called the reduction polynomial. For each 
reduction polynomial, there exists a polynomial basis representation. In such a 
                                                 




representation, each element of )2( mGF corresponds to a binary polynomial of degree less 









m ++++= −−−−  
The field element A ∈ )2( mGF  is usually denoted by the bit string 
( 0121 ...... aaaa mm −− ) of length m. 
The following procedure is commonly used to choose a reduction polynomial: if 
an irreducible trinomial2 1++ km xx  exists over GF(2), then the reduction polynomial 
F(x) is chosen to be the irreducible trinomial with the lowest-degree middle term kx . If no 
irreducible trinomial exists, then select instead a pentanomial 1123 ++++ kkkm xxxx , such 
that 1k  has the minimal value; the value of 2k  is minimal for the given 1k ; and 3k  is 
minimal for given 1k  and 2k .  
 
2.4.1 Finite Field Arithmetic in GF(2m) Using Polynomial Basis 
In this section, we describe algorithms for performing arithmetic operations in the 
finite field )2( mGF  using polynomial basis representation.  
 
Addition. Addition in )2( mGF  is the usual addition of vectors over GF(2). That is, add 
the corresponding bits modulo 2, i.e. performing bitwise Xoring. 
 
                                                 
2 A polynomial with three terms 
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Input: 0121 ...... aaaaA mm −−=  , 0121 ...... bbbbB mm −−=  ∈ )2( mGF  
Output: 0121 ...... ccccBAC mm −−=+=  ∈ )2( mGF  
4. for i = 0 to m-1 do 
          iii bac ⊕=  
5. return (C) 
Algorithm 2. 7: Bit-level method for addition in )2( mGF  
 
Reduction. By the definition of multiplication in )2( mGF , the result of a polynomial 
multiplication or squaring has to be reduced modulo a reduction (irreducible) polynomial 
of degree m. This reduction operation is particularly efficient when the irreducible 
polynomial F(x) is a trinomial or pentanomial. The following algorithm for computing 
A(x) mod F(x) works by reducing the degree of A(x) until it is less than m. 
 
Input: 0122 ...... aaaA m−=  and 0121 ...... fffffF mmm −−=   
Output: C = A mod F 
1. for i = 2m-2 to m do 
          for j = 0 to m-1 do 
                  If 0≠jf  then ijmijmi aaa += +−+−     
2. return (C = 0121 ...... aaaa mm −− ) 
Algorithm 2. 8: Bit-level method for modular reduction in )2( mGF  
 
Multiplication. The basic method for performing a multiplication in )2( mGF  is the "shift-
and-add" method. Given A(x) ∈ )2( mGF , the shift-left operation xA(x) mod F(x) can be 

































Then the steps of the "shift-and-add" method are given below. 
 
Input: A(x),B(x) ∈ )2( mGF  and 0121 ...... fffffF mmm −−=   
Output: C = A×B mod F 
4. set C(x) = 0 
5. for i = m-1 to 0 do 
        C(x) = xC(x) mod F(x)    
         If 0≠ia  then C(x) = C(x) + B(x)   //use algorithm 2.7   
6. return (C(x)) 
Algorithm 2. 9: Shift-and-add method for modular multiplication in )2( mGF . 
 
A faster modular multiplication is proposed in [50] but it requires more temporary 
storage.  
Squaring. This operation can be calculated in an efficient way by observing that the 
square of a polynomial A(x) is given by: 
( ) ∑∑ −=−= == 11 222112))(( mi iimi ii xaxaxA  
This equation yields a simple squaring algorithm: 
Input: 011...... aaaA m−=  and 0121 ...... fffffF mmm −−=   
Output: C = A2 mod F 
1. ∑ −== 11 22mi ii xaT  
2. C = T mod F    // use algorithm 2.8 
3. return (C(x)) 
Algorithm 2. 10: Bit-level method for squaring in )2( mGF  
 
A known technique for speeding up the computation in step 1 is to use a table 




Inversion. The basic algorithm for computing multiplicative inverses is the extended 
Euclidean algorithm. A high level description of this method is the following: 
 
Input: A(x) ∈ )2( mGF , (A(x) ≠ 0) and 0121 ...... fffffF mmm −−=   
Output: C = A-1 mod F 
1. set B1(x) = 1, B2(x) = 0 
          set P1(x) = A(x), P2(x) = F(x) 
2. while degree(P1(x)) ≠  0 do 
        if degree(P1(x)) < degree(P2(x))   then 
                  Exchange P1(x),P2(x) and B1(x) B2(x) 
                   j = degree(P1(x)) – degree(P2(x)) 
                  )()()( 211 xPxxPxP
j+= , )()()( 211 xBxxBxB j+=  
3. return (C(x)=  B1(x)) 
Algorithm 2. 11: Inversion using extended Euclidean algorithm in )2( mGF . 
 
An alternative method for computing inverses, called the almost inverse 
algorithm, was proposed by Schroeppel et al [70]. This method works quite well when the 
reduction polynomial is a trinomial of the form 1++ km xx  with k > W and m – k > W, 
where W is the word size of the computer used. The authors suggested a number of 
implementation tricks that can be used for improving the speed of this method. Many of 
these tricks also work for the extended Euclidean algorithm. However, in the context of 
elliptic curve computations, most of the inversions required can be avoided be using 
projective coordinates (see chapter 5). 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
 In this chapter, the basic theory behind finite fields has been presented. The 
construction of finite fields has been illustrated and the representation of finite field 
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elements has been considered. Also, the finite fields GF(p) and GF(2m) were defined. The 
basic arithmetic operations for these two finite fields were studied and the algorithms for 






Elliptic Curve Arithmetic 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we present fundamentals of the theory of elliptic curves defined 
over finite fields. Curve arithmetic is defined in terms of underlining field operations 
discussed in chapter 2. However, based on the group law, elliptic curve can be defined 
over the prime field GF(p) or the binary field GF(2m). In both cases, the two main 
operations of elliptic curve are the addition and doubling operations. Figure 3.1 shows the 
hierarchal organization of curve operations in terms of finite field operations. 
 
Figure 3. 1: Hierarchal organization of elliptic curve arithmetic. 
 
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives an 
introduction to elliptic curves. Section 3.3 presents the basic fundamentals of group low. 











Elliptic curve over the prime field GF(p) and the binary field )2( mGF  are discussed in 
sections 3.4 and 3.5 respectively. Finally, we conclude this chapter in section 3.6.  
 
3.2 Introduction to Elliptic Curves 
Definition 3.1: Let E be an elliptic curve defined over the finite field K denoted by E/K. 






2 axaxaxyaxyay +++=++     3.1 
 Where, 64321 ,,,, aaaaa  ∈ K. 
For GF(p), we get the simplified Weierstrass of the elliptic curve equation 3.1.  
E/K: 64
32 axaxy ++=        3.2 
However, there are several ways of defining equations for elliptic curves, which 
depend on whether the field is a prime finite field, pF , or a binary (characteristic 2) finite 
field, )2( mGF . The Weierstrass equation for both finite fields GF(p) and )2( mGF  are 
described in sections 3.4 and 3.5 respectively. 
Additional information on elliptic curves and its applications to cryptography can 
be found in [9], [13], [14] and [15]. 
 
3.3 Group Law 
 Let E be an elliptic curve defined over the field K denoted by E/K. There is a 
chord-and-tangent rule for adding tow points in E/K to give a third point in E/K. together 
with this addition operation, the set of points in E/K forms an abelian group with ∞ 
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serving as its identity. The group (E/K,+)  consists of a finite set of points P(x,y) that 
satisfy the elliptic curve equation 3.2 together with a point at infinity. The x and y 
coordinates of any point as well as the coefficients of elliptic curve equation, 64 ,aa , are 
elements of K. The group (E/K,+) is the algebraic group that is used to construct elliptic 
curve cryptosystem.  
Addition operation, + , is best explained geometrically. Let ),( 11 yxP =  and 
),( 22 yxQ =  be two distinct points on an elliptic curve E. Then the sum R of P and Q is 
defined as follows: 
1. Draw a line through P and Q. This line intersects the elliptic curve at a third 
point R . 
2. R is the reflection of R  around the x-axis. 
The double R, of P, is defined as follows: 
1. Draw the tangent line to the elliptic curve at P. This line intersects the elliptic 
curve at a third point R . 
2. R is the reflection of R  around the x-axis. 
The algebraic formulations of the group law can be derived from the geometric 
description. In the next two sections, we present the algebraic formulations of the group 
law of elliptic curve over finite fields GF(p) and )2( mGF . 
 
3.4 Elliptic Curve Over Prime Field GF(p) 
Definition 3.2: Let P > 3 be an odd prime and let a, b ∈ GF(p) satisfy 
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)(mod0274 23 pba ≠+ . Then an elliptic curve E over a finite prime field GF(p) , 
denoted by E/GF(p), is defined by an equation: 
E/GF(p): baxxy ++= 32        3.3 
where parameters a, b ∈ GF(p).  
Comments in definition 3.2 
(i) Equation 3.3 is called Weierstrass equation with aa =4  and ba =6 . 
(ii) We say that E is defined over GF(p) because the coefficients a and b are 
elements of GF(p). GF(p) is called the underlining field. 
(iii) The notion E/GF(p) (or E( pF )) is used to emphasize that E is defined over 
GF(p).  
(iv) The set of points of an elliptic curve E/GF(p) are  the points (or solutions) P = 
(x, y) (where x, y ∈ GF(p)) that satisfy equation 3.3 together with a special 
point called the point at inanity, ∞.  
(v) The point ∞ is the only point on the line at infinity (∞ and –∞) that satisfies the 
projective form of the Weierstrass equation. 
(vi) For a given point ),( 111 yxP = , 1x  is called the x-coordinate of 1P  and 1y  is 
called the y-coordinate of 1P . 
The algebraic formulas of group law for E/GF(p) are specified as follows: 
1. Identity: P + ∞ = ∞ + P  =  P for all P ∈ E/GF(p). 
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2. Inverse: if ),( yxP =  ∈ E/GF(p), then ),(),( yxyx −+  = ∞. The point ),( yx − is 
denoted by –P and is called the inverse of P. Note that –P is indeed a point in 
E/GF(p). Also, – ∞ = ∞. 
3. Point Addition (denoted by ADD): Let ),( 11 yxP =  ∈ E/GF(p) and ),( 22 yxQ =  ∈ 
E/GF(p) be two points satisfying the elliptic curve equation 3.3 where QP ±≠ . 




















     3.4 
4. Point doubling (denoted by DBL): Let ),( 11 yxP =  ∈ E/GF(p) be a point satisfying 























      3.5 
From the above formulas, we get the following results: 
• If ),(),( 1122 yxyx −= , then )),((),(),( 111133 yxyxyx −+=  = ∞. 
• If ),( 22 yx  = ∞, then += ),(),( 1133 yxyx  ∞ ),( 11 yx= . 
• ),( 11 yx−  = ),( 11 yx − . 
Example 3.1: Elliptic curve over the prime field GF(29). 
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 Let P = 29 (hence we have finite field GF(29) (or 29F )) and the elliptic curve 
coefficients a and b are 4 and 20 respectively. The elliptic curve equation 3.3 becomes:  
 20432 ++= xxy  
First, note that )(mod0274 23 pba ≠+  is satisfied. That is, 
7)29(mod11056)29(mod202744 23 ==×+×  which ≠ (0 mod 29). 
 To get the points of  E/GF(29), consider all possible values of x which are in the 
range from 0 to 28 and compute the corresponding y value by using equation 3.3 with a = 
4 and b = 20. Note that all operations are performed modulo 29. For example, 
• When x = 0, 20002 ++=y  = 20 = 20 (mod 29), and )29(mod20=y . There 
are two solutions: 
• y = 7 since 7 × 7 = 49 = 20 (mod 29). i.e. the first solution of square root of 20 
(mod 29) is 7. Therefore, the point (0,7) ∈ E/GF(29). 
• y = 22 since 22 × 22 = 484 = 20 (mod 29). i.e. the second solution of square 
root of 20 (mod 29) is 22. Therefore, the point (0,22) ∈ E/GF(29). 
• When x = 10, 201041032 +×+=y  = 1060 = 16 (mod 29), and  
)29(mod16=y . There are two solutions: 
• y = 4 since 4 × 4 = 16 = 16 (mod 29). i.e. the first solution of square root of 16 
(mod 29) is 4. Therefore, the point (10,4) ∈ E/GF(29). 
• y = 25 since 25 × 25 = 625 = 16 (mod 29). i.e. the second solution of square 
root of 16 (mod 29) is 25. Therefore, the point (10,25) ∈ E/GF(29). 
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• When x = 7, 2074732 +×+=y  = 391 = 14 (mod 29). )29(mod14=y  is not 
found. In other words, there is no number in the range from 0 to 29 that when it is 
multiplied by itself gives 14 (mod 29). Therefore points (7, y) ∉ E/GF(29). 
The points in E/GF(29) are the following: 
∞ (2,6) (4,19) (8,10) (13,23) (16,2) (19,16) (27,2) 
(0,7) (2,23) (5,7) (8,19) (14,6) (16,27) (20,3) (27,27) 
(0,22) (3,1) (5,22) (10,4) (14,23) (17,10) (20,26)  
(1,5) (3,28) (6,12) (10,25) (15,2) (17,19) (24,7)  
(1,24) (4,10) (6,17) (13,6) (15,27) (19,13) (24,22)  
 
Point Addition: Let ),( 11 yxP =  = (5,22) and ),( 22 yxQ =  = (16,27) (note that QP ±≠ ). 











yyλ  = 5 × 8 = 40 = 11 (mod 29).  
Note that the inverse of 11 (mod 29) is the number r where 11 × r = 1 (mod 29). 
That number, i.e. r, is 8 since 8 × 11 = 88 = 1 (mod 29). 
100165)11( 221
2
3 =−−=−−= xxx λ  = 13 (mod 29). 
22)135(11)( 1313 −−=−−= yxxy λ  = –110 = 6 (mod 29). 
 Therefore, R = (13,6) which is in E/GF(29). 
31 
 
Remark: to get the modulo of a negative number r mod P, repeat adding P to r until 
getting the first positive number in the range from 0 to P. for example, to get –110 mod 
29, repeat adding 29 to –110 until getting the first positive number in the range from 0 to 
29 which is 6. 
Point doubling: Let ),( 11 yxP =  = (5,22). Then ),(2 33 yxPR ==  is given by: (apply 












axλ  = 21 (mod 29) × 1)15( − (mod 29) = 21 × 2 = 
42 = 13 (mod 29).  
Note that the inverse of 15 (mod 29) is the number r where 15 × r = 1 (mod 29). 
That number, i.e. r, is 2 since 2 × 15 = 30 = 1 (mod 29). 
15910)13(2 21
2
3 =−=−= xx λ  = 14 (mod 29). 
22)145(13)( 1313 −−=−−= yxxy λ  = –139 = 6 (mod 29). 
 Therefore, R = (14,6) which is in E/GF(29).   
 
3.5 Elliptic Curve Over Binary Field GF(2m) 
Definition 3.3: Let )2( mGF  be a finite field of characteristic two. A non-supersingular 
elliptic curve E over )2( mGF , denoted by E/ )2( mGF , is defined to be the set of solutions 
),( yx ∈ )2( mGF  to the equation, 
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E/ )2( mGF : baxxxyy ++=+ 232       3.6 
where a and b ∈ )2( mGF  and b ≠ 0.  
Comments in definition 3.3 
(i) Equation 3.6 is called Weierstrass equation with 11 =a , aa =4  and ba =6 . 
(ii) We say that E is defined over )2( mGF  because the coefficients a and b are 
elements of )2( mGF . )2( mGF  is called the underlining field. 
(iii) The notion E/ )2( mGF  (or E( )2( mGF )) is used to emphasize that E is defined 
over )2( mGF .  
(iv) The set of points of an elliptic curve E/ )2( mGF  are  the points (or solutions) P 
= (x, y) (where x, y ∈ )2( mGF ) that satisfy equation 3.6 together with a 
special point called the point at inanity, ∞.  
(v) The point ∞ is the only point on the line at infinity (∞ and –∞) that satisfies the 
projective form of the Weierstrass equation. 
(vi) For a given point ),( 111 yxP = , 1x  is called the x-coordinate of 1P  and 1y  is 
called the y-coordinate of 1P . 
It is well known that E with the point at infinity, ∞, forms an abelian finite group with ∞ 
serving as the identity element of the group. The algebraic formulas of group law for 
E/ )2( mGF  are specified as follows: 
1. Identity: P + ∞ = ∞ + P  =  P for all P ∈ E/ )2( mGF . 
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2. Inverse: if ),( yxP =  ∈ E/ )2( mGF , then ),(),( yxxyx ++ = ∞. The point 
),( yxx +  is denoted by –P and is called the inverse of P. Note that –P is indeed a 
point in E/ )2( mGF . Also, – ∞ = ∞. 
3. Point Addition (denoted by ADD): Let ),( 11 yxP =  ∈ E/ )2( mGF  and ),( 22 yxQ =  
∈ E/ )2( mGF  be two points satisfying the elliptic curve equation 3.6 where 



















     3.7 
5. Point doubling (denoted by DBL): Let ),( 11 yxP =  ∈ E/ )2( mGF  be a point 



















      3.8 
From the above formulas, we get the following results: 
• If ),(),( 1122 yxyx −= , then )),((),(),( 111133 yxyxyx −+=  = ∞. 
• If ),( 22 yx  = ∞, then += ),(),( 1133 yxyx  ∞ ),( 11 yx= . 
• ),(),( 11111 yxxyx +=− . 
Example 3.2: non-supersingular elliptic curve over the binary field )2( 4GF . 
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 Consider the finite field )2( 4GF  as represented by the reduction polynomial 
1)( 4 ++= zzzf . An element 012233 azazaza +++  ∈ )2( 4GF  is represented by the bit 
string )( 0123 aaaa  of length 4 bits. For example, (0101) represents 1
2 +z .  
 Let elliptic curve coefficients a and b are 3z  and 13 +z  respectively. The elliptic 
curve equation 3.6 becomes: E/ )2( 4GF : 132332 +++=+ zxzxxyy . 
To get the points of  E/ )2( 4GF , consider all possible values of x which are in the 
range from (0000) to (1111) and compute the corresponding y value by using the above 
elliptic equation. Note that all operations are performed modulo the reduction polynomial  
1)( 4 ++= zzzf .  
The points in E/ )2( 4GF  are the following: 
∞ (0011,1100) (1000,0001) (1100,0000) 
(0000,1011) (0011,1111) (1000,1001) (1100,1100) 
(0001,0000) (0101,0000) (1001,0110) (1111,0100) 
(0001,0001) (0101,0101) (1001,1111) (1111,1011) 
(0010,1101) (0111,1011) (1011,0010)  
(0010,1111) (0111,1100) (1011,1001)  
 
Point Addition: Let ),( 11 yxP =  = (0010,1111) and ),( 22 yxQ =  = (1100,1100) (note that 
QP ±≠ ). Then ),( 33 yxQPR =+=  = (0001,0001) (apply addition formula 3.7). 
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Point doubling: Let ),( 11 yxP =  = (0010,1111). Then ),(2 33 yxPR ==  is (1011,0010) 
(apply doubling formula 3.8)   
 
3.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have presented the fundamentals of the theory of elliptic curves 
defined over finite fields. Hierarchal organization of curve operations in terms of finite 
field operations has been introduced. Also, defining an elliptic curve over the prime field 
GF(p) and over the binary field GF(2m) has been discussed with providing an example for 






Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 The security of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) in based on the apparent 
intractability of Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) [9]. To date, that 
there are no sub-exponential algorithms for the ECDLP known. This means that we can 
use shorter keys (compared to other cryptosystems) for high security levels. However, to 
establish an ECC, several main aspects need to be discussed. The main purpose of this 
chapter is to present these main aspect which are necessary for any environment that 
wishes to use ECC. 
 To setup an ECC, domain parameters such as the curve coefficients a and b and 
the base point should be selected and verified. These parameters are used to establish a 
cryptography system whether this system is a symmetric key or public key cryptography. 
Also, a curial operation in ECC is the scalar multiplication (or point multiplication) in 
which a base point P is added to itself K times. This point multiplication is performed 
based on the group law discussed in chapter 3.   
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Since this thesis considers both the elliptic curve defined over the prime field 
E/GF(p) and over the binary field E/GF(2m), we use the following common notation: 
E/GF(q) , where q = p or q = 2m, to denote both cases. Whenever "E/GF(q)" appears, it 
means that the related subject is applicable to both E/GF(p) and E/GF(2m). 
 This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the ECDLC. Elliptic 
curve domain parameters are presented in section 4.3. Elliptic curve cryptosystems 
namely, elliptic curve symmetric and public cryptography are discussed in section 4.4. 
Scalar multiplication and the most popular algorithms to perform it are the subject of 
section 4.5. Finally, conclusions are drawn in section 4.6. 
 
4.2 Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) 
ECDLP is defined as follows: Given an elliptic curve E/GF(q), a point P ∈ 
E/GF(q) of order n and a point Q ∈ E/GF(q), determine the integer K satisfying Q = K P, 
provided that such 0 ≤ K  ≤ n-1 exists. The integer K  is called the discrete logarithm of Q 
to the base P, denoted QK Plog= . 
To date, the most efficient general algorithm to resolve the ECDLP is Pollard-ρ 
[17] algorithm, which has the running time )/( rnΟ , where r is the parallel processor 
number.  
Another possible attack known on the ECDLP is the combination of the Pohlig-
Hellman algorithm [16] and Pollard-ρ algorithm where the computation of K  is reduced 
to the problem of computing K  modulo each prime factor of n. So if n is a large prime, 
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the ECDLP becomes harder. In practice, one must carefully select elliptic curve 
parameters (section 4.2) such as selecting a base point that has large prime order n and 
curve order  #E/GF(q) = n ×  h, where h is a small integer.   
 It is well known that the security of any cryptosystems depends mainly on the 
hardness of the mathematical underlining problem that the cryptosystems is based on. 
Fore example, Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) 3  cryptosystem is based on integer 
factorization problem. An instance of integer factorization problem is an integer n that is a 
product of two L/2 bits  primes. The best algorithm known for solving the integer 
factorization problem is the Number Field Sieve (NFS) [9] which has sub-exponential 
time.   On the other hand, The best algorithm to solve the ECDLP is the combination of 
the Pohlig-Hellman [16] and Pollard’s ρ algorithms [17], which has a fully-exponential 
running time. This means that significantly smaller parameters can be used in ECC than in 
RSA system, but with equivalent levels of security. A typical example of the size in bits 
of the keys used, is that a l60-bit ECC key is equivalent to RSA with a modulus of 1024 
bits. Thus ECC offers potential reductions in the number of required arithmetic operations, 
storage space, bandwidth and electrical power. These advantages are specially important 




                                                 
3 In RSA, one has a public key (e, n), a prime number P, and a private key 01...kkK n−= .When creating an 
encrypted message C one has to compute C = Pe mod n. Decryption is done by P = Cd mod n. The modular 
exponentiation is usually done by the square-and-multiply algorithm. 
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4.3 ECC Domain Parameters 
Before we introduce the ECC domain parameters, It is necessary to present some basic 
facts and concepts of ECC.  
• Order of point P ∈ E/GF(q) is the smallest integer r such that rP = ∞. 
• Order of the curve, is the number of points of E/GF(q), donated by #E/GF(q).  
Note that the curve order can be computed by Schoof's algorithm [9] or its 
improvements, which is needed if one selects a random curve. And normally 
choosing a and b to make the curve order have a large prime factor can improve 
the cryptography scheme's security. So, this is an important parameter of the 
scheme to determine the system's security. 
• Hasse Theorem: let E be an elliptic curve defined over GF(p). then the curve order 
#E/GF(p) is bounded by: 
≤−+ pp 21  #E/GF(p) pp 21++≤  
Elliptic curve parameters over the finite field GF(p) or GF(2m) can be described by 
the following 6-tuple: 
T = (q, FR, a, b, G, n, h)   
Where: 




• FR: the field representation, i.e., using which method to represent the elements in 
the field (polynomial basis or normal basis for GF(2m), or normal or Montgomery 
residue for GF(p)). 
• a, b: the curve coefficients, depending on the security requirement. 
• G: the base point, G = ( GG yx , ), one element in E/GF(q), which has the largest 
order n. 
• n: the order of G, large prime. Also, the order of the curve, N = #E/GF(q), is 
divisible by n. 
• h: # E/GF(q)/n. 
These parameters should be chosen to setup an ECC system. 
 
4.4 Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem 
Given a message point ),( mm yx , a base point ( GG yx , ), and a given key, K, the 
cipher point ),( CC yx  is obtained using the following equation, 
),(),(),( GGmmCC yxKyxyx +=       4.1 
There are two basics steps in the computation of the above equations. The first is 
to find the scalar multiplication (section 4.5) of the base point with the key,  )",(" GG yxK .  
The resulting point is then added to the message point, ),( mm yx  to obtain the cipher point.   
At the receiver, the message point is recovered from the cipher point which is 
usually transmitted, the shared key and the base point, that is 
),(),(),( GGCCmm yxKyxyx −=       4.2 
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4.4.1 Symmetric Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
The steps of elliptic curve symmetric cryptography can be summarized as follows: 
Both the sender and receiver must agree on: 
1. A random number, K, that will be the shared secret key for communication,  
2. A base point, ),( GG yxG = . 
At the sending correspondent:  
1 Embed a message bit string into the x-coordinate of an elliptic curve point 
which is designated as the message point, ),( mm yx . 
2 The cipher point ),( cc yx is computed using, 
),(),(),( GGmmcc yxKyxyx +=  
3 The appropriate bits of the x-coordinate and the sign bit of the y-coordinate of 
the cipher point ),( cc yx  are sent to the receiving entity. 
At the receiving correspondent, the following steps are performed, 
1. Using the shared key, K, and the base point ),( GG yx , the scalar multiplication 
),( GG yxKKG =  is computed. 
2. The message point ),( mm yx  is computed using,  
)),((),(),( GGccmm yxKyxyx −+=  






4.4.2 Public Key Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
Before we proceed to see how two entities can communicate using elliptic curve 
public key cryptography, we first have to show how the private and public keys are 
generated and verified and then how the sending and receiving entities agree on a key. For 
the following, let A denotes the sending entity and B denotes the receiving entity.  
Key Generation. We mean by key generation is to generate the public and private key 
pair. Given the domain parameters (q, FR, a, b, G, n, h), each entity does the following: 
Sending entity, A: 
1. Selects a random integer Ad  from the interval [1,n – 1]. 
2. Computes GdQ AA = . (It is a scalar multiplication step, ),( GGAA yxdQ = ). 
Ad  is the private key and AQ  is the public key of A.  
Similarly, B computes Bd  and BQ  as its private and public key pair. 
Key Validation. We mean by key validation is to validate the public key's legality. Entity 
A does the following: 
1. Check that BQ  ≠ ∞. 








y denote the x-coordinate and 
y-coordinate of the point BQ . 
3. Check that BQ  lies on the elliptic curve defined by a and b; 
4. Check that n BQ  = ∞. (note that, n BQ  = n( Bd G) = Bd (nG) = Bd ∞ = ∞, because 
G's order is n) 
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The public key validation without Step 4 is called the partial public-key validation. 
Without Step 4, the entity could be attacked. However, we can carefully select h to reduce 
the threat. 
Key agreement scheme. One of the most popular key agreement schemes  is the Diffie-
Hellman key agreement scheme [9]. Table 4.1 shows the steps taken by each entity. 
By end of step 3, in table 4.1,each entity get the same shared secret point 
),( PP yx . That is, A computes: GddGddQdP BABABA )()( ===  and 
B computes: GddGddGddQdP BAABABAB )()()( ==== .  
 
Table 4. 1 : Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme 
Step Description Entity A Entity B 
1 Choose random private key Ad =rand(1,n – 1) Bd =rand(1,n – 1) 
2 Compute public key from the private key and 
the base point G. Then each entity publishes 
its public key. 
GdQ AA =  GdQ BB =  
3 Generate Common key. Each entity 
computes the common key using its private 
key and the public key of the other entity. 
),( PPBA yxQdP ==  ),( PPAB yxQdP ==
 
 
The steps of elliptic curve public key cryptography can be summarized as follows: 
Both the sender and receiver must agree on: 
1. An elliptic curve. 2. A base point, ),( GG yxG = . 
 
At the sending correspondent: 
 
1. Embed a message bit string into the x-coordinate of an elliptic curve point which 
is designated as the message point, ),( mm yx . 
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2.  Using the steps (entity A) in table 4.1, compute the shared secret point 
),( PP yxP = . 
3. Compute a cipher point ),( cc yx  using: ),(),(),( PPmmcc yxyxyx += .  
4. Send appropriate bits of the x-coordinate and the sign bit of the y-coordinate of the 
cipher point ),( cc yx  to the receiving correspondent; 
At the receiving correspondent: 
1. Using the steps (entity B) in table 4.1, compute the shared secret point 
),( PP yxP = . 
2. Compute the message point ),( mm yx  using ),(),(),( PPccmm yxyxyx −= . 
3. Recover the message bit string from xm  
 
4.5 Scalar Multiplication 
Scalar multiplication (SM) (or point multiplication) is the result of adding the base 
point4 P to itself K times on the elliptic curve over a given finite field, where K is a 
positive integer. That is 
4434421
timesK
PPPKP ++= ......         4.3 
The integer K is referred to as scalar and the point P as the base point.  
However, adding the point P to itself K times is not an efficient way to compute 
scalar multiplication. More efficient methods are based on a sequence of Addition (ADD) 
                                                 
4 We mean by base point here, is a base point for the scalar multiplication and not the base point G in the 
domain parameters. This is because scalar multiplication can be performed to any point whether this point is 
G or any other point P 
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and Doubling (DBL) operations. Note that doubling operation is simply adding the point 
to itself. In the literature, there are many methods (or algorithms) for computing KP or 
equivalently performing the scalar multiplication. In the following subsections, we present 
the most popular scalar multiplication algorithms. However, it is worth to mention that 
each of theses algorithms can be applied to E/GF(p) and E/GF(2m). 
 









n ++++ −−−−  be the binary representation of the 
scalar K where }1,0{∈ik  is the i-th bit and n is the total number of bits. Hence, the scalar 











2   
which can be expanded to one of the following forms: 






1 2.......22 ++++= −−−−    4.4 
     PkPkPkPkKP nn 0121 )...)))(2(2(...2(2 ++++= −−    4.5 
Based on 4.4 and 4.5, there are two main binary methods of calculating KP. The 
first is the Least-to-Most (LM) algorithm, which corresponds to the expansion in 4.4, 
starts from the least significant bit of K to the most significant one. The second is the 
Most-to-Least (ML) algorithm, which corresponds to the expansion in 4.5, starts from the 





Algorithm 4. 1: Least-to-Most (LM) binary algorithm for scalar multiplication 
 
 
Algorithm 4. 2: Most-to- Least (ML) binary algorithm for scalar multiplication 
 
In both algorithms, KP is computed using the straightforward double-and-add 
approach in n iterations. The point doubling operation (DBL) is performed in all cases 
regardless of the scalar bit value, while the ADD operation is conditioned by the scalar bit 
value. If the scalar bit value is 1, ADD is performed; otherwise it is not performed. 
 
4.5.2 Window Methods 
Several generalizations of the binary method work by processing simultaneously a 
block of digits. In these methods, depending on the size of the blocks (or windows) a 
INPUT K, P 
OUTPUT    KP 
1. Initialize Q[0] = P 
2. for i = n-2 downto 0 
3.      Q[0] = DBL(Q[0]) 
4.      if k[i] = 1 then 
5.          Q[0] = ADD(Q[0],P) 
6.      end if 
7. end for 
8. return Q[0]  
INPUT K, P 
OUTPUT    KP 
1. Initialize Q[0] = ∞ , Q[1] = P 
2. for i = 0 to n-1 
3.       if k[i] = 1 then 
4.              Q[0] = ADD(Q[0],Q[1]) 
5.        end if 
6.       Q[1] = DBL(Q[1]) 
7. end for 
8. return Q[0]  
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number of precomputed points are required. However, the most popular window methods 
presented in this subsection are: m-ary, modified m-ary and sliding window methods. 
 
4.5.2.1 The m-ary Method 
This method uses the m-ary expansion of K where rm 2=  for some integer r ≥  1. 
The binary method is a special case of m-ary method corresponding to r = 1. The scalar  








j mkK , jk  ∈ {0, 1, 2, …, m-1}. 
The m-ary method of computing KP is shown in algorithm 4.3. 








j mkK and a point P = (x,y) ∈ E/GF(q) 
Output: The point Q = KP ∈ E/GF(q) 
// Precomputation: 
1. P1 = P 
2. for i = 2 to m – 1 do 
          Pi = Pi-1 + P            // (we have Pi  = iP) 
3. Q = ∞ 
// Main loop 
4. for j = n - 1 downto 0 do 
5.            Q = [m]Q             //(this requires r doublings) 




Algorithm 4. 3: m-ary method for scalar multiplication 
 
It can be readily verified that the algorithm computes KP, following Horner's rule [16]:  
PkPkPkPkmmmmKP nn 0121 )...)))](]([](...[]([[ ++++= −−  
The number of doubling in the main loop of the m-ary method is (d – 1)r (the first 
iteration is not counted, as it starts with Q = ∞ ). Since ⎡ ⎤rnd /= , where n is the length 
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of the binary representation of K, the number of doublings in the m-ary method may be up 
to (r – 1) less than the (n – 1) required by the binary method. However, it needs to pre-
compute and store the points 2P to [m-1]P. 
 
4.5.2.2 The Modified m-ary Method 
The main disadvantage of the m-ary method is that it requites pre-computing and 
storing the points 2P, 3P, …, [m-1]P. This disadvantage can be reduced to only 
computing and saving the odd multiples of P only (i.e. skipping the even multiples of P in 
the precomputation phase) resulting in the modified m-ary method shown in algorithm 4.4.  
 







j mkK and a point P= (x,y) ∈ E/GF(q) 
Output: The point Q = KP ∈ E/GF(q) 
// Precomputation: 
1. P1 = P,     P2 = P 
2. for i = 1 to (m – 2) / 2 do 
         21212 PPP ii += −+  
3. Q = ∞. 
// Main loop 
4. for j = n - 1 downto 0 do 
5.              If jk  ≠ 0 then 
6.                        Let js , jh  be such that j
s
j hk j2= , jh  odd. 
7.                       Q = [ jsr−2 ]Q 
8.                       Q = Q  + 
jh
P  
9.              Else  js  = r 
10.            Q = [ js2 ]Q 
Return (Q) 




In the modified m-ary method, computation of mP (step 5 of algorithm 4.3) is split 
into two steps (steps 7 and 8) as shown algorithm 4.4. However, in algorithm 4.4, we 
assume that r > 1, otherwise we revert to the original binary method. 
 
4.5.2.3 Sliding Window Method 
 In the m-ary and modified m-ary methods, the windows are contiguous and in 
fixed bit positions. When a window has zeros in the left most bit positions, it is treated as 
any other window. However, in the sliding window methods, the left most zeros of any 
window are dropped and corresponding doubling operations are performed in the 
accumulator point Q. Therefore, the window size can shrink and grow up to length r.   









jkK , jk  ∈ {0, 1}. 
and computing KP using this method is shown in algorithm 4.5. 
In the main while loop of algorithm 4.5, the bits of the K are scanned starting from 
the most significant bit and based on the value of each bit one of two things may 
performed: 
1. If jk  = 0, then perform a double operation on the point Q (step 5).  
2. If jk  ≠ 0, (i.e jk  = 1) then: 
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a. Consider a window of size up to r bits such that the contents of this 
window is 21 )......( tjjj kkkh −=  where j is the current bit position and t is 
the least integer such that j – t + 1 ≤  r and tk  = 1. 
b. Update the value of the point Q as shown in step 9. 
 








jkK and a point P= (x,y) ∈ E/GF(q) 
Output: The point Q = KP ∈ E/GF(q) 
// Precomputation: 
1. P1 = P,     P2 =2P 
2. for i = 1 to )12( 1 −−r  do 
         21212 PPP ii += −+  
3. Q = ∞   ,      j = n – 1. 
// Main loop 
4. While j ≥ 0  do 
5.              If jk  = 0 then         
                      Q = [2]Q;        j = j – 1; 
6.              Else 
7.                       Let t be the least integer such that 
                                   j – t + 1 ≤ r and tk  = 1 
8.                       21 )......( tjjj kkkh −=  
9.                       Q = [ 12 +−tj ]Q + 
jh
P  
10.                      j = t – 1 
Return (Q) 
 
Algorithm 4. 5: Sliding window method for scalar multiplication 
 
 
4.5.3 Scalar Recoding Methods 
We main by scalar recoding is transforming the scalar K to another form K  such 
that it still gives the correct result of computing KP. i.e. KP = K P but with less 
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computations. One popular recoding of any integer (rather than the scalar) is the non-
adjacent form (NAF) recoding. In NAF, every integer K has a unique signed digit 
representation of the form ∑ −== 10 2li iikK  where ik  ∈ {-1,0,1}, such that no two 
consecutive digits are nonzero [9]. However, there are several algorithms for computing 
the NAF of K from its binary representation (see for example [8] and [9]). The following 
algorithm (algorithm 4.6), from Solinas [18] computes the NAF of an integer K.  
 
Input: an integer K 
Output: The NAF form of K, NAF(K) = (ul-1 … u1u0) 
1. Set c = K,    l = 0 
2. While c > 0 do 
            if c odd then  
                   Set ul = 2 – (c mod 4) 
                   Set c = c – ul 
             Else ul = 0 
             Set c = c/2,   l = l + 1 
Return (NAF(K) = (ul-1 … u1u0)) 
Algorithm 4. 6: Computation of NAF(K) 
 
A general form of NAF(K) is what is called the width-w nonadjacent form or 
width-w NAF. Let w be an integer greater than one. Then every positive number K has a 









juK  Where: 
• Each nonzero ju  is odd and less than 12 −w  in absolute value. 
• Among any w consecutive coefficients, at most one is non zero. 
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The width-w NAF is written as ).....()( 0121 uuuuKNAF llw −−= . A generalized version of 
algorithm 4.6 for computing )(KNAFw  is described in algorithm 4.7. 
 
Input: an integer K 
Output: ).....()( 0121 uuuuKNAF llw −−=  
1. Set c = K,    l = 0 
2. While c > 0 do 
            if c odd then  
                   ul = 2 – (c mod 2w) 
                   If ul > 2w-1 then 
                        ul = ul – 2w 
                   c = c – ul 
             Else ul = 0 
             c = c/2,   l = l + 1 
Return ( ).....()( 0121 uuuuKNAF llw −−← ) 
Algorithm 4. 7: Computation of )(KNAFw  
 
Many scalar multiplication algorithms have been proposed based on NAF(K) and 
)(KNAFw  representations of the scalar [8], [9], [18] and [19]. Addition-subtraction 
algorithm (section 4.3.3.1) and width-w window algorithm (section 4.3.3.2) are examples 
of using these representations respectively. 
 
4.5.3.1 Addition-Subtraction Algorithms 
An improved algorithm for computing KP can be obtained from the following facts:  
• Every integer K has a unique NAF representation.  
• The expected weight of a NAF of length l is l/3 [9].  
• The computation of the negation of a point P = (x; y) ∈ E/GF(p) is simply the 
negation of its y-coordinate (i.e. – P = (x; –y)) which  is virtually free. So the cost 
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of addition or subtraction is practically the same. In case of E/GF(2m), –P is 
computed by replacing y-coordinate by (x+y). 
Addition-subtraction algorithm requires computing the NAF representation of the 
scalar K. It performs a point addition or subtraction depending on the sign of each digit of 
K as shown in Algorithm 4.8. This algorithm scans the NAF representation of the scalar K 
(which has now l bits rather than n) from left to right and requires l doublings and l /3 
additions on average. However, this algorithm can be modified to obtain a right-to-left 
version [18], which does not need storage for the NAF(K). 
 
Input: An integer K an a point P = (x,y) ∈ E/GF(q) 
Output: The point Q = KP ∈ E/GF(q) 
1. Use algorithm 4.6 to compute NAF(K) = (ul-1 … u1u0) 
2. Q = ∞ 
2. for j = l - 1 downto 0 do 
            Q = DBL(Q) 
            if ul = 1  then  
                   Q = ADD(Q, P) 
            if ul = –1  then  
                   Q = ADD(Q, – P) 
Return (Q) 
Algorithm 4. 8: Binary NAF algorithm (addition-subtraction) for scalar multiplication 
 
4.5.3.2 Width-w Window Method 
Given the width-w NAF of an integer K, and a point ∈ E/GF(p), the calculation of 
KP can be carried out by using a typical window method called the width-w window 
method [18] shown in algorithm 4.9. 
The number of nonzero digits in the )(KNAFw  is on the average l/(w + 1) [20]. 
Therefore, algorithm 4.9 requires 12 2 −−w  additions and one doubling for the 
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precomputation step, and (l/(w + 1)) additions and (l – 1) doublings for the main 
computation. Note that although the number of additions can be reduced by selecting an 
appropriate width w, the number of doublings is the same as in the previous methods. The 
total number of finite fields operations required for computing KP depends mainly on the 
algorithms used for the elliptic operations (affine or projective coordinates), the cost-ratio 
of inversion to multiplication, and the width w. 
 
Input: integers K and w, a point P = (x,y) ∈ E/GF(q) 
Output: The point Q = KP ∈ E/GF(q) 
// Precomputation: 
// Compute uP for u odd and 122 −<< wu  
1. P0 = P, T = 2P 
2. for i = 1 to 12 2 −−w  do 
          Pi = Pi-1 + T 
// Main computation 
3. Use algorithm 4.7 to compute ).....()( 0121 uuuuKNAF llw −−←  
4. Q = ∞ 
5. for j = l - 1 downto 0 do 
            Q = DBL(Q) 
            if uj ≠  0  then  
                     2/)1( −= jui  
                     if uj >  0  then 
                            Q = ADD(Q, Pi) 
                      Else 
                            Q = ADD(Q,–Pi) 
Return (Q) 




4.5.4 Lim/Lee Method 
This method, developed by Lim and Lee [21], can be used for computing KP when 
P is a fixed point, known in advance of the computation. In order to compute KP, the l-bit 
integer K is divided into h blocks Kr, each one of length a = ⎡ ⎤hl / . In addition, each 








































t IsGKP  
Where the precomputation array G[s][u] for 0 ≤ s < v, 0 ≤ u < 2h and 201 )...( uuu h−= , is 










r PuuG , 
]][0[2]][[ uGusG sb=  










tbsvbrts kI  
A detailed description of Lim/Lee’s method is given in algorithm 4.10. This 
algorithm requires )12( −hv  elliptic points of storage, and the average number of 
operations to perform a scalar multiplication is (b – 1) doublings and ( 12/)12( −− vbhh ) 
additions on average, but (vb – 1) additions in the worst case. The selection of both 
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parameters h and v presents a trade-off between precomputation (memory) and online 
computations (speed). Some improvements to this algorithm are discussed in [22]. 
 
Input: Integers K, h, v and an array of points G[s][u],with huvs 21,0 <≤<≤  
Output: The point Q = KP ∈ E/GF(q) 
// The array G is computed as: 
for u = 1 to 12 −h  do 
for s = 0 to v – 1 do 










sb PuusG  
// Main computation 
1. Q = ∞ 
2. for t = b - 1 downto 0 do 
Q = DBL(Q) 











ts kI  
if Is,t ≠  0  then 
Q = ADD(Q, G[s][ Is,t]) 
Return (Q) 
Algorithm 4. 10: Lim/Lee method for scalar multiplication 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
 In this chapter, the basic aspects behind elliptic curve cryptography has been 
introduced. ECDLP has been defined as the mathematical underlining problem of ECC. 
The ECC domain parameters were presented. We concluded that careful selection of these 
parameters plays a certain role in ECC security. The most important elliptic curve 
cryptography schemes, symmetric key and public key, are studied. The detailed steps to 
establish a secure communication between two entities using these two schemes are 
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addressed. Finally, in this chapter, the main operation in ECC, scalar multiplication, is 










The most difficult finite field operation to implement is inversion. An efficient  
hardware implementations in GF(2m) costs [52]5: 
⎣ ⎦ 1)1()1(log2 −−+− mwm  multiplications ;   1−m  squaring 
Where w(m – 1) denotes the number of ones in the binary representation of        (m 
– 1). It is reported in [52] that the number of multiplications and squaring needed to 
compute inversions in the NIST binary fields GF(2163) and GF(2232) to be: 
m ⎣ ⎦)1(log2 −m w(m – 1) Multiplication Squaring 
163 7 3 9 162 
233 7 4 10 232 
 
In software implementation, the inversion is estimated to be between 9 and 30 
multiplications in case of GF(p) with p larger than 100 bits [23]. 
                                                 
5 It is derived based on the fact: 221 −− = maa  with a ∈GF(2m). Then recursively compute ( )2121 1−− −= maa  
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Therefore, one of the most important techniques that can be used to enhance the 
scalar multiplication is the idea of transferring the point coordinates into another 
coordinates that can eliminate the inversion operation. 
Deciding which point Coordinate System (CS) to use is also one of the crucial 
decisions when implementing elliptic curve cryptosystem. The point coordinate system 
used for addition and doubling of points on the elliptic curve determines the efficiency of 
these operations, and hence the efficiency of the basic cryptographic operation, scalar 
multiplication.  
This chapter discusses the various coordinates that can be used in order to 
eliminate the inverse operation in the scalar multiplication and hence increase the speed of 
calculations. We still need one final inverse operation to return back to the normal 
(Affine) coordinates after completing the scalar multiplication. However, there are five 
different coordinate systems [23] - [25]: Affine (A), Homogenous Projective (H), Jacobian 
(J), Chudnovsky-Jacobian (C), Modified (M) and mixed coordinate systems. The 
computation times in terms of number of multiplications (M), squaring (S), and inverse (I) 
operations are computed for each coordinate system. For simplicity we will not consider 
the addition, subtraction and multiplication by a small constant because they are very fast 
compared to multiplication, squaring and inversion operations.  
Affine coordinates are the simplest to understand and are used for communication 
between two parties because they require the lowest bandwidth. However, the modular 
inversions required when adding and doubling points which are represented using Affine 
coordinates cause them to be highly inefficient for use in addition and doubling of points. 
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The other coordinate systems require at least one extra value (i.e. z-coordinate) to 
represent a point and do not require the use of modular inversions in point addition and 
doubling, but extra multiplications and squaring are required instead. When referring to 
the Affine CS, small liters are used, i.e. x, y, and capital liters, i.e. X, Y, Z, are used when 
referring to the remaining coordinate systems.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Affined coordinate system is discussed in 
section 5.2. Sections 5.3 to 5.7 present homogenous, Jacobian, Chudnovsky-Jacobian, 
modified Jacobian and mixed  coordinate systems. In section 5.8 conclusions are provided. 
 
5.2 Affine Coordinates 
Let: 
 ECE:     y2 = x3 + ax + b  (a,b ∈ GF(p), 4a3 + 27b2 ≠ 0).   5.1 
be the equation of elliptic curve E over Fp. We will refer to this equation as ECE. 
Let: P = (x1,y1), Q = (x2,y2) are points on E, and we want to fined R = P + Q = (x3,y3). 
The affine formulas for addition and doubling are given below: 
• The addition formulas (R = P + Q = (x3,y3) where (P ≠ ±Q)) is given by: 
x3 = λ2 – x1 – x2 
y3 = λ (x1 – x3) – y1       5.2 
Where: λ = (y2 – y1)/( x2 – x1) 
• The doubling formulas (R = 2P = (x3,y3)) is given by: 
x3 = λ2 – 2 x1  
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y3 = λ (x1 – x3) – y1       5.3 
Where: λ = (3 x12 + a)/(2 y1) 
The computation times for addition and doubling operations using affine 
coordinates are (1I + 2M + 1S) and (1I + 2M + 2S) respectively. 
 
5.3 Homogenous Projective Coordinates 
 In homogenous projective coordinates the following transformation functions are 
used to get the projected X & Y coordinates: 
 
Z
Xx =  and 
Z
Yy =        
The ECE becomes: 
3232 bZaXZXZY ++=         5.4 
In this CS, the points P, Q, and R are represented as follows: 
P = (X1,Y1,Z1), Q = (X2,Y2,Z2), and R = P + Q = (X3,Y3,Z3). 
• The addition formulas are given by: 
( ) 213321321233 ,, ZZvZZYvAZXvuYvAX =−−==    5.5 
 where: 
2112 ZYZYu −= , 2112 ZXZXv −=  and 2123212 2 ZXvvZZuA −−=  
• The doubling formulas are given by (R = 2P): 







1 3XaZw += ,  11ZYs = ,  sYXB 11=  and Bwh 82 −=  
The computation times for addition and doubling operations using homogenous 
coordinates are (12M + 2S) and (7M + 5S) respectively. 
 
5.4 Jacobian Coordinates 
 In Jacobian CS, the following transformation functions are used: 
 2Z
Xx =  and 3Z
Yy =        
The ECE becomes: 
6432 bZaXZXY ++=              5.7  
In this CS, the points P, Q, and R are represented as follows: 
P = (X1, Y1, Z1), Q = (X2, Y2, Z2), and R = P + Q = (X3, Y3, Z3). 









3 ),(,2 =−+−=+−−=   5.8 
 where: 
2
211 ZXU = , 2122 ZXU = , 3211 ZYS = , 3122 ZYS = , 12 UUH −= , and 12 SSr −=  
• The doubling formulas are given by (R = 2P): 
113
4
133 2),(8, ZYZTSMYYTX =−+−==          5.9 
 where: 2114 YXS = ,  41213 aZXM += ,  and 22 MST +−=  
The computation times for addition and doubling operations using Jacobian 
coordinates are (12M + 4S) and (4M + 6S) respectively. 
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5.5 Chudnovsky-Jacobian Coordinates 
 D. V. Chudnovsky [25] concluded that Jacobian coordinate system provide faster 
doubling and slower addition compared to projective coordinates. In order to speedup 
addition, he proposed the Chudnovsky-Jacobian coordinate system. In this CS, a Jacobian 
point is represented internally as 5-tupel point (X, Y, Z, Z2, Z3). The transformation and 
ECE equations are the same as in Jacobian CS, while the points P, Q, and R represented 
as follows: 
P = (X1, Y1, Z1, Z12, Z13), Q = (X2, Y2, Z2, Z22, Z23), and R = P + Q = (X3, Y3, Z3, Z32, 
Z33).  
The main idea in Chudnovsky-Jacobian coordinate is that the Z2, Z3 are already 
calculated in the previous iteration and no need to calculate them again in the current 
iteration. In other words, Z12, Z13, Z22, Z23 are computed during the previous iteration and 
fed to the current iteration as inputs, while Z32, Z33 need to be calculated. 























3 , ZZZZ ==         
 where: 
2
211 ZXU = , 2122 ZXU = , 3211 ZYS = , 3122 ZYS = , 12 UUH −= , and  
12 SSr −=  













3 , ZZZZ ==  
 where: 2114 YXS = ,  22121 )(3 ZaXM += ,  and 22 MST +−=  
The computation times for addition and doubling operations using Chudnovsky-
Jacobian coordinates are (11M + 3S) and (5M + 6S) respectively. 
 
5.6 Modified Jacobian Coordinates 
 Henri Cohen et. al. modified the Jacobian coordinates and claimed that they got 
the fastest possible point doubling. The term (aZ4) is needed in doubling rather than in 
Addition. Taking this into consideration, they employed the idea of internally representing 
this term and provide it as input to the doubling formula. The point is represented in 4-
tuple representation (X, Y, Z, aZ4). It uses the same transformation equations used in 
Jacobian coordinates.  
The points P, Q, and R are represented as follows: 
P = (X1, Y1, Z1, a Z14), Q = (X2, Y2, Z2, a Z24), and R = P + Q = (X3, Y3, Z3, a Z34) 



















3 aZaZ =        
 where: 
2
211 ZXU = , 2122 ZXU = , 3211 ZYS = , 3122 ZYS = , 12 UUH −= , and 12 SSr −=  
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• The doubling formula is given by (R = 2P): 
11333 2,)(, ZYZUTSMYTX =−−==     5.13 
)(2 41
4
3 aZUaZ =  
 where: 2114 YXS = , 418YU = , 41213 aZXM += ,  and 22 MST +−=  
The computation times for addition and doubling operations using modified 
Jacobian coordinates are (13M + 6S) and (4M + 4S) respectively. 
 
5.7 Mixed Coordinates 
Henri Cohen et al. [23] recommended the idea of mixed coordinates, where the 
inputs and outputs to point additions and doublings may be in different coordinates. i.e. 
with mixed coordinates we can add two points where one point is given in some 
coordinate system and the other point is in some other coordinate system. Also, the result 
point can be computed in a third coordinate system.  
Consider the coordinate systems discussed so far. We have many choices in order to 
mix them in one operation. For example, we can select Affine coordinates for input points 
and the result be in Chudnovsky-Jacobian coordinates. This mixing can be denoted by 
(AAC), where the first two letters denote the input coordinates (Affine) and the third one 
represents the result coordinates (Chudnovsky-Jacobian). In case of doubling, (AM) 
means that the input point is represented in Affine coordinates and the result is in  
Modified coordinates.  However, Cohen does not show the formulas used in case of 
mixing different coordinates. Therefore, considerable effort needs to be spent to derive 
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these equations. He provides the cost of mixed coordinates in terms of number of 
multiplication, squaring and inversion operations required for Addition and Doubling 
operations as shown in Table 5.1 [23]. 
Table 5. 1: Costs of Addition and Doubling operations  
using mixed coordinates 




























































































In order to use mixed coordinates it is necessary to be able to convert a point 
representation from one coordinate system to another. Table 5.2 presents the number of 
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multiplications, squaring, and inversions required to convert a point representation among 
the discussed five coordinate systems.  
Table 5. 2: Point Conversions among different coordinates 
From \ To Affine Projective Jacobean Chudnovsky Modified
Affine - - - - - 
Projective 2M + I - 2M + I 2M + I 2M + I 
Jacobean 3M+S+I 3M+S+I - 2M 3M 
Chudnovsky 3M+S+I 3M+S+I - - 3M 
Modified 3M+S+I 3M+S+I - 2M - 
 
Table 5.2 shows that the conversion from Affine coordinates to any of the other 
coordinate systems is very efficient because the conversions only consist of setting all of 
the Z, Z2 and Z3 coordinates to one, and the aZ4 coordinate to a (the elliptic curve 
parameter). Conversion to or from homogenous projective coordinates is inefficient 
because of the inversion required, as is converting from any of the other coordinate 
systems to affine coordinates. 
 
5.8 Conclusions 
 This chapter has discussed the various coordinates that can be used in order 
to eliminate the inverse operation in the scalar multiplication. Five different coordinate 
systems were studied: Affine (A) CS, Homogenous Projective (P) CS, Jacobian (J) CS, 
Chudnovsky-Jacobian (C) CS, and Modified (M) CS. The computation times in terms of 
number of multiplications (M), squaring (S), and inverses (I) operations were computed 
for each coordinate system. Also, mixed coordinates system in which the inputs and 
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outputs to point additions and doublings may be in different coordinates has been 
illustrated. Comparisons among different coordinate systems and the required operations 






Side Channel Attacks and Countermeasures 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Every computing device acts also as a source of additional information usually 
called side channel leak information (figure 6.1). Depending on its internal computations, 
it consumes different amounts of power, emits different amounts of electromagnetic 
radiations, needs different running times or even produces different types of error 
messages or sounds. All these additional types of information can and have already been 
exploited in attacks.  
 










Side-channel cryptanalysis takes advantage of implementation-specific 
characteristics to recover the secret parameters involved in the computation. It is therefore 
much less general than classical cryptanalysis – since it is specific to a given 
implementation – but often much more powerful, and is considered very seriously by 
cryptographic devices' implementers. 
In this chapter, we survey different types of side channel attacks and the various 
countermeasures known at the time of writing. Also, the classification methods of the 
attacks found in the literature are discussed. Based on that, we propose a new 
classification method according to the type of information being leaked. This 
classification method is used to classify and analyze both the attacks and countermeasures.  
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 gives a 
classification of the various attacks found in the literature. It also presents the proposed 
classification method. Sections 6.4 to 6.8 describe the various side channel attacks, 
namely, fault attacks, timing attacks, power analysis attacks, electromagnetic attacks and 
projective coordinates leak. Section 6.9 presents countermeasures for these attacks. In 
section 6.9, we classify the countermeasures according to the proposed classification. 
Also in this section, we analyze each countermeasure via providing the attacks that it can 
defend, attacks that it cannot defend, its advantages and weaknesses. Finally, conclusions 





6.2 Classification of Side Channel Attacks 
The literature usually classifies side channel attacks depending on the way they 
affect the attacked device. This result in the following two orthogonal axes.  
Invasive vs. non-invasive: invasive attacks require depackaging the chip to get direct 
access to its components; a typical example of this is the connection of a wire on a data 
bus to see the data transfers. A non-invasive attack only exploits externally available 
information  such as running time and power consumption. In [80], Skorobogatov and 
Anderson add a new distinction with what they call semi-invasive attacks. These attacks 
have the specificity that they require depackaging of the chip to get access to the chip 
surface, but do not tamper with the passivation layer –  they do not require electrical 
contact to the metal surface. 
Active vs. passive: active attacks try to tamper with the device's proper functioning; for 
example, fault-induction attacks will try to induce errors in the computation. As opposed, 
passive attacks will simply observe the device's behavior during its processing, without 
disturbing it. 
Although these classifications help in organizing the attacks into groups, it does 
not help in providing the type of information being leaked. Therefore, we propose the 
following classification based on the type of information being leaked so that it is possible 
to devise some countermeasures to protect against attacks of certain class. This 
classification divides all known attacks into three classes: Class A: Operation-dependent 
attacks that depend on the type of operation being performed (multiply, square, addition, 
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doubling, etc…) such as timing attacks and simple power analysis attacks. Class B: Data-
dependent attacks that are based on the data being manipulated by the cryptodevice such 
as fault attacks and projective coordinate leaks. Class C: Address-dependent attacks that 
are based on the addresses (locations) of the data being processed such as and address-bit 
differential power attacks. Table 6.1 presents the various side channel attacks according to 
the above proposed classification. 
Note that some attacks exploit both the data being processed and a certain 
operation such as doubling certain point to leak some information. Examples of these 
attacks are DPA and DEMA. This will be illustrated in more details when we discuss each 
attack alone. 
Let the type of information being leaked be represented by a binary variable that 
equals "1" when this type of information is leaked and "0" when it is not. For example, let 
O denotes operation-dependent information, D denotes data-dependent information and A 
denotes Address-dependent information. Then, there are seven possible classes of attacks 
each of which exploits one or more kind of leaked information. These classes range from 
ADO = 001 to 111. The code 000 means no attacks while 111 means an attack that 
exploits operations, data and locations of data. Table 6.2 lists the side channel attacks and 
the code of each one according to this general classification. 
SPA attack has the code 001 because it is based on the conditional ADD operation 
whether it is performed or not (section 6.5.1). DPA attack has the code 011 because it is 
based on operations being performed on classified input points (section 6.5.1). ABDPA 
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has the code 100 because it is based on the addresses (or locations) of data being 
manipulated. 
Table 6. 1: Classification of side channel attacks. 
Class Attack Year of 
discovery6 
Target 
Timing Attack (TA) 1996 
[27] 
-Conditional operations. 
- Small differences obtained from 
feeding the operations with classified 
input points 




- Conditional operations. 
-Optimization techniques 




-Small differences obtained from 
feeding the operations with classified 
input points. 
Simple Electromagnetic 
Analysis (SEMA) attack 
2000 
[46]-[48] 
- Conditional operations. 
-Optimization techniques 
Differential Electromagnetic 
Analysis (DEMA) attack 
2000 
[46]-[48] 
-Small differences obtained from 





Doubling Attack (DA) 2003 [30] -Zeros in the scalar. 
Fault Attacks (FA) 1997 
[43]-[45] 
-Registers (variables) content.  
Timing Attack (TA) 1996 
[27] 
- Small differences obtained from 
feeding the operations with classified 
input points 
DPA attack 1999 
[26] 
Small differences obtained from 
feeding the operations with classified 
input points 
DEMA attack 2000 
[46]-[48] 
Small differences obtained from 
feeding the operations with classified 
input points 




-Coordinates of a point.  
Doubling Attack (DA) 2003 [30] -Zeros in the scalar. 
Zero-value Point Attack (ZPA) 2003 
[29] 













Address-bit DPA (ABDPA) 2002 
[38],[39] 
-Addresses (Locations) of variables. 
                                                 
6 The year shown is either the discovery year of the attack or its application to ECC. 
74 
 
The three classes in table 6.1 are special cases of the general classification in table 
6.2. However, since most of classes in this general classification are empty (at the time of 
writing) especially classes from 101 to 111, we stick to the proposed classification 
presented in table 6.1. 
In the following sections, we discuss all side channel attacks listed in table 6.2 in 
the same order they appear in the table. 
 




Fault Attacks (FA) 010 Based on faults induced to the data being 
manipulated. 
Timing Attack (TA) 011 Based on the variation in execution time for 
classified input points. 
Simple Power Analysis (SPA) 
attack 
001 Based on the conditional ADD operation, i.e. 
whether it is performed or not. 
Differential Power Analysis 
(DPA) attack 
011 Based on operations being performed on classified 
input points. 
Refined Power Analysis (RPA) 
attacks 
010 Exploits a special point with zero-value such as (0, 
y) or (x, 0). 
Zero-value Point Attack (ZPA) 010 A generalization of RPA where it exploits any 
zero-value auxiliary register. 
Doubling Attack (DA) 011 Based on detecting when the same operation is 
performed on the same operands. 
Address-bit DPA (ABDPA) 100 Based on the idea that accessing the same location 
is correlated to the scalar bit value. 
Simple Electromagnetic 
Analysis (SEMA) attack 
001 Based on the conditional ADD operation, i.e. 
whether it is performed or not. 
Differential Electromagnetic 
Analysis (DEMA) attack 
011 Based on operations being performed on classified 
input points. 
Projective Coordinates Leak 
(PCL) 
010 Based on knowing the projective representation of 





6.3 Fault Analysis Attacks 
Fault attacks were introduced by Boneh et al in [43]. Fault attacks are based on 
tampering with a device in order to have it perform some erroneous operations, hoping 
that the result of that erroneous behavior will  leak information about the secret 
parameters involved – for example by changing some bits in the internal memory. 
Boneh et al classified the faults into three categories. The first type is transient 
faults which can occur randomly causing a faulty computation to be executed. The second 
type is latent faults, which are hardware or software bugs that are difficult to locate. The 
third type is induced faults for which physical access to the hardware is necessary. 
Induced faults are the most interesting because of the active role of the attacker. For 
example, optical fault induction attacks, as introduced by Scorobogatov and Anderson 
[44], use a flashgun targeting a transistor to change the state of a memory cell in a 
microcontroller. The authors have proven this optical probing to be feasible as they 
managed to change an arbitrary bit of an SRAM array. 
Differential fault attacks (DFA) on ECC cryptosystems were outlined in the work 
of Biehl et al. [45]. They presented three types of attacks on ECC that can be used to 
derive information about the secret key if bit errors can be inserted into the elliptic curve 
computations in a tamper-proof device. They also estimate the effectiveness of the attacks 
using a software simulation. 
Their methods require very precise placement and timing of the faults and depend 
on the ability to change the coordinates of a point at any specific iteration of the scalar 
multiplication. Based on that, the scenario of DFA on ECC is the following: 
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n ++++= −−−−       6.1 
And let P be the base point, and the right-to-left scalar multiplication algorithm is: 
 
H = P; Q = 0; 
for i = 0 to n-1 do 
      if ( ik  = 1) then Q = Q + H; 




Assume that we know the binary length n of the unknown scalar K (note that an 
attacker can easily guess this length). Denote by Q[i], H[i] the value stored in the variable 
Q, H in the algorithm above before iteration i. The final result will then be Q[n-1]. The 
attacker proceeds as follows: 
1. Use the tamper-proof device with some input Pe to get the correct result Q[n-1] = 
K Pe.  
2. Restart scalar multiplication with the same input Pe but enforce a random register 
fault to get a faulty result ]1[
~ −nQ . Assume that we enforce the register fault in 
beginning of the last iteration, n-1, and that this fault changes the variable H.  
3. If the final result is unchanged, then there was no addition in the last iteration and 
1−nk  = 0, otherwise there was an addition and 1−nk = 1 (remember that the final 
result is in the variable Q, see the above algorithm). 
Clearly, we can do this for each bit of the scalar. 
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Fault attacks can be considered as one of the biggest threat of all implementation 
attacks as countermeasures usually include more complex techniques which are not easy 
to implement on constraint environment such as smart cards. 
 
6.4 Timing attack 
In 1996 Kocher [27] described timing based attacks on public key algorithms such 
as RSA. Timing attacks are based on the fact that algorithms with a non-constant 
execution time can leak secret information. A non-constant execution time can be caused 
by conditional branches in the algorithm, various optimization techniques, cache hits, etc. 
For example, the binary algorithm 4.1 (in chapter 4) of the scalar multiplication performs 
the addition operation only if the current bit of the scalar is 1. Hence there will be 
different execution times when the current bit is 0 or 1. 
Assume that the scalar K is constant throughout the attack and that the attacker can 
choose the input points. The scenario of timing attack on ECC is the following: 
Let the scalar K be represented by the binary representation 6.1. Assume that 
algorithm 4.1 is used for the scalar multiplication. Suppose that the bits 
121 ,.......,, +−− jnn kkk  are known. The attacker wants to find the j-th bit, jk . He proceeds as 
follows: 
1. The attacker first makes a guess: jk = 1 (or 0). 
2. He takes several input points tDD ,...1  and divides these points into two subsets 
based on the following rule: based in his knowledge about the scalar multiplication 
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algorithm, he knows (via simulation for example) that some points need more time 
than the others to be doubled and added to a fixed base point P. This difference in 
time comes due to the fact that doubling certain point and adding the result to the 
base point needs more modular reductions than other points. Based on that, he 
selects input points tDD ,...1  and classify them into two subsets: S1 for which the 
computation of DBL( iD ) and ADD( iD +P) will induce a modular reduction and 
S2 for which it will not. 
3. For each input point iD , he computes a full scalar multiplication K iD . If jk  is 
really one, then we can expect the computation times for the points from S1 to be 
slightly higher than the corresponding times for S2. On the other hand, if the 
actual value of jk  is zero, then the ADD operation will not be performed and the 
separation into two subsets should look random and we should not observe any 
distinguishable difference in the computation times. 
 
6.5 Power Analysis Attacks 
The power consumption of a cryptographic device may provide much information 
about the operations that take place and the involved parameters. This is the idea of 
simple and differential power analysis, first introduced by Kocher et al. in [26] and [27]. 
After publication of these two main types, other power analysis attacks have been 
discovered. At the time of writing there are six types of power analysis attacks. These 
attacks are:  Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attack [26], Differential Power Analysis 
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(DPA) Attack [26] and [32], Refined Power Analysis (RPA) attack (also known as 
Goubin attack) [28],  Zero-value Point Attack (ZPA) [29], Doubling Attack (DA) [30] and 
Address-Bit Differential Power Analysis (ABDPA) Attack [38], [39]. Sections 6.6.1 to 
6.6.6 discuss each of these attacks. 
 
6.5.1 Simple Power Analysis (SPA) Attack 
SPA makes direct use of one power consumption measurement. A trace refers to a 
measurement (i.e., a dataset) taken for one execution of the cryptographic operation under 
attack. In a simple power analysis attack, only a single measurement is used to gain 
information about the secret key of a device.  Obviously, to perform such an attack the 
side-channel information needs to be strong enough to be directly visible in the trace. 
Additionally, the secret key needs to have some simple, exploitable relationship with the 
operations visible in the power trace. Such an attack typically targets implementations 
which use key dependent operations in the implementation. 
An important characteristic of simple power attacks is the assumption that the 
attacker is supposed to have a detailed knowledge about the implementation of the 
cryptographic algorithm under attack. Furthermore, the part(s) of the trace corresponding 
to the operation under attack needs to be clearly distinguishable from the whole trace. 
In elliptic curve cryptography, SPA attack consists of observing the power 
consumption during a single execution of an elliptic curve cryptographic algorithm. The 
power consumption analysis may enable one to distinguish between point addition and 
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point doubling in the non-immune scalar multiplication algorithm. As shown in scalar 
multiplication algorithms presented in section 4.3 namely Algorithms 4.1 and 4.2, 
performing the ADD operation is conditioned by the scalar (key) bit. If the scalar bit value 
is ONE, an ADD operation is performed, otherwise, an ADD operation is not performed. 
Therefore, a simple power analysis will produce different power traces that distinguish 
between the existence of an ADD operation or not.  This can reveal the bit values of the 
scalar. 
 
6.5.2 Differential Power Analysis (DPA) Attack 
Even if an algorithm is protected against SPA attack, it may be vulnerable to the more 
sophisticated differential power analysis (DPA) attack. DPA attack is based on the same 
basic concept as a SPA attack, but makes use of several measurements and statistical 
analysis to extract very small differences in the power consumption signals.  
Assume that the scalar multiplication algorithm is immune against SAP by using 
double-and-add always method (algorithms 6.2 or 6.3). Let the scalar K be represented by 
6.1 where ik  is the i-th bit of the binary representation of K, and n is the total number of 
bits. If one knows the binary representation of the computed points one can again mount a 
successful attack. At step i the processed point P depends only on the first bits in kk ...1−  of 
the secret scalar K. When P is processed, power consumptions is correlated to the bits of 
P. No correlation will be observed if the point is not computed. For example, the second 
most significant bit can be learned by calculating the correlation between the power 
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consumption and any specific bit of the binary representation of 4P. If 2−nk  = 0, 4P is 
computed during the binary algorithm. Otherwise if 2−nk  = 1, 4P is never computed and 
thus there will be no correlation observed. This correlation method  is used to classify 
power traces of several input points chosen by the attacker. In the following we present a 
possible scenario of DPA. 
Assume that an attacker already knows the highest bits, 121 ......., +−− jnn kkk , of K. (i.e. 
the bits from position j+1 up to n-1 where j is the current position) and he wants to find 
jk . The scenario of DPA on ECC is the following: 
1. The attacker first makes a guess: jk = 0 (or 1). 
2. He chooses several input points tDD ,...1  and computes ( ) ijdn jd di DkQ −−=∑= 22 1 . 
The attacker can compute these points using a small program. For example, in 
attacking bit 2−nk  if the attacker guess that jk = 0, then he will computes (He will 
compute not the cryptodevice) tQQ ,...1  = tDD 4,...4 1 .  
3. He picks a certain bit in the binary representation of tQQ ,...1  (fixed for all points) 
as a boolean selection function g to construct the following two index sets: 
})(:{})(:{ falseQgiSandtrueQgiS ifit ====  
For example, g is chosen to be a specific bit of the binary representation of 




4. Let )(τii CC =  = power trace obtained from the computation of a full scalar 
multiplication KDi. This is a function of the time τ. 
5. Let SiiC ∈ denote the average of the functions iC  for the i ∈ S, ft SSS ∪= . If 
the guess of jk  was incorrect then  
0≈− ∈∈ ft SiiSii CC  
i.e. the two sets are uncorrelated.  
On the other hand, if the guess of jk  was correct then the difference 
ft SiiSii
CC ∈∈ −  will present spikes, i.e. deviations from zero. 
 
6.5.3 Refined Power Analysis (RPA) Attack 
In 2003, DPA is further improved to the Refined Power Analysis (RPA) by Goubin et 
al [28]. RPA exploits a special point with a zero value and reveals a secret key. An elliptic 
curve happens to have a special point (0, y) or (x, 0), which can be controlled by an 
adversary because the order of base point is usually known. RPA utilizes such a feature 
that the power consumption of 0 is distinguishable from that of a non-zero element. 
Although elliptic curve cryptosystems are vulnerable to RPA, RPA is not applied to RSA 
or DLP-based cryptosystems because they don‘t have such a special zero element. In 
general, the RPA attack assumes that the attacker can input adaptively chosen messages or 
elliptic curve points to the victim scalar multiplication algorithm.  
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Smart analyzed the RPA attack in detail and discounted its effectiveness in a large 
number of order [37]. However, the RPA attack is still a threat to most elliptic curve 
cryptosystems. 
 
6.5.4 Zero-value Point Attack (ZPA) 
RPA is generalized to Zero-value Point Attack (ZPA) in [29]. ZPA makes use of any 
zero-value register used in addition or doubling formula. ZPA utilizes a special feature of 
elliptic curves that addition and doubling formulas need a lot of each different operations 
stored in auxiliary registers, one of which happens to become zero. 
In ZPA, the attacker utilizes an auxiliary register which might take a zero-value in the 
definition field. This auxiliary register will take a value of zero for certain operations that 
are some how correlated to the scalar bit values. Hence, some secret bits may be revealed. 
 
6.5.5 Doubling Attack  
In 2003, a new attack known as Doubling attack is proposed by Fouque et al [30]. DA 
only works for the ML binary method. The main idea of this attack is based on the fact 
that, even if an adversary cannot see whether the computation being done is doubling or 
addition, he can still detect when the same operation is done twice. More precisely, if a 
device computes 2A and 2B in any operation, the attacker is not able to guess the value of 
A or B but he can check if A = B. This assumption is reasonable since this kind of 
computation usually takes many clock cycles and depends greatly on the value of the 
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operands. If the noise is negligible, a simple comparison of the two power traces during 
the doubling will be efficient to detect this equality. 
 
6.5.6 Address-Bit Differential Power Analysis Attack 
In 1999, Messerges et al. proposed a new attack against the secret key cryptosystems, 
the address-bit DPA (ABDPA), which analyzes a correlation between the secret 
information and addresses of registers [38]. Then, in 2002, Itoh et al. extended the attack 
to Elliptic Curve based Cryptosystems [39].  
Address-bit Differential Power Analysis Attack is based on the correlation between bit 
values of the scalar and the location (address) of the variables used in a scalar 
multiplication algorithm. Consider for example Takagi’s algorithm (algorithm 6.3). The 
values of variables Q[0], Q[1] and Q[2] can be randomized by randomizing the projective 
coordinates (or the base point) as shown in Figure 6.2(a). However, Figure 6.2(b) shows 
that the location of input operand of DBL operation (dotted line) and the data transfer 
from either Q[1] or Q[2] to Q[0] (solid line) are correlated to the bit value of the scalar. 
This Figure shows that, in Takagi’s algorithm, the following data transfer is performed 

































    
 




(b) Correlation still exists between the addresses and the bit values of the scalar 
 
Figure 6. 2: Address-bit differential power analysis attack 
 
6.6 Electromagnetic Analysis Attacks 
Any movement of electric charges is accompanied by an electromagnetic (EM) 
field. The currents going through a processor can characterize it according to its spectral 
signature. Electromagnetic attacks, first introduced by Quisquater and Samyde [46], and 
further developed in [47], [48] exploit this side channel by placing coils in the 
































The information measured can be analyzed in the same way as power consumption 
(simple and differential electromagnetic analysis – SEMA and DEMA), but may also 
provide much more information and are therefore very useful, even when power 
consumption is available. Agrawal et al [49] show that EM emanations consist of a 
multiplicity of signals, each leaking somewhat different information about the underlying 
computation. They sort the EM emanations in two main categories: direct emanations, i.e. 
emanations that result from intentional current flow, and unintentional emanations, caused 
by coupling effects between components in close proximity. According to them, 
unintentional emanations, which have been somewhat neglected so far, can prove much 
more useful than direct emanations. Moreover, some of them have substantially better 
propagation than direct emanations, which enables them to be observed without resorting 
to invasive attacks (and even, in some cases, to be carried out at pretty large distances - 15 
feet! - which comes back to the field of tempest-like attacks [50]). Finally, they argue that 
EM emanations can even be used to break power analysis countermeasures, and illustrate 
this by sketching a practical example. 
Electromagnetic attacks are powerful attacks especially when combined with other 
side channel attacks. For example, Quisquater and Samyde recently showed [51] that it 
was possible to build a dictionary of instructions and their power/electromagnetic traces, 
and, using correlation techniques and neural networks, to recognize the instructions 
executed by a processor. 
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EMA is a non-invasive attack, as it consists in measuring the near field. However, 
this attack is made much more efficient by de-packaging the chip first, to allow nearer 
measurements and to avoid perturbations due to the passivation layer. 
 
6.7 Projective Coordinates Leak 
In 2004, Nigel Smart et. al. [42] showed that it is possible to leak some 
information about the secret key (scalar K) through the projective representation of elliptic 
curve points. Giving that Q = KP is the elliptic-curve double-and-add scalar multiplication 
of an elliptic curve point P by a secret K, they showed that allowing an adversary access 
to the projective representation of Q may result in information being revealed about K.  
In [42], they restrict projective coordinates leak to Jacobian projective coordinates 
in GF(p) (although it can be applied to other coordinates). For each affine point there are 
P-1 representatives in Jacobian projective coordinates, one for every non-zero value of Z. 
By knowing the projective coordinates of a point G, they consider the least significant bit 
of the scalar and guess its value. Once this is done, it is possible to compute a set of 
candidates for the coordinates of the previous intermediate values handled by the double-
and-add algorithm while processing that bit. This is achieved by reversing computations: 
reversing doubling is Halving while reversing addition is subtracting. In other words, they 
apply a backtracking algorithm that can reveal whether the final bit was zero or not.  
This attack requires a special backtracking formulas for each projective coordinate 
system. Thus, formulas used to half (subtract) a point in homogenous projective 




This section presents countermeasures found in the literature for side channel 
attacks . We organized the countermeasures in the same way as we did for attacks. 
 
6.8.1 Fault Attack Countermeasures 
The most obvious way that comes to mind in order to protect against fault attacks 
is to check the computation for errors, for example by repeating the computation and 
comparing the results. However, it must be noted that this policy is very costly, either in 
time (repeat computation) or in hardware (double hardware and perform both 
computations in parallel). Moreover, repeating the computation is not always satisfactory 
as, in the case of a permanent fault induction, it will yield identical, although wrong, 
results. 
Another way to check for the presence of faults is, in the case of public-key 
cryptography, to re-encrypt the message. This is usually less time-consuming, as the 
public exponent is usually chosen to be small.  
 
6.8.2 Timing Attack Countermeasures 
The obvious way to prevent timing attacks is to implement cryptographic 
algorithms with a constant execution time. In case of elliptic curve cryptography, this idea 




Almost all modern implementations are resistant against timing attacks, which 
makes a timing-only attack very difficult. However, the threat remains in combining 
timing information with other side-channels. For example, timing information can be used 
by an attacker in order to locate specific parts of the algorithm. 
 
6.8.3 SPA Attack Countermeasures 
To protect against SPA attack, Coron [32] proposed a simple SPA countermeasure 
which consisted of modifying the binary methods shown in algorithms 4.1 and 4.2 to be 
as in algorithms 6.1 and 6.2 respectively. The basic idea of these countermeasures is to 
perform the ADD operation in all cases regardless of the scalar bit value. Therefore, the 
ADD operation is no longer conditioned by the scalar bit values. However, if the ADD 
operation is originally not required (i.e. in case of the scalar bit is 0), the result of ADD 
operation is simply discarded. Since none of the instructions in algorithms 6.1 and 6.2 
depend on the scalar bit value, these algorithms are resistant to a SPA attack. These 
algorithms are called Double-and-ADD always algorithms since it computes a point 
addition and point doubling in each iteration without regard to the secret key K. However, 
even though this scheme is resistant to SPA attack, it remains vulnerable to DPA attack. 
INPUT K, P 
OUTPUT    KP 
1. Initialize Q[2] = P 
2. for i = n-2 down to 0 
3.      Q[0] = DBL(Q[2]) 
4.      Q[1] = ADD(Q[0], P) 
5.      Q[2] = Q[ki] 
6. end for 
            return Q[2] 




INPUT K, P 
OUTPUT    KP 
1. Initialize Q[0] = P; Q[1] = P 
2. for i = 1 to n-1 
3.      Q[0] = DBL(Q[0])   
4.      Q[2] = ADD(Q[0], Q[1]) 
5.       Q[1] = Q[1+ ki]  
      end for 
            return Q[1] 
Algorithm 6. 2: Double-and-ADD always Least-to-Most (LM) binary algorithm. 
 
 Another ML algorithm to avoid this kind of leak was proposed by Takagi et al 
[33]. This algorithm uses extra ADD operations to assure that the sequence of DBL and 
ADD operations is carried out in each iteration. We refer to this algorithm as Takagi’s 
algorithm and it is shown in algorithm 6.3. 
 
INPUT K, P 
OUTPUT    KP 
1. Initialize Q[0] = P; Q[1] = 2P 
2. for i = n-2 down to 0 
3.      Q[2] = DBL(Q[ki]) 
4.      Q[1] = ADD(Q[0], Q[1]) 
5.      Q[0] = Q[2- ki],  
6.      Q[1] = Q[1+ ki] 
7. end for 
            return Q[0] 
Algorithm 6. 3: Takagi’s ML algorithm for scalar multiplication. 
 
6.8.4 DPA Attack Countermeasures 
In order for an algorithm to be resistant to a DPA attack, some system parameters or 
computation procedures must be randomized. Coron et. al [32] suggested three 
countermeasures to protect against a classical DPA: randomizing the scalar, randomizing 
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the base point P, and randomizing the projective coordinates. Brief summary of how these 
countermeasures can be realized is given below: 
1. Randomizing the scalar K 
If n = ordE(P) denotes the order of P ∈  E/GF(p), then Q = KP can be 
computed as Q = (k + r n)P for a random r. Alternatively, one can replace n by 
the order of the elliptic curve, #E/GF(p). 
2. Randomizing the base-point P 
The base point P to be multiplied by K is randomized by adding a secret 
random point R for which we know S = KR. Scalar multiplication is done by 
computing the point (R + P)K and subtracting S = KR to get Q = KP. 
3. Using randomized projective coordinates 
Randomized projective coordinates can use the Homogenous or Jacobian 
coordinate to randomize a point P = (x, y).  For homogenous projective 
coordinate, P can be randomized to ( rryrx ,, ) for a random number r  ∈ 
GF(p). Similarly, P can be randomized to ( ryrxr ,, 32 ) in case of using 
Jacobian coordinates where r is a random in GF(p). 
 However, the main goal of all these countermeasures, and others proposed in [33] 
- [36], is to randomize the power traces collected by the attacker and hence make it 




6.8.5 Doubling Attack Countermeasures 
According to [30], two of Coron’s three proposed countermeasures against DPA 
attacks, discussed in the previous section, fail to protect against a doubling attack: 
randomizing the scalar and randomizing the base point. However, his third 
countermeasure, the randomized projective coordinate does protect against a doubling 
attack as does a randomized exponentiation algorithm such as the Ha-Moon algorithm 
which maps a given scalar to one of various representations [34]. Since the positions of 
the zeros in the Ha-Moon algorithm vary in each representation, the doubling attack 
cannot detect the positions of the zeros for the doubling operation. 
To enhance the Coron’s 2ed countermeasure, to protect against a doubling attack, the 
secret random point R should be randomly updated. A regularly updated method shouldn’t 
be used. 
 
6.8.6 RPA & ZPA Attacks Countermeasures 
To protect against RPA and ZPA attacks, the base point P or the secret scalar d should 
be randomized. For example, Coron’s first two counter-measures (but not the 3rd) protect 
against these attacks. Projective coordinates randomization does not protect against RPA 
and ZPA because it cannot randomize the zero-value operands. 
Mamiya et al [31] recently proposed a countermeasure (called BRIP) which uses a 
random initial point (RIP) R. They computes KP + R using a special algorithm and then 




6.8.7 Address-Bit Differential Power Analysis Attack Countermeasures 
The countermeasures used to protect against simple power analysis and differential 
power analysis that are based on randomization of the base point or the projective 
coordinate do not provide countermeasure against address-bit analysis attacks. Therefore, 
these countermeasures do not remove the correlation between the bit values of a scalar 
and the location (address) of the variables used in a scalar multiplication algorithm.  
Itoh et al gave several countermeasures against the ABDPA attack in [39]. But 
those countermeasures require at least twice computing time than without them [39]. 
A hardware-based DPA countermeasure proposed by May et al. [40] is based on 
Randomized Register Renaming (RRR). RRR is supposed to be implemented on a 
processor that can execute instructions in parallel. In other words, it requires a special 
hardware to work [41]. 
In 2003, Itoh et al. proposed a countermeasure [41], called randomized addressing 
method (RA), which is similar to RRR but does not require special hardware because it 
can be implemented by only software with a program code. In RA, they randomize 








n ++++ −−−−  
where ( )}1,0{∈ir . They change each bit, ik , of the scalar to ii rk ⊕ , where ⊕  denotes 
the XOR operation. Then all addresses of registers are randomized so that the side channel 
information will be randomized for each scalar exponentiation. Of course this change in 
the scalar bits requires a special algorithm to calculate the correct point of the scalar 
multiplication KP. They provided such an algorithm in [41]. 
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6.8.8 Electromagnetic Attacks Countermeasures 
Electromagnetic attacks and power attacks are, in many respects, very similar. 
Although the way the side channel leaks information differs, but the type of leaking 
information is roughly the same. Countermeasures do not try to reduce the signal 
amplitude, but rather to make the information it conveys useless by obscuring the internal 
parameters. Therefore, any countermeasure for SPA and DPA can be used for SEMA and 
DEMA respectively. 
 
6.8.9 Projective Coordinates Leak Countermeasures 
Nigel Smart et al [42] suggested two methods to resist this attack. First, we call it 
Smart's trick, which is done by randomly replacing the output (X, Y, Z) of the 
computation by (X, εY, εZ), with ε = ±1. Although, this method does not lend itself to a 
formal proof, they claim that it can defend the PCL. However, this method does not 
protect against PCL if the attacker obtains intermediate points. Second, is by replacing (x, 
y, z) representation of Q by ),,( 32 λλλ yx , where λ  is randomly chosen among the non 
zero elements of the base field. This method, identical to Coron's 3-ed countermeasure, 
provides a randomly chosen set of projective coordinates for the result and, therefore, 
cannot leak additional information.  
However, it is worth mentioning that they assume that the attacker knows the 





6.9 Classification of Countermeasures 
In this section, we provide a classification of countermeasures according to the 
proposed classification of the attacks presented in section 6.2. Table 6.3 shows the 
proposed classification. In addition, table 6.3 contains the attacks that each 
countermeasure can help in defending them and those  it cannot.  Also, table 6.3 contrast 
the advantages and disadvantages of each countermeasure. 
 
6.10 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have surveyed different types of side channel attacks and the 
various countermeasures for defending them. Also, according to the type of information 
being leaked, a new classification method of attacks has been proposed. This 
classification method was used to classify and analyze both the attacks and 
countermeasures. Three classes were proposed: Class A: Operation-dependent attacks that 
depend on the type of operation being performed. Class B: Data-dependent attacks that 
are based on the data being manipulated. Class C: Address-dependent attacks that are 
based on the addresses (locations) of the data being processed. 
In this chapter, we analyze and contrast the existed countermeasures in terms of 
what attacks each countermeasure can defend and what it cannot, its advantages and 
disadvantages. A summary of this analyze is presented in table 6.3 
We conclude that there are powerful side channel attacks that exploit more that 
one type of leaked information. Therefore, sophisticated countermeasures to protect 
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against each type of information are mandatory. We recommend that at least one 
countermeasure from each class should be involved in any ECC implementation. 
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-S = KR of the secret random 
point R must be known. 
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scalar the multiplication time.  
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-Each coordinate system 
requires its own randomization 
method. 
-Requires 2 multiplications in H 
coordinate system and 3 
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DA -Does not require 
storing RK of the 
random point R. 
-Does not require 
updating R. 
-Complex. 





FAs The rest - The only way to 
detect errors. 
-Complex. 
-Needs special techniques. 





N. Smart's trick 
(010) 
PCL The rest -Simple. -Does not protect PCL if the 
attacker obtain intermediate 
points. 
Randomized register 
renaming (RRR) (100) 
ABDPA The rest -Faster than RA. -Requires special hardware. C: 
Address-
dependent Randomized 
addressing (RA) (100) 
ABDPA The rest -Does not requires 
special hardware. 







Dynamic Projective Coordinate (DPC) System 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Using projective coordinates in point addition and doubling operations is an 
important requirement to remove the need for intermediate inversion operations in the 
scalar multiplication. The usual way used in the literature to achieve this is by using a 
fixed coordinate system that is selected in the design stage. The selected system is used in 
a fixed manner for all scalar multiplication iterations. However, although using a fixed 
coordinate system removes the intermediate inversion operations, it becomes a security 
weakness since it can be exploited by projective coordinates leak attacks to reveal some 
secure information (section 6.7 in chapter 6). Therefore, finding a coordinate system that 
can satisfy both requirements: removing the intermediate inversions and being secure 
against such attacks is mandatory. 
Although, mixed coordinates (section 5.7) provide efficient addition and doubling 
operations, most of them cannot be used for the following reasons: 
• It is necessary to convert a point representation from one coordinate system to 
another to have the input in the required format for the addition or doubling 
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operation. For example, using Jacobian coordinate for addition operation and 
homogenous coordinates for doubling operation requires converting the addition 
result to homogenous coordinates. This conversion requires an inversion operation. 
Same thing happens if using homogenous for addition and Jacobian for doubling.  
• It requires separate mathematical formulas for each coordinate system. 
However, using different projective coordinates for different runs and/or different 
phases of the scalar multiplication is not used yet as a randomization method to resist 
many operation-dependent and data-dependent attacks. 
In this chapter, we introduce the Dynamic Projective Coordinate (DPC) system 
which is proposed to overcome the above difficulties and has the following properties: 
• It automates the selection of the projective coordinate system and uses a single 
mathematical formulation/software code to implement different projective 
coordinate systems.  
• It allows the computing/encrypting device to select the projective coordinate either 
at random, or according to a certain rule. 
• Different projective coordinates can be implemented by using two parameters 
where one parameter defines the projection of the x-coordinate and a second 
parameter defines the projection of the y-coordinate of an elliptic curve point. This 
allows different projective coordinates to be used within the same mathematical 
formulation in calculating the scalar multiplication. 
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• The computation of the scalar multiplication can be randomized by simply varying 
either the x-coordinate projecting parameter and/or the y-coordinate projecting 
parameter.  
•  It allows projective coordinates hopping at any time during the scalar 
multiplication.  
• With DPC system, different projective coordinate systems can be used for 
different phases of the scalar multiplication. Fore example, a certain coordinate 
system can be used for the pre-computation phase of the scalar multiplication 
while other coordinate systems can be used for addition and/or doubling 
operations in the main loop. Furthermore, different blocks (or windows) of the 
scalar K can use different projective coordinate systems. 
• It does not require the sending and receiving correspondents to use to the same 
projective coordinates in computing the same scalar multiplication. 
In this chapter, we start by defining dynamic transformation functions that are 
used to convert any affine point to any projective coordinates using the same 
mathematical formula. Then these transformation functions are used to develop dynamic 
addition and doubling formulas for elliptic curve over the prime field GF(p) and elliptic 
curve over binary field E/GF(2m). 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 introduces the 
proposed dynamic projecting parameters and transformation functions. In section 7.3, 
DPC is used to propose dynamic addition and doubling formulas for elliptic curve over 
finite field GF(P). Similarly, in section 7.4, DPC is used to propose dynamic addition and 
100 
 
doubling formulas for elliptic curve over finite field )2( mGF . Finally, conclusions are 
presented in section 7.5 
 
7.2 Dynamic Projecting Parameters  
In DPC, we use two values xLZ  and yLZ  for projecting the x-coordinate and the y-
coordinate of a point respectively. xL  and yL  are projecting parameters (powers) that can 
be chosen either at random or according to a certain criteria such as a criteria for reducing 
the computation complexity. 
To formulate the Dynamic Projective Coordinate system, consider that there are 
multiple degrees of powers for the Z-coordinate, as follows: 
Degree-0 is the affine coordinate system P = (x,y) 
In Degree-1, 
Z
Xx = , 
Z
Yy =  
In Degree-2, 2Z
Xx = , 2Z
Yy =  
…  … … 
In Degree-i, iZ
Xx = , iZ
Yy =  
In DPC system the x and y coordinates can be projected to any degree of the above 
degrees and not necessarily to the same degree. In other words, x-coordinate can be in one 








Xx =  and 
yLZ
Yy =       7.1 
where, xL  and yL  are positive integers. 
However, in any projective coordinate system, each affine point ( yx, ) can be 
converted to many projective points ( ZYX ,, ), one for each non-zero value of Z. This 
means that we have the freedom to select Z. However, Z should be selected in a way that 
clears the denominators and minimizes the computations of 3X  and 3Y . For example, 
consider addition operation using homogenous coordinate system in which the point 
),,( 3333 ZYXP =  is the result of point addition ),,( 1111 ZYXP = + ),,( 2222 ZYXP = . The 
Z-coordinate of the result point, 3Z , is chosen to be 21
3 ZZV , where 2112 ZXZXV −= , 
which is the best choice to unify Z-coordinate and minimize the computations of 3X  and 
3Y  (see equation 5.5 in section 5.3). Similarly, in case of addition using Jacobian 




12 ZXZXH −=  (equation 5.8 in 
section 5.4).  
Therefore, in order to have a general method for choosing 3Z  in DPC, a third 
parameter, called d-parameter, is used to control choosing the Z-coordinate of the 
resulting point of addition and doubling operations. For example, 3Z  can be chosen to be 
21ZZV
d . By setting d=3 we get the same definition of 3Z  in homogenous coordinate 
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system while by setting d=1 we get the same definition of 3Z  in Jacobian coordinate 
system.  However, it is worth mentioning that d is not used to project neither x nor y 
coordinates. It is only used to help in choosing Z-coordinate of the resulting point of 
addition and doubling operations. Furthermore, 3Z  of addition operation and 3Z  of 
doubling operation are different because each operation has its own formula. 
 However, using the d-parameter in the way discussed above introduces a powerful 
and very efficient projective coordinates randomization method by simply randomizing d 
itself. This method is discussed in chapter 8.  
 
7.3 Dynamic Projective Coordinate System for E/GF(p) 
Let E/GF(P) denotes elliptic curve defined over the prime field GF(P) (see section 
3.3 in chapter 3). By substituting for x and y from 7.1 in the elliptic curve equation 3.3, we 
get: 
xxyx LLLL bZaXZXZY 323232 ++=−       7.2 
Note that if we set 1== yx LL  in 7.2, we get: 3232 bZaXZXZY ++=  which is 
identical to the standard projective equation of the elliptic curve equation over prime field 
found in [4]. 
This equation is satisfied by all projective points with Z ≠ 0 for which the 
corresponding affine points satisfy the affine equation 3.3. Now the question is which 
points on the line at infinity satisfy equation 7.2? Setting Z = 0 in the equation leads to 
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03 =X , i.e. 0=X . The only point with both X and Z zero is the point (0, 1, 0). This point 
is called the point at infinity and denoted as ∞. It is the point on the intersection of the y-
axis with the line at infinity 
Lemma 7.1: Any point ),( yxQ =  ∈ E/GF(p) represented in affine coordinates can be 
transferred to a 4-tuple projective point ),,,( yx LL ZZYXP =  ∈ E/GF(p) where, xLZ  and yLZ  
≠ 0. 
Proof: Since the two values, xLZ  and yLZ , are available within the 4-tuple representation 
of the point, the affine point (x,y) can be obtained by direct application of 7.1. 
The following subsections present the addition and doubling formulas for GF(p) 
using DPC. However, several DPC formulas are introduced. These formulas are: General 
formulas in which xL  and yL  can be selected to be any positive integers without any 
restriction. Optimized formulas in which xL  and yL  are selected according to certain rule 
to reduce the number of computations required. Mixed formulas in which each coordinate 
of each point has its own projecting parameter.  
 
7.3.1 General Dynamic Projective Coordinate System for E/GF(p) 
Formulations for Elliptic curve point addition and doubling, over GF(p), using 
DPC are presented in this section. We develop point addition mathematical formulas that 
can be used to implement any projective coordinate system simply by varying the 
projecting parameters xL  and yL . Similarly, point doubling formulas are also presented. 
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However, one of the most important features of the DPC system for E/GF(p) is that the 
same mathematical formulas, either for point addition or doubling, can implement any 
projective coordinate system without the need to recode or reprogram the cryptodevice. 
 
Point Addition Formula 
Theorem 7.1: Given two elliptic curve points represented in DPC, 
),,,( 1111
yx LL ZZYXP = ∈E/GF(P), ),,,( 2222 yx LL ZZYXQ =  ∈ E/GF(p), and denoting the point 
),,,( 3333
yx LL ZZYXR =  ∈ E/GF(p) as the addition  of the two points P and Q, i.e. QPR += , 



















































































     7.3 
Proof: According to lemma 7.1, since ),,,( 1111 yx
LL ZZYXP = , ),,,( 2222 yx LL ZZYXQ =  and 
),,,( 3333
yx LL ZZYXR =  are elliptic curve projective points ∈ E/GF(p), one can use the 
addition formula 3.4 for E/GF(p) in affine coordinates to compute QPR +=  (addition 
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operation). The projective coordinates ),,,( 3333 yx
LL ZZYX  of the point R can be derived using 
the dynamic transformation functions 7.1. This is shown in appendix A-I to obtain the 
formulas 7.3 for computing QPR += . 
 
Point Doubling Formula 
Theorem 7.2: Given an elliptic curve point represented in DPC, ),,,( 1111 yx
LL ZZYXP =  ∈ 
E/GF(p), and denoting the point ),,,( 3333 yx
LL ZZYXR =  ∈ E/GF(p) as the addition  of the 













































































     7.4 
Proof: According to lemma 7.1, let ),,,( 1111 yx
LL ZZYXP = , and ),,,( 3333 yx LL ZZYXR =  be elliptic 
curve projective points ∈ E/GF(p). We can use the doubling formula 3.5 for E/GF(p) in 
affine coordinates to compute PR 2=  (doubling operation). The projective coordinates 
),,,( 3333 yx
LL ZZYX  of the point R can be derived using the dynamic transformation 
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functions 7.1. This is shown in appendix B-I to obtain the formulas 7.4 for computing 
PR 2= . 
 
7.3.2 Mixed Dynamic Projective Coordinate System for E/GF(p) 
Formulas 7.3 are obtained using uniform transformation in which xL  and yL  are 
the same for the three points P, Q and R. More general addition formulas can be obtained 
by using mixed transformation where each coordinate in each point has its own projecting 
parameter. In this case, projecting parameters 11 , yx LL  are used for P, 22 , yx LL  are used for 
Q and 33 , yx LL  are used for R.  
Theorem 7.3: Given two elliptic curve points represented in DPC, 
),,,( 11 1111
yx LL ZZYXP = ∈E/GF(p), ),,,( 22 2222 yx LL ZZYXQ = ∈E/GF(p), and denoting the 
point ),,,( 33 3333 yx
LL ZZYXR =  ∈ E/GF(p) as the addition  of the two points P and Q, 































































































     7.5 
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Proof: The proof of Theorem 7.3 is similar to the proof of Theorem 7.1 with replacing 
each xLiZ  by xiLiZ  and each y
L
iZ  by yi
L
iZ  where, i = 1,2. 
Formulas 7.4 are obtained using uniform transformation functions in which xL  and 
yL  are the same for P and R. More general addition formulas can be obtained by using 
mixed transformation, where different projecting parameters for each point, i.e. 11, yx LL  for 
P and 33 , yx LL  for R.  
Theorem 7.4: Given an elliptic curve point represented in DPC, 
),,,( 11 1111
yx LL ZZYXP = ∈E/GF(p), and denoting the point ),,,( 33 3333 yx LL ZZYXR =  ∈ E/GF(p) as 






























































































     7.6 
Proof: The proof of Theorem 7.4 is similar to the proof of Theorem 7.2 with replacing 
each xLiZ  by xiLiZ  and each y
L
iZ  by yi
L
iZ  where, i = 1,2. 
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7.3.3 Optimized Dynamic Projective Coordinate System for E/GF(p) 
Addition and doubling formulas 7.3 and 7.4 are the most general homogenous 
formulas for E/GF(p) without any restriction on the values of the projecting parameters 
xL  and yL . However, their computation complexity can be reduced by reproducing these 
formulas with taking 1Z  and 2Z  as common factors in each equation (whenever it is 
possible) and simplify the resultant formulas by eliminating the unnecessary terms. This 
results in the existence of terms such as yx LLZ −1 , in which its power is a relation between 
xL  and yL . Existence of such terms requires providing either pure Z-coordinate (i.e. not 
raised to any power) or the required term as a ready computed value in the point 
representation. This can be achieved with the help of the following lemma. 
Lemma 7.2: Any point ),( yxQ =  E/GF(p) represented in affine coordinates can be 
transferred to a 5-tuple projective point ),,,,( yx LL ZZZYXP =  E/GF(p) where, Z , xLZ  and 
yLZ  ≠ 0. 
Proof: Since the values, Z , xLZ  and yLZ , are available within the 5-tuple representation 
of the point, proof follows directly from 7.1. 
Appendixes C-I and D-I present the derivation of optimized addition and doubling 
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    7.8 
Formulas 7.7 and 7.8 are obtained using uniform transformation functions. Similar 
mixed optimized formulas can be obtained using the same way as in appendixes C-I and 
D-I with replacing each xLiZ  by xiLiZ  and each y
L
iZ  by yi
L
iZ  where, i = 1,2. The mixed 
































































































   7.9 



























































































7.4 Dynamic Projective Coordinate System for E/GF(2m) 
Dynamic Projective Coordinate system can be used to get addition and doubling 
formulas, similar to those obtained in section 7.4, in case of defining ECC over the binary 
field )2( mGF . 
Transformation functions 7.1 are used to formulate the DPC in E/ )2( mGF . By 
substituting for x and y from 7.1 in the elliptic curve equation 3.6, we get: 
xxyxyx LLLLLL bZZaXXXYZZY 3232232 ++=+ −−     7.11 
Note that if we set 1== yx LL  in 7.11, we get: 3232 bZZaXXXYZZY ++=+  which is 
identical to the standard projective form of the elliptic curve equation over binary field 
found in [52]. Also, If Z = 0, then 03 =X , i.e. 0=X . Therefore, (0,1,0) is the only 
projective point that satisfies this equation. This point is called the point at infinity and 
denoted as ∞. 
Lemma 7.3: Any point ),( yxQ = ∈ E/ )2( mGF  represented in affine coordinates can be 
transferred to a 4-tuple projective point ),,,( yx LL ZZYXP = ∈ E/ )2( mGF  where, xLZ  and 
yLZ  ≠ 0. 
Proof: Since the two values, xLZ  and yLZ , is available within the 4-tuple representation of 





7.4.1 General Dynamic Projective Coordinate System for E/GF(2m)  
Formulations for Elliptic curve point addition and doubling, over )2( mGF , using 
DPC are presented in this section. We develop point addition mathematical formulas that 
can be used to implement any projective coordinate system simply by varying the 
projecting parameters xL  and yL . Similarly, point doubling formulas are also presented. 
However, one of the most important features of the DPC system for E/ )2( mGF   is that the 
same mathematical formulas, either for point addition or doubling, can implement any 
projective coordinate system without the need to recode or reprogram the cryptodevice. 
 
Point Addition Formula 
Theorem 7.5: Given two elliptic curve points represented in DPC, 
),,,( 1111
yx LL ZZYXP = ∈E/ )2( mGF , ),,,( 2222 yx LL ZZYXQ =  E/ )2( mGF , and denoting the 
point ),,,( 3333 yx
LL ZZYXR =  ∈ E/ )2( mGF  as the addition of the two points P and Q, 














































































    7.12 
Proof: According to lemma 7.3, since ),,,( 1111 yx
LL ZZYXP = , ),,,( 2222 yx LL ZZYXQ =  and 
),,,( 3333
yx LL ZZYXR =  are elliptic curve projective points ∈ E/ )2( mGF , one can use the 
addition formula 3.7 for E/ )2( mGF  in affine coordinates to compute QPR +=  (addition 
operation). The dynamic projective coordinates ),,,( 3333 yx
LL ZZYX  of the point R can be 
derived using the dynamic transformation functions 7.1. This is shown in appendix A-II to 
obtain the formulas in equation 7.12 for computing QPR += . 
 
Point Doubling Formula  
Theorem 7.6: Given an elliptic curve point represented in DPC, ),,,( 1111 yx
LL ZZYXP =  ∈ 
E/ )2( mGF , and denoting the point ),,,( 3333 yx
LL ZZYXR =  ∈ E/ )2( mGF  as the addition of 

































































Proof: According to lemma 7.3, let ),,,( 1111 yx
LL ZZYXP = , and ),,,( 3333 yx LL ZZYXR =  be elliptic 
curve projective points ∈ E/ )2( mGF . We can use the doubling formula 3.8 for E/ )2( mGF  
in affine coordinates to compute PR 2=  (doubling operation). The dynamic projective 
coordinates ),,,( 3333 yx
LL ZZYX  of the point R can be derived using the dynamic 
transformation functions 7.1. This is shown in appendix B-II to obtain the formulas in 
equation 7.13 for computing PR 2= . 
 
7.4.2 Mixed Dynamic Projective Coordinate System for E/GF(2m) 
Formulas 7.12 are obtained using uniform transformation in which xL  and yL  are 
the same for the three points P, Q and R. More general addition formulas can be obtained 
by using mixed transformation where each coordinate in each point has its own projecting 
parameter. In this case, projecting parameters 11, yx LL  are used for P, 22 , yx LL  are used for 
Q and 33 , yx LL  are used for R.  
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Theorem 7.7: Given two elliptic curve points represented in DPC, 
),,,( 11 1111 yx
LL ZZYXP = ∈ E/ )2( mGF , ),,,( 22 2222 yx LL ZZYXQ = ∈ E/ )2( mGF , and denoting 
the point ),,,( 33 3333 yx
LL ZZYXR = ∈ E/ )2( mGF  as the addition of the two points P and Q, 
i.e. QPR += , the coordinates of the point R is given by: 
( )


















































































    7.14 
Proof: The proof of Theorem 7.7 is similar to the proof of Theorem 7.5 with replacing 
each xLiZ  by xiLiZ  and each y
L
iZ  by yi
L
iZ  where, i = 1,2. 
Formulas 7.13 are obtained using uniform transformation in which xL  and yL  are 
the same for P and R. More general doubling formulas can be obtained by using mixed 
transformation. In this case, projecting parameters 11, yx LL  are used for P, and 33 , yx LL  are 
used for R.  
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Theorem 7.8: Given an elliptic curve point represented in DPC, ),,,( 11 1111 yx
LL ZZYXP = ∈ 
E/ )2( mGF , and denoting the point ),,,( 33 3333 yx
LL ZZYXR = ∈ E/ )2( mGF  as the addition  of 





































































Proof: The proof of Theorem 7.8 is similar to the proof of Theorem 7.6 and is omitted 
here for space limitations. 
 
7.4.3 Optimized Dynamic Projective Coordinate System for E/GF(2m) 
Addition and doubling formulas 7.12 and 7.13 are the most general homogenous 
formulas for E/ )2( mGF  without any restriction in the values of the projecting parameters 
xL  and yL . However, their computation complexity can be reduced by reproducing these 
formulas with taking 1Z  and 2Z  as common factors in each equation (whenever it is 
possible) and simplify the resultant formulas by eliminating the unnecessary terms. This 
results in the existence of terms such as yx LLZ −1 , in which its power is a relation between 
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xL  and yL . Existence of such terms requires providing either pure Z-coordinate (i.e. not 
raised to any power) or the required term as a ready computed value in the point 
representation. This can be achieved with the help of the following lemma. 
Lemma 7.4: Any point ),( yxQ =  ∈ E/ )2( mGF   represented in affine coordinates can be 
transferred to a 5-tuple projective point ),,,,( yx LL ZZZYXP =  ∈ E/ )2( mGF  where, Z , 
xLZ  and yLZ  ≠ 0. 
Proof: Since the values, Z , xLZ  and yLZ , are available within the 5-tuple representation 
of the point, proof is follows directly from 7.1. 
Appendixes C-II and D-II present the derivation of optimized addition and 























































































   7.16 









































































    7.17 
Formulas 7.16 and 7.17 are obtained using uniform transformation functions. 
Similar mixed optimized formulas can be obtained using the same way as in appendixes 
C-II and D-II with replacing each xLiZ  by xiLiZ  and each y
L
iZ  by yi
L
iZ  where, i = 1,2. The 
mixed optimized addition formulas are: 
( )
( )
( ) ( )





































































































































































   7.19 
 
7.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, a new approach called Dynamic Projective Coordinate (DPC) 
system was presented. In DPC, we first proposed a general transformation functions that 
can be used to project x and y coordinates of any point to any projective coordinates. Then 
these transformation functions are used to derive dynamic addition and doubling formulas 
for both E/GF(p) and E/GF(2m). However, three types of formulas for both addition and 
doubling operations were presented. First, general formulas in which there is no 
constraints on the projecting parameters xL  and yL  with d ≥ 3. Second, optimized 
formulas that reduce the number of required computations by selecting projecting 
parameters according to certain rules. Third, mixed formulas in which each coordinate can 
be projected using its own projecting parameter resulting in the most mixing degree of 
coordinates ever. By this way, coordinates of the same point can be represented in 
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different coordinate systems. The detailed steps for deriving each type of these formula 
are presented in appendices.  
The resulting DPC allows the computing/encrypting device to select the projective 
coordinate either at random, or according to a certain rule. Therefore, DPC automates the 
selection of the projective coordinate system and uses a single mathematical 







Performance and Using of DPC 
 
8.1 Introduction 
We mean by performance of DPC system is the number of required field 
arithmetic operations (computations) for addition and doubling operations. The less the 
number of required computations the faster the system we get. As in [23]-[25], for 
simplicity, we neglect addition, subtraction and multiplication by a small constant because 
they are much faster than multiplication and inversion operations.  
To analyze the performance of DPC, we have to compute the number of field 
operations in each formula of the formulas presented in chapter 7. Therefore, a method for 
computing the number of computations in a dynamic formula is required. In this chapter 
we provide such a method that can determine the number of computations as a function of 
the projecting parameters xLZ and yLZ  and d parameter.  
As shown in chapter 7, the conventional homogenous and Jacobian coordinate 
systems are special cases of DPC. Hence, by selecting the appropriate xLZ and yLZ  and d 
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parameters, we compare the DPC with these coordinate systems. Moreover, Mixed DPC 
system is compared with the mixed coordinates (section 5.7 in chapter5). 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.2 presents a method of 
computing the number of field operations that can be applied for both E/GF(p) and 
E/GF(2m). The performance of DPC in E/GF(p) and in E/GF(2m) is discussed in sections 
8.3 and 8.4 respectively. Using DPC is addressed in section 8.5. Finally, conclusions are 
given in section 8.6  
 
8.2 Calculating the Number of Field Operations in DPC System 
To calculate the number of field operations in any DPC formula of the addition 
and doubling formulas presented in chapter 7, the following points should be noticed. 
• First, the number of field operations in a DPC formula consists of two parts. Part1 
is a constant number of operations that must be performed regardless of the values 
of xL , yL  and d. Examples of part1 are the field operations required to compute 
the auxiliary variables U and V in all addition formulas (i.e. formulas 7.3, 7.5, 7.7, 
7.9, 7.12, 7.14, 7.16 and 7.18 ) and compute the auxiliary variables W and S in all 
doubling formulas (i.e. formulas 7.4, 7.6, 7.8, 7.10, 7.13, 7.15, 7.17 and 7.19). 
Part2 is the number of field operations required to compute the terms that are 
raised to some powers and these powers are functions of xL , yL  and d. Examples 
of part2 are the field operations required to compute xLZ3  and y
LZ3  in all formulas. 
123 
 
• Second, the total number of field operations in any formula is the summation of 
part1 and part2. Hence the total number of field operations is a function of xL , yL  
and d even of a part of it is a constant number. 
Let ),( BTα  and ),( BTβ  be two functions that calculate, respectively, the number 
of multiplication and squaring operations required to raise some term, T, to the power of 
B. Then these alpha and beta functions are used to determine part2 of the total number of 









l ++++= −−−−   with l bit length. Then the average number of ones 
in B is l/2. Hence, according to the square and multiply method, the average values (E) of 
),( BTα  and ),( BTβ  are given by: 
E( ),( BTα ) = l/2 multiplications;  E( ),( BTβ ) = l squaring.  8.1 
However, without loss of generality, xL  and yL  can be selected in a way that 
minimizes part2 computations such as selecting them to be powers of 2. In this case, part2 
computations become squaring only which are faster than multiplications. 
In the following, we present a full example of how the number of field operations 
are calculated in a DPC formula. Consider the optimized addition formula 7.7. The 
number of field operations in this formula is computed as in table 8.1: 
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Table 8. 1: Number of field operations in addition formula 7.7 
 
Term # of Multiplications (M) # of Squaring (S) 
U 2  
V 2  
























































































































































































































By setting xL  = yL  = 1 and d = 3 we get a total number of computations equals to 
2+2+1+0+3+2+1+0+1 = 12M and 0+0+0+0+2+0+0+0+0 = 2S which is identical to the 
number of computations in homogenous coordinate system (section 5.3). 
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The number of computations in other DPC formulas are computed in the same 
way discussed above. However, it is important to mention that the above method is 
applied in both cases when using DPC for E/GF(p) and for E/GF(2m).  
 
8.3 Performance of DPC for E/GF(p)  
As presented in chapter 7, there are several DPC formulas for E/GF(p) for addition 
and doubling operations. These formulas range from general formulas in which no 
constraints in selecting xL  and yL  (with d≥3) to formulas that can be used according to 
certain selection rules of xL  and yL  such as 023 ≥− yx LL  or 0≥− xy LL . However, if the 
main goal is enhancing the performance, then clever selection of xL , yL  and d can reduce 
the number of computations dramatically.  
Tables 8.2 and 8.3 show the computation times in terms of the required number of 
multiplication and squaring operations for addition and doubling operations respectively. 
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Table 8. 2: Computation times for DPC addition operation in E/GF(p). a ∈ (0,1) 
 
Formula Multiplications (M) Squaring (S) 
General–Uniform d ≥ 3 ( )),(),,(max18 ydxd LRLR αα+  ( )),(),,(max2 ydxd LRLR ββ+  



























































































































































































































































































































Equivalent homogenous PC  
d = 3, 1== yx LL  
13 2 
Equivalent  Jacobian PC  





Table 8. 3: Computation times for DPC doubling operation in E/GF(p). a ∈ (0,1) 
 
Formula Multiplications (M) Squaring (S) 
General–Uniform d ≥ 3 ( )),(),(max11 ydxd LSLS αα ++  ( )),(),(max4 ydxd LSLS ββ ++  


























































































































































































































































Equivalent homogenous PC 
d = 3 1== yx LL  
8 5 
Equivalent Jacobian PC 









The first column specifies the DPC system used. The second and third columns 
specify the number of multiplications and squaring respectively. The number of required 
multiplications and squaring are calculated using the method introduced in section 8.2. 
For example, in the case of using general-uniform addition formula (the first row of table 
8.2) the number of required multiplications is ( )),(),,(max18 ydxd LRLR αα+ . Thus, it 
requires 18 multiplications (part1) plus the maximum of ),( xd LRα  and ),( yd LRα (part2). 
Note that we need only the maximum of these two numbers because the other one 
(minimum) will be computed in the way while computing the maximum one.  
Also, Tables 8.2 and 8.3 show the savings in the number of required operations in 
optimized formulas compared to the general formulas. However, for further analyzing of 
performance of DPC in E/GF(p), we compare it with the most popular existing 
(conventional) coordinate systems, namely, homogenous (H), Jacobian (J), modified (M) 
and mixed coordinate systems. Table 8.4 shows the exact number of computations in 
these coordinate systems according to [23] and the corresponding equivalent systems in 
DPC. The first four rows show the number of computations in the conventional projective 
coordinates found in [23]. The second four rows present the DPC systems that are 
equivalent to those conventional ones. The remaining rows show some possible new 
mixed DPC systems that do not exist in [23]-[25]. An example of such new mixed 
coordinates is DPC-HxAyH. In this system the x-coordinate of the input points is 
represented in homogenous coordinates, the y-coordinate is represented in affine 
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coordinates and the result point is represented in homogenous coordinates. Similar other 
mixed systems are listed in the table with their computation times. 
Table 8. 4: Comparisons of field operations using DPC in E/GF(p). 
 
Projective Coordinate (PC) System Addition Doubling 
HHH 12M + 2S 7M + 5S  
JJJ 12M + 4S 4M + 6S  
MMM 13M + 6S  4M + 4S  
AAJ 5M + 3S  2M + 4S  
Optimized DPC (DPC-HHH) 1,3 === Yx LLd  12M + 2S  8M + 5S  
Optimized DPC (DPC-JJJ) 3,2,1 === Yx LLd  12M + 3S  8M + 5S   
Optimized DPC (DPC-MMM) 3,2,1 === Yx LLd  12M + 4S  8M + 4S  

















6M + 2S  4M + 4S  

















7M + 2S  5M + 4S  

















12M + 2S 7M + 4S 

















13M +3S 7M + 5S 

















14M + 2S 10M + 4S 

















15M + 3S 10M + 5S 
 (DPC-HHH = Equivalent homogenous DPC, DPC-JJJ = Equivalent Jacobian DPC  DPC-
MMM = Equivalent modified DPC) 
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By comparing the number of arithmetic operations of the existing coordinate 
systems and the corresponding DPC systems, table 8.4 shows that addition using DPC-
HHH has the same cost as HHH. In case of Jacobian the DPC-JJJ is faster than JJJ by one 
square operation. Also, DPC-MMM is faster than MMM by one multiplication and 2 
squaring operations.  
In the case of doubling operation, HH is faster than DPC-HH by one 
multiplication while JJ has less multiplications and more squaring than DPC-JJ.  
By using mixed DPC formulas for E/GF(p), it is possible to hop from one 
coordinate system to another during the scalar multiplication without the need to perform 
any inversion operation. We mean by hopping is using a coordinate system in iteration i 
of the scalar multiplication and use another (desired) coordinate system in the next 
iteration, i+1. In conventional coordinate systems, hopping is achieved by first converting 
the resulting point of iteration i to the desired coordinate system and then perform the 
point doubling (or addition) in iteration i+1 using the desired coordinate system formulas. 
In DPC, hopping is achieved by simply setting the projecting parameters 3xL  and 3yL  and 
d-parameter of the resulting point of iteration i to the desired values by which point 
operations in iteration i+1 will be performed in the desired coordinate system. In other 
words, hopping in DPC system is achieved by adjusting the projecting parameters 3xL  and 




Tables 8.5 and 8.6 show the cost of hoping among a set of possible DPC systems. 
These tables show only the DPC systems that are equivalent to the conventional 
coordinate systems presented in chapter 5. Other possible coordinate systems can be 
obtained by using different values of 3xL , 3yL  and d. 
However, it should be pointed out that the affine coordinates are used only in the 
boundaries of the scalar multiplication (bolded areas in tables 8.5 and 8.6). i.e. the affine 
base point is converted to any DPC system, scalar multiplication is performed and the 
result is converted back to the affine coordinates. The conversion from affine to any DPC 
system costs nothing since Z can be initialized to 1; while conversion back to affine 
coordinates requires an inversion operation.  Note that conversion back to affine 
coordinates requires an inversion operation in all coordinate systems (conventional as well 
as DPC) regardless of the projective coordinate system used. 
 
Table 8. 5: Hopping cost in DPC system (E/GF(p) Addition operation) 
From \ To Affine DPC-HHH DPC-JJJ DPC-CCC DPC-MMM 
Affine - - - - - 
DPC-HHH 2M + I 16M + 2S 15M + 2S 16M + 3S 15M + 4S 
DPC-JJJ 3M+S+I 18M + 2S 17M + 2S 17M + 2S 17M + 3S 
DPC-CCC 3M+S+I 18M + 2S 17M + 2S 17M + 2S 17M + 3S 
DPC-MMM 3M+S+I 18M + 2S 17M + 2S 17M + 2S 17M + 3S 
 
 
Table 8. 6: Hopping cost in DPC system (E/GF(p) Doubling operation) 
From \ To Affine DPC-HHH DPC-JJJ DPC-CCC DPC-MMM 
Affine - - - - - 
DPC-HHH 2M + I 8M + 5S 7M + 5S 8M + 6S 7M + 7S 
DPC-JJJ 3M+S+I 9M + 5S 8M + 5S 8M + 5S 8M + 6S 
DPC-CCC 3M+S+I 9M + 5S 8M + 5S 8M + 5S 8M + 6S 
DPC-MMM 3M+S+I 9M + 4S 8M + 4S 8M + 4S 8M + 4S 
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Tables 8.5 and 8.6 show that hoping from one DPC system to another during the 
scalar multiplication does not require any inversion operation. On the other hand, in 
conventional coordinate systems, the conversion form homogenous to Jacobian or to any 
Jacobian variant coordinate system (i.e. C and M) requires an inversion operation as 
shown in table 5.2. Same thing happens if converting from Jacobian or Jacobian variant 
coordinate systems to Homogenous. However, conversion among the Jacobian and 
Jacobian variant coordinate systems does not require inversion operation because they are 
actually belong to the same coordinate systems (Jacobian). In other words, they use the 
same transformation functions 2/ ZXx =  and 3/ ZXx = , and hence no need to perform 
the inversion operation. Also, note that table 5.2 shows only the point conversion cost and 
does not include the cost of addition (or doubling) operation. 
Tables 8.7 and 8.8 show the number of multiplications for different values of xL  
and yL  for E/GF(p) optimized DPC addition and doubling operations respectively. For 
each value of xL  there are several possible choices of yL (second column). These choices 
increase as xL  increases. For example, in case of addition operation, if xL  = 1, then we 
have only one yL  possible value while if xL  = 10 we have six possible values of yL . In 
case of doubling operation, if xL  = 1, then we have two possible values of yL  while if xL  
= 5 we have six possible values of yL . This due to the constraints caused by the relations 




Table 8. 7: Possible values of xL  and 
yL for addition operation in E/GF(p) 
xL  
Valid range 
of yL  
Number of 
multiplications 
1 1 12 
2 14 2 
3 15 
3 18 3 
4 18 
4 15 
5 17 4 
6 18 
5 18 






























15 21  
Table 8. 8: Possible values of xL  and 
yL for doubling operation in E/GF(p) 
xL  
Valid range 
of yL  
Number of 
multiplications 
1 7 1 
2 9 
2 9 

























In case of addition operation (table 8.7), for a certain xL , the best choice of  yL  is 
the one with the minimum umber of ones in the binary representation of the terms 
( xy LL − ), ( yx LL 23 − ), ( 2−xdL ), ( 3−ydL ) and (max( xL , yL )). For example, if xL  = 5, 
then the best choice of yL  is 5 while the best choice for xL  = 10 is yL  = 12. 
 Similarly, in case of doubling operation (table 8.8), the best choice of  yL  for a 
certain xL  is the one with the minimum umber of ones in the binary representation of the 
terms ( xy LL − ), ( yx LL −2 ), ( 2−xdL ), ( 3−ydL ) and (max( xL , yL )). For example, if xL  
= 3, then the best choice of yL  is either 3, 4 or 5 while the best choice for xL  = 5 is yL  = 
5 or 9 . 
 
8.4 Performance of DPC for E/GF(2m) 
There are several DPC formulas for E/GF(2m) for both addition and doubling 
operations. These formulas range from general formulas in which no constraints in 
selecting xL  and yL  (with d≥3) to formulas that can be used according to certain selection 
rules of xL  and yL  such as 023 ≥− yx LL  or 0≥− xy LL . Again, if the main goal is 
enhancing the performance, then clever selection of xL , yL  and d can reduce the number 
of computations dramatically.  
Tables 8.9 and 8.10 show the computation times in terms of the required number 




Table 8. 9: Computation times for addition in DPC/GF(2m). a ∈ (0,1) 
Formula Multiplications (M) Squaring (S) 
General–Uniform ( )),(),,(max17 ydxd LTRLTR αα+  ( )),(),,(max1 ydxd LTRLTR ββ+  
General–Mixed ( )),(),,(max17 33 ydxd LTRLTR αα+  ( )),(),,(max1 33 ydxd LTRLTR ββ+  
Optimized-Uniform 
d ≥3, 023 ≥− yx LL , 



























































































































































































































































































d = 3, 1== yx LL  
15 2 
Equivalent  Jacobian PC  








Table 8. 10: Computation times for doubling in DPC/GF(2m). a ∈ (0,1) 
Formula Multiplications (M) Squaring (S) 
General–Uniform ( )),(),,(max10 ydxd LSLS αα+  ( )),(),,(max1 ydxd LSLS ββ+  
General–Mixed ( )),(),,(max10 33 ydxd LSLS αα+  ( )),(),,(max1 33 ydxd LSLS ββ+  
Optimized-Uniform 






















































































































































































Equivalent homogenous PC 
1== yx LL , d = 3 
8 2 
Equivalent Jacobian PC 
d =1, 3,2 == yx LL  
7 2 
 
Similar to what we did in case of E/GF(p), we compare DPC for E/GF(2m) with 
the conventional coordinate systems. Table 8.11 shows the exact number of computations 
of these coordinate systems and the corresponding equivalent systems in DPC for 
E/GF(2m). Although mixed coordinates for E/GF(2m) are not existing in the literature, 




Table 8. 11: Comparisons of field operations using DPC in E/GF(2m). 
PC System Addition Doubling 
HHH 15M + 2S 7M + 5S  
JJJ 14M + 4S 5M + 5S  
Optimized DPC (DPC-HHH) 1,3 === Yx LLd  15M + 2S  8M + 2S  
Optimized DPC (DPC-JJJ) 3,2,1 === Yx LLd  13M + 2S  7M + 2S   
General Mixed DPC (DPC-AAH) 3=d  
02211 ==== YxYx LLLL  
1,1 33 == Yx LL  
8M + 1S  6M + 2S  
General Mixed DPC (DPC-AAJ) 
d =1 
02211 ==== YxYx LLLL  
3,2 33 == Yx LL  
7M + 1S  5M + 2S  
General Mixed DPC (DPC- AxHyH) 

















12M + 1S 8M + 2S 
General Mixed DPC(DPC- AxJyJ) 

















11M +2S 7M + 2S 
General Mixed DPC (DPC- HxAyH) 

















13M + 1S 8M + 3S 
General Mixed DPC (DPC- JxAyJ) 

















15M + 2S 7M + 3S 
DPC-HHH = Equivalent homogenous DPC, DPC-JJJ = Equivalent Jacobian DPC  DPC-




In case of addition operation, table 8.11 shows that DPC-HHH has exactly the 
same number of computations as in HHH and DPC-JJJ is faster than JJJ by one 
multiplication and two squaring operations.  
In doubling operation,  DPC-HH is higher than HH by one multiplication but 
lower by 3 squaring.  Hence by considering S = 0.8M, as in [23], DPC-HH is in total 
faster than HH. Also, DPC-JJ is higher than JJ by two multiplications but lower by 3 
squaring. Hence, under the same assumption, i.e. S = 0.8M, DPC-JJ is faster than JJ. 
Similar to the case of E/GF(p), by using mixed DPC formulas for E/GF(2m), it is 
possible to hop from one coordinate system to another during the scalar multiplication 
without the need to perform any inversion operation. Tables 8.12 and 8.13 show the cost 
of hopping among a set of possible coordinate systems. 
 
Table 8. 12: Hopping cost in DPC system (E/GF(2m) Addition operation) 
From \ To Affine DPC-HHH DPC-JJJ DPC-CCC DPC-MMM 
Affine - - - - - 
DPC-HHH 2M + I 19M+2S 18M+2S 18M+2S 18M+3S 
DPC-JJJ 3M+S+I 20M+2S 19M+2S 19M+2S 19M+3S 
DPC-CCC 3M+S+I 20M+2S 19M+2S 19M+2S 19M+3S 
DPC-MMM 3M+S+I 20M+3S 19M+3S 19M+3S 19M+3S 
 
 
Table 8. 13: Hopping cost in DPC system (E/GF(2m) Doubling operation) 
From \ To Affine DPC-HHH DPC-JJJ DPC-CCC DPC-MMM 
Affine - - - - - 
DPC-HHH 2M + I 8M+2S 7M+2S 8M+3S 8M+4S 
DPC-JJJ 3M+S+I 8M+2S 7M+2S 7M+2S 7M+3S 
DPC-CCC 3M+S+I 8M+2S 7M+2S 7M+2S 7M+3S 




Tables 8.14 and 8.15 show the number of multiplications for different values of xL  
and yL  for E/GF(2
m) optimized DPC addition and doubling operations respectively. For 
each value of xL  there are several possible choices of yL  (second column). These choices 
increase as xL  increases. For example, in case of addition operation, if xL  = 1, then we 
have only one yL  possible value while if xL  = 10 we have six possible values of yL . In 
case of doubling operation, if xL  = 1, then we have two possible values of yL  while if xL  
= 5 we have six possible values of yL . This due to the constraints caused by the relations 
between xL  and yL .  
In case of addition operation (table 8.14), for a certain xL , the best choice of  yL  is 
the one with the minimum umber of ones in the binary representation of the terms 
( xy LL − ), ( yx LL 23 − ), ( 2−xdL ), ( 3−ydL ) and (max( xL , yL )). For example, if xL  = 5, 
then the best choice of yL  is 5 while the best choice for xL  = 10 is yL  = 12. 
 Similarly, in case of doubling operation (table 8.15), the best choice of  yL  for a 
certain xL  is the one with the minimum umber of ones in the binary representation of the 
terms ( yx LL −2 ), ( 2−xdL ), ( 3−ydL ) and (max( xL , yL )). For example, if xL  = 3, then 









Table 8. 14: Possible values of xL  and 








1 1 15 
2 17 2 
3 18 
3 21 3 
4 21 
4 18 
5 20 4 
6 21 
5 21 

































 Table 8. 15: Possible values of xL  and 




of yL  
Number of 
multiplications 
1 1 8 
1 2 10 
2 2 10 
2 3 12 
2 4 10 
3 3 14 
3 4 14 
3 5 14 
3 6 16 
4 4 11 
4 5 14 
4 6 15 
4 7 15 
4 8 12 
5 5 14 
5 6 16 
5 7 16 
5 8 16 
5 9 14 







8.5 Using DPC System 
One of the most important features of DPC is that it automates the selection of the 
projective coordinate system and uses a single mathematical formulation/software code to 
implement different projective coordinate systems. In other words, different projective 
coordinate systems can be implemented by using different values of xLZ  , yLZ and d. For 
example, consider DPC addition formulas 7.7 and doubling formulas 7.8. By setting 
































































Which are identical to the homogenous projective coordinates system (section 5.3 
in chapter 5) in which the transformation functions: ZXx /=  and ZYy /=  are used.  
Also, By setting 3,2 == yx LL  and d = 1, we get a DPC system that is identical to the 
Jacobian projective coordinates system (section 5.3 in chapter 5) in which the 
transformation functions: 2/ ZXx =  and 3/ ZYy =  are used. 
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DPC system can be plugged to any scalar multiplication algorithm such as those in 
[3] and [14] without any restriction. The only thing that is needed to be done is selecting 
the values of the projecting parameters xL  and yL  and the d-parameter. However, there 
are two possible modes for using DPC with any scalar multiplication algorithm. First, is 
initializing the coordinate system and selecting the projecting and d parameters in the 
beginning of the scalar multiplication and fixing that system for the whole scalar 
multiplication iterations. Second, is allowing projective coordinates hopping at any time 
during the scalar multiplication.  
In scalar multiplication, it is required to perform a series of doubling and addition 
operations where the result of one operation is used as input operands to the other. This 
prevents conventional mixed coordinates from benefiting from the efficient mixed 
coordinates such as using HHH for addition and JJ for doubling. This is, however, 
because the result of the ADD operation is represented in  H coordinates while the input 
of the DBL operation must be in J representation. The conversion from H to J 
representation requires an inversion operation as shown in table 5.2. This kind of 
problems do not exit in DPC system since it is possible to dynamically change from one 
coordinate system to another without any inversion operation simply by using mixed DPC 
formulas with setting 3xL  and 3yL  to the desired values.  
In window based methods, DPC can use different projective coordinate systems 
for different phases of the scalar multiplication. Fore example, a certain coordinate system 
can be used for the pre-computation phase of the scalar multiplication while other 
coordinate systems can be used for addition and/or doubling operations in the main loop. 
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Furthermore, different blocks (or windows) of the scalar K can use different projective 
coordinate systems. 
Finally, it worth to mention that each run of the scalar multiplication can start with 
new coordinate system every time. This is because DPC system lends itself to randomize 
the scalar multiplication simply by randomizing the projecting parameters.  
 
8.6 Conclusions 
This chapter discussed the performance and using of DPC. The performance of 
DPC for addition and doubling operations in both E/GF(p) and E/GF(2m) has been 
analyzed. We conclude that the number of field operations required is a function of the 
projecting parameters xL  and yL  and the d-parameter. Various tables that show the 
number for required operations for several coordinate systems were presented.  
Also, this chapter studied how the DPC can be used. DPC uses a single 
mathematical formulation/software code to implement different projective coordinate 
systems. Hence, we conclude that DPC system can be plugged to any scalar multiplication 
algorithm. However, two possible modes for using DPC with any scalar multiplication 
algorithm were been discussed. First, initializing the coordinate system and selecting the 
projecting and d parameters in the beginning of the scalar multiplication and fixing that 
system for the whole scalar multiplication iterations. Second, is allowing projective 






Scalar Multiplication Security In Presence of DPC 
 
9.1 Introduction 
Since the scalar multiplication is the part of any elliptic curve cryptosystem that is 
directly correlated to the secret scalar K, researcher have become increasingly aware of 
the possibility of side channel attacks that exploits specific properties of the 
implementation of the scalar multiplication. As discussed in chapter 6, there are many 
countermeasures that can be used to protect against these attacks. However, non of these 
countermeasures are guaranteed to defeat all the side channel attacks. For example, many 
countermeasures against differential power analysis attacks rely on randomizing the 
projective coordinates. But all these countermeasures are vulnerable to the projective 
coordinates leak since they depend on pre-determined projective coordinate systems. 
Moreover, these countermeasures are vulnerable to the newly proposed attacks such as 
RPA, ZPA, DA, ABDPA attacks.  
According to the proposed classification, presented in chapter 6, of side channel 
attacks, in this chapter, we propose and analyze countermeasures for operation-and-data 
dependent and data-dependent attacks. We mean by operation-and-data dependent attacks 
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is the attacks that are based on both the data being manipulated and the operations being 
performed on this data. Also, we propose countermeasures for address-dependent attacks. 
For each of the proposed countermeasure, we provide  the security and complexity 
analysis. 
All the proposed countermeasures are based on using the DPC system as the 
coordinate system. This is because the DPC system lends itself to randomization simply 
by randomizing the projecting parameters xL  and yL  and/or d-parameter. Also, all the 
proposed countermeasures are applied to both E/GF(p) and E/GF(2m). 
However, the following notations are used through out this chapter. DPC_ADD 
means any DPC addition formula. DPC_DBL means any DPC doubling formula. Also, 
we use the word "mixed" or "optimized" in front of these notations to specify the mixed 
and optimized DPC formulas.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 9.2 discusses the proposed 
countermeasures for operation-and-data dependent attacks. The proposed 
countermeasures for address-dependent attacks are addressed in section 9.3. Finally, 
section 9.4 gives the conclusions.  
 
9.2 Countermeasures for Operation and Data Dependent Attacks 
As discussed in chapter 6, most of attacks are operation-dependent and at the same 
time data-dependent such as DPA and DA attacks. Some other attacks are data-dependent 
only such as RPA, ZPA and PCL. The existing countermeasures (section 6.9) do not 
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defeat all these attacks. More precisely, if a countermeasure defends one attack it may not 
defend the others. In the following, we show the attacks that each countermeasure cannot 
defend according to the mentioned reference. 
• Randomizing the base point (code = 010). (Coron's 2nd countermeasure) does not 
protect RPA [30].  
• Randomizing projective coordinates (code = 010) does not protect RPA, ZPA 
[31]. 
• Randomizing the scalar (code = 001) does not protect PCL [42]. 
• N. Smart's trick (code = 010) does not protect RPA, ZPA [31] and some cases of 
PCL [42]. 
• Non of the above countermeasures protect address bit DPA (ABDPA) [38]. 
Therefore, it is desired to find countermeasures to protect against these type of attacks. 
In this chapter, we propose three countermeasures for operation-and-data dependent and 
data-dependent attacks and two countermeasures for address-dependent attacks. All the 
proposed countermeasures are based on the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 9.1: By randomizing the projecting parameters xL  and yL  and/or d parameter in 
any addition and doubling DPC formula, both the data being manipulated and the number 
of operations being performed are randomized.  
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Proof: Given that xL  and yL  and/or d are initialized randomly. Then the proof consists of 
the following three parts: 
1. Each auxiliary variable T in any formula of the formulas presented in chapter 7 is a 
function of either xL , yL  and/or d. Hence, the value of T is randomized since xL  
and yL  and/or d are initialized randomly. 
2. Each of the variables 3X , 3Y  x
LZ3  and y
LZ3  which form the resultant point 
( 3X , 3Y , x
LZ3 , y
LZ3 ) of any formula of the formulas presented in chapter 7 is a 
function of either xL , yL  and/or d. Hence, the values of these variables are 
randomized since xL  and yL  and/or d are initialized randomly. 
3. As shown in tables 8.2, 8.3, 8.9 and 8.10, the number of required operations for 
each formula of the formulas presented in chapter 7 is a function of either xL , yL  
and/or d. Hence, the number of required operations are randomized since xL  and 
yL  and/or d are initialized randomly. 
 In the following, we introduce the proposed countermeasures and for each 
countermeasure, we do the following: 
• Apply the countermeasure to the binary ML and binary NAF algorithms (4.2 and 
4.8) respectively. We have chosen these two algorithms because they are the most 
widely used scalar multiplication algorithms.  
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• Analyze the security of the countermeasure by showing the attacks that the 
countermeasure can resist and how; and the attacks that the countermeasure cannot 
resist and why.  
• Analyze the complexity of the countermeasure by showing the cost in terms of 
number of field operations required for the countermeasure itself and the cost of 
applying it to the ML and binary NAF algorithms. 
 
Countermeasure 1: This countermeasure uses the DPC system with randomly initialized 
projecting parameters, xL , yL  and d. Countermeasure1 randomizes xL , yL  and d in the 
beginning of each run of the scalar multiplication. Hence, each execution of the scalar 
multiplication has its own coordinate system with different data values and different 
number of field operations. Although any DPC addition or doubling formula can be used 
for this countermeasure, it is preferred to use the optimized formulas since they require 
less number of field operations such as using formula 7.7 for addition in E/GF(p) and 7.16 
for addition in GF(2m) (see tables 8.2, 8.3, 8.9 and 8.10).  
Algorithms 9.1 and  9.2 show the application of this countermeasure to the binary 






INPUT K, P 
OUTPUT    KP 
7. xL = rand(1..N) , yL = rand(1..N), d = rand(3..N) 
8. Set Z = 1 then compute P = (X,Y,1,1) 
9. Initialize Q[2] = P 
10. for i = n-2 down to 0 
11.      Q[0] = DPC_DBL(Q[2]) 
12.      Q[1] = DPC_ADD(Q[0], P) 
13.      Q[2] = Q[ki] 
14. end for 
15. Convert Q[2] to affine coordinate. 
       Return Q[2] 
Algorithm 9. 1: Binary ML algorithm with countermeasure1 
 
Input: An integer K an a point P = (x,y) ∈ E/GF(q) 
Output: The point Q = KP ∈ E/GF(q) 
1. Compute NAF(K) = (ul-1 … u1u0) 
2. xL = rand(1..N) , yL = rand(1..N), d = rand(3..N) 
3. Set Z = 1 then compute P = (X,Y,1,1) 
4. Q = ∞ 
5. for j = l - 1 downto 0 do 
6. Q = DPC_DBL(Q) 
7. if ul = 1  then 
8.          Q = DPC_ADD(Q, P) 
9. if ul = –1  then 
10.          Q = DPC_ADD(Q, – P) 
11. Convert Q to affine coordinate. 
  Return (Q) 
Algorithm 9. 2: Binary NAF algorithm with countermeasure1 
 
Security analysis of Countermeasure1:  
The number of field operations in DPC_ADD and DPC_DBL is determined in the 
beginning of the scalar multiplication when the values of xL , yL  and d are initialized. 
These numbers remain fixed during the whole scalar multiplication. In the next run of the 
scalar multiplication, new values of xL , yL  and d will be initiated and hence the number 
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of field operations in DPC_ADD and DPC_DBL will be changed accordingly. Based on 
that, this countermeasure can resist DPA, DFA, DEMA and DA. 
Also, any register used in DPC_ADD and DPC_DBL operations changes at each 
execution. Hence this countermeasure is resistant against RPA, ZPA and PCL attacks. 
Since countermeasure1 has nothing to do with addresses of variables, algorithm 
9.1 is not immune against ABDPA. This is because there is still a direct correlation 
between the register transfer operation in step 7 and the scalar bit value. On the other 
hand, algorithm 9.2 is immune against ABDPA by its nature since the locations of 
operands of DPC_ADD and DPC_DBL operations are independent of the scalar bit 
values. 
Finally, it is worth to mention that countermeasure1 resists SPA since it uses 
double-and-add always method in algorithm 9.1. In algorithm 9.2, the addition operations 
are not conditioned by the value of the scalar bit. 
 
Complexity analysis of Countermeasure1:  









n ++++= −−−−  where n is the number of bits. 
Let A and D denotes the number of field operations (multiplications + squaring) in 
DPC_ADD and DPC_DBL respectively. In other words, A contains the number of 
multiplications and squaring in DPC_ADD and D contains the number of multiplications 
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and squaring in DPC_DBL. Fore example,  A = 12M + 2S and D = 8M + 5S in case of 
using DPC-HHH system. Since the DPC_ADD and DPC_DBL operations are performed 
in each iteration of algorithm 9.1 (double-and-add always), then its Expected Running 
Time (ERT) is given by [52]: 
 ERT(Algorithm 9.1) = An + Dn      9.1 
With n being the bit length of the scalar K. 
The values of A and D are given in tables 8.2 and 8.3 for E/GF(p) and in tables 8.9 
and 8.10 for E/GF(2m). Note that the number of field operations in A and D differ from 
one DPC formula to the other. For example, the ERT of algorithm 9.1 when using the 
general DPC_ADD and DPC_DBL formulas is given by: 
ERT(Algorithm 9.1) =  
( ) ( )( ) +++++ nMLSELSELRELRE ydxdydxd )),(()),((max11)),(()),,((max18 αααα  
( ) ( )( )nSLSELSELRELRE ydxdydxd )),(()),((max4)),(()),,((max2 ββββ ++++  
Where the letter E before alpha and beta functions means their expected values which are 
given by equation 8.1 (see section 8.2). Note that M denotes multiplication and S denotes 
squaring. 
 Table 9.1 shows the expected running times of algorithm 9.1 when using some 





Table 9. 1: Expected running times of algorithm 9.1 for specified DPC systems 
 
Coordinate system ERT in case of E/GF(p) ERT in case of E/GF(2m) 
Optimized DPC-HHH 20n M + 7n S 23n M + 4n S 
Optimized DPC-JJJ 20n M + 8n S 20n M + 4n S 
n = bit length of the recoded scalar, M = multiplication and S = squaring 
 
 In case of algorithm 9.2, given that the binary representation of the recoded scalar 









l ++++= −−−−      9.2 
Then according to [52] the average density of non zero digits in U is l/3 where l is 
the bit length of U. Based on that, the expected running time of algorithm 9.2 is: 
ERT(Algorithm 9.2) = lDAl +
3
      9.3 
with A and D given in tables 8.2 and 8.3 for E/GF(p) and in tables 8.9 and 8.10 for 
E/GF(2m). For example, the ERT  of algorithm 9.2 when using the general DPC_ADD 
and DPC_DBL formulas is given by: 
ERT(Algorithm 9.2) =  
( )( ) ( )( ) +⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ ++++ MlLSELSElLRELRE ydxdydxd )),(()),((max113)),(()),,((max18 αααα  




 Table 9.2 shows the expected running times of algorithm 9.2 when using some 
specific DPC systems. 
 
Table 9. 2: Expected running times of algorithm 9.2 for specified DPC systems 
 
Coordinate system ERT in case of E/GF(p) ERT in case of E/GF(2m) 
Optimized DPC-HHH 12l M + 5.66l S 13l M + 2.66l S 
Optimized DPC-JJJ 12l M + 6l S 11.33l M + 2.66l S 
l = bit length of the recoded scalar, M = multiplication and S = squaring 
 
Countermeasure 2: This countermeasure is based in using DPC in conjunction with 
exponent (scalar) splitting (ES) method as follows:  
1. ES splits the scalar K into two parts R and (K – R) using a random number R.  
2. Computes RPP =1 , PRKP )(2 −=  and then 21 PPKP += . 
1P  and 2P   are computed using DPC with randomly initialized projecting 
parameters. These parameters could be the same for both points (i.e. for 1P  and 2P ) or 
be different. In case of different projecting parameters, the final addition to get 
21 PPKP += , is performed either using a mixed addition formula that allows using 
different projective coordinates, or performed using the affine coordinates since it is 
the last operation and the final result should be presented in the affine coordinates.  
Let the number of bits in R and (K – R) be 1n  and 2n  respectively. Then the binary 











n ++++= −−−−  
Algorithms 9.3 and  9.4 show the application of this countermeasure to the binary 
ML and binary NAF algorithms respectively. Note that in case of binary NAF, 
countermeasure2 splits the scalar before recoding and then R and (K – R) are recoded 
separately. In this case, 1n  and 2n  become the bit length of U1 and U2 respectively. 









l ++++= −−−−  (see section 4.5.3) with bit length l equals to n 
or grater by only 1. 
 
Security analysis of Countermeasure2: 
The security analysis of countermeasure1 is applicable to phase1 and phase2 of 
countermeasure2. That is, each phase is immune against DPA, DFA, and DA since the 
number of operations is randomized and immune against RPA, ZPA, and PCL since the 
data manipulated is also randomized. Furthermore, countermeasure2 resists SPA and DPA 
in the same way discussed in countermeasure1. Also, algorithm 9.3 does not resist 
ABDPA for the same reason addressed in countermeasure1.  
However, countermeasure2 has an additional security strength resulting from 
random splitting the scalar into two scalars. This is because in each run of the scalar 
multiplication the data and the number of operations will be randomized since R and (K – 
R) will have different values in each run. 
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INPUT K, P 
OUTPUT    KP 
  Phase 1: 
1. R = rand(1..K-1) 
2. xL = rand(1..N) , yL = rand(1..N), d = 
rand(3..N) 
3. Set Z = 1 then compute P = (X,Y,1,1) 
4. Initialize Q[2] = P 
5. for i = 1n -2 down to 0 
6.      Q[0] = Optimized_DPC_DBL(Q[2]) 
7.      Q[1] = Optimized_DPC_ADD(Q[0], P) 
8.      Q[2] = Q[ ir ] 
9. end for 
10. 1P  = Q[2] 
  Phase 2:  
11. K = K – R  
12. xL = rand(1..N) , yL = rand(1..N), d = 
rand(3..N) 
13. Set Z = 1 then compute P = (X,Y,1,1) 
14. Initialize Q[2] = P 
15. for i = 2n -2 down to 0 
16.      Q[0] = Optimized_DPC_DBL(Q[2]) 
17.      Q[1] = Optimized_DPC_ADD(Q[0], P) 
18.      Q[2] = Q[ ik ] 
19. end for 
20. 1P  = 1P  + Q[2] 
21. Convert 1P  to affine coordinate. 
       Return ( 1P ) 
 Input: K , P  
Output: The point Q = KP  
1. R = rand(1..K-1) 
  Phase 1: 
2. Compute NAF(U) = ( 11−nu 21−nu  … 0u ) 
3. xL = rand(1..N) , yL = rand(1..N), d = 
rand(3..N) 
4. Set Z = 1 then compute P = (X,Y,1,1) 
5. Q = ∞ 
6. for i = 1n  - 1 downto 0 do 
7. Q = Optimized_DPC_DBL(Q) 
8. if iu  = 1  then 
9.          Q = Optimized_DPC_ADD(Q, P) 
10. if iu  = –1  then 
11.          Q = Optimized_DPC_ADD(Q, – P) 
12. 1P = Q 
  Phase 2: 
13. Compute NAF(K-R) U = ( 12−nu 22−nu  … 
0u ) 
14. xL = rand(1..N) , yL = rand(1..N), d = 
rand(3..N) 
15. Set Z = 1 then compute P = (X,Y,1,1) 
16. Q = ∞ 
17. for i = 2n  - 1 downto 0 do 
18. Q = Optimized_DPC_DBL(Q) 
19. if iu  = 1  then 
20.          Q = Optimized_DPC_ADD(Q, P) 
21. if iu  = –1  then 
22.          Q = Optimized_DPC_ADD(Q, – P) 
23. 1P = 1P  +  Q 
24. Convert 1P  to affine coordinate. 
  Return ( 1P ) 
Algorithm 9. 3: Binary ML algorithm with 
countermeasure2 







Complexity analysis of Countermeasure2: 
Countermeasure2 computes KP by almost the same cost as countermeasure1 since 
each phase uses the double-and-add always method. However, there are an extra final 
addition operation to compute 21 PPKP += . Also, computing K = K – R requires one 
word-length subtraction operation which can be neglected.  
 
Countermeasure3: A third countermeasure uses the ability of DPC to dynamically hop 
from one coordinate system to another half the way in the scalar multiplication. This 
hopping can be achieved by using general or optimized mixed addition and doubling 
formulas. This kind of formulas have the ability to perform the addition and doubling 
operations in totally different projective coordinates. Furthermore, these formulas do not 
requires any inversion operation to change form one coordinate system to the other. 
However, dynamic hopping can range from hopping in each iteration of the scalar 
multiplication (full hopping) to non-hopping which is identical to the case of 
countermeasure1.  
Countermeasure3 can be performed as follows: 
1. Randomly initialize the projecting parameters 1xL , 1yL , 2xL , 2yL , 3xL , 3yL  and d 
parameter. Note that we need to use all these parameters since the mixed formulas 
are used. 
2. Start the scalar multiplication. 
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3. In each iteration, based on the value of a random bit r, randomly select new 
parameters 3xL , 3yL  and d. i.e. if r = 1, then 3xL  = rand (1..N), 3yL = rand (1..N), 
and d = rand (3..N); otherwise keep the old values. This random selection is called 
a hop.  
Algorithms 9.5 and  9.6 show the application of this countermeasure to the binary 
ML and binary NAF algorithms respectively.  
 
INPUT K, P 
OUTPUT    KP 
1. 1xL = rand(1..N) , 1yL = rand(1..N), d = rand(3..N) 
2. 2xL = rand(1..N) , 2yL = rand(1..N) 
3. 3xL = rand(1..N) , 3yL = rand(1..N) 
4. Set Z = 1 then compute P = (X,Y,1,1) 
5. Initialize Q[2] = P 
6. for i = n-2 down to 0 
7.       if (r = rand(0..1) = 1) then 
8.             3xL = rand(1..N) , 3yL = rand(1..N) 
9.      Q[0] = Mixed_DPC_DBL(Q[2]) 
10.      Q[1] = Mixed_DPC_ADD(Q[0], P) 
11.      Q[2] = Q[ki] 
12. end for 
13. Convert Q[2] to affine coordinate. 
       Return Q[2] 








Input: An integer K an a point P = (x,y) ∈ E/GF(q) 
Output: The point Q = KP ∈ E/GF(q) 
1. Compute NAF(K) = (ul-1 … u1u0) 
2. 1xL = rand(1..N) , 1yL = rand(1..N), d = rand(3..N) 
3. 2xL = rand(1..N) , 2yL = rand(1..N) 
4. 3xL = rand(1..N) , 3yL = rand(1..N) 
5. Set Z = 1 then compute P = (X,Y,1,1) 
6. Q = ∞ 
7. for j = l - 1 downto 0 do 
8.       if (r = rand(0..1) = 1) then 
9.             3xL = rand(1..N) , 3yL = rand(1..N) 
10.      Q = Mixed_DPC_DBL(Q) 
11.      if ul = 1  then 
12.               Q = Mixed_DPC_ADD(Q, P) 
13.      if ul = –1  then 
14.               Q = Mixed_DPC_ADD(Q, – P) 
15. end for 
16. Convert Q to affine coordinate. 
  Return (Q) 
Algorithm 9. 6: Binary NAF algorithm with countermeasure3 
 
Security analysis of Countermeasure3: 
The security analysis of this countermeasure is similar to that of countermeasure1 
except that it uses mixed DPC formulas in which each coordinate of each point has it own 
different projecting parameters.  
According to step1 of countermeasure3, the number of field operations and the 
data manipulated will be randomized in each run of the scalar multiplication. Hence this 
countermeasure has the same security as countermeasure1. i.e. it can defend the same 
attacks defended by countermeasure1. Moreover, in any iteration of the scalar 
multiplication, one or more of the projecting parameters 3xL , 3yL  and/or d can hop to a 
new random value. This introduces intermediate randomization inside execution of the 
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scalar multiplication where it can guard any similarity analysis of different blocks of the 
scalar multiplication.  
Since countermeasure3 has nothing to do with addresses of variables, algorithm 
9.5 is not immune against ABDPA. This is because there is still a direct correlation 
between the register transfer operation in step 11 and the scalar bit value. On the other 
hand, algorithm 9.6 is immune against ABDPA by its nature since the locations of 
operands of DPC_ADD and DPC_DBL operations are independent of the scalar bit 
values. 
Algorithm 9.5 resists SPA because of: First, it uses double-and-add always 
method. Second, the projective coordinates hopping in the intermediate iterations is 
applied to both the addition and doubling operations to prevent any distinguishably 
between them. Recall that the addition and doubling operations are performed in each 
iteration independently from the scalar bit value. Third, projective coordinates hopping 
happens at random iterations without any correlation between this hopping and the scalar 
bit value. i.e. the projective coordinates hopping is independent of the scalar bit values.  
Also, algorithm 9.6 resists SPA because the addition operations are not 
conditioned by the value of the scalar bit. Moreover, the "Third" argument above is valid 






Complexity analysis of Countermeasure3: 
The expected running time of algorithms 9.5 and 9.6 are given by 9.1 and 9.3 
respectively with the values of A and D being the number of filed operations for addition 
and doubling operations for the mixed DPC formulas only. The number of field 
operations of such formulas are given in tables 8.2 and 8.3 for E/GF(p) and in tables 8.9 
and 8.10 for E/GF(2m). For example, the ERT of algorithm 9.5 when using the general 
mixed DPC_ADD and DPC_DBL formulas is given by: 

































































































Where the letter E before alpha and beta functions means their expected values which are 
given by equation 8.1 (see section 8.2). 
On the other hand, the ERT of algorithm 9.6 when using the general mixed 
DPC_ADD and DPC_DBL formulas is given by: 



































































































9.3 Countermeasures for Address-Dependent Attacks 
Since most of the scalar multiplication binary algorithms are vulnerable to 
address-bit-DPA attack (ABDPA), it is desired to find an immune algorithm to such 
attack. Here, we prose two ML algorisms called Add-Add algorithm and transition-based 
algorithm that can be used in conjunction with DPC system. These algorithms can be used 
to protect against class C attack. Fortunately, these algorithms can also be used to protect 
against doubling attack. However, it is worth to mention that DPC can be plugged to any 
of these algorithms. Hence, we will concentrate in describing the proposed algorithms 
letting the use of DPC to be default argument. 
 
  9.3.1 Add-Add Algorithm 
This algorithm is a ML algorithm.  It performs one ADD operation followed by 
another ADD operation in each iteration of a scalar multiplication. In any iteration of the 
scalar multiplication, the first ADD and the second ADD operations are performed in a 
fixed sequence (ADD Æ ADD). i.e. they will be performed in all iterations in the same 
order independently of the scalar bit values.  Note that we can get –P by simply negating 
the y-coordinate of P in case of GF(p) and adding x to y coordinates in case of GF(2m). 







INPUT K, P 
OUTPUT    KP 
1. Initialize Q[0] = P(or 2P); Q[1] = 2P(or P);     Q[2] = P 
2. for i = n-2 down to 0 
3.      Q[0] = ADD(Q[1],Q[0]) 
4.      Q[1] = ADD((Q[0], (-1)1-ki Q[2])] 
5. end for 
            return Q[1- k0] 
Algorithm 9. 7: Add-Add algorithm 
 
The second ADD operation performs the addition operation on the contents of 
Q[0] and Q[2]. The result is stored in Q[1]. The effect of ik−− 1)1( in step 4 of the algorithm 
can be explained as follows. First, note that the contents of Q[2] is always P. If the current 
bit ik  is 1, P will be added to Q[0]. Otherwise (i.e. for ik  = 0), –P is added to Q[0].  
Figure 9.1 presents two examples of Add-Add algorithm. The upper table of the 
Figure shows the values of Q[0], Q[1], and Q[2] in all iterations of calculating 173P. The 
lower table shows all iterations of calculating 155P. 
 
K 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Q[2] 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Q[0] 1 3 5 11 21 43 87 173 
Q[1] 2 2 6 10 22 44 86 174 
         
K 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Q[2] 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Q[0] 1 3 5 9 19 39 77 155 
Q[1] 2 2 4 10 20 38 78 156 
Figure 9. 1: Two examples of Add-Add algorithm. 
Upper table calculates 173P. Lower table calculates 155P. 
 
Add-Add algorithm resists doubling attack by its nature since no doubling 
operation at all. It resists ABDPA since it reads its operands from a fixed locations 
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regardless of the scalar bit value. When –P is needed it is simply computed (it can be 
computed all the times). 
 
9.3.2 Transition-Based Algorithm 
This algorithm is a ML algorithm. In any iteration, doubling and addition 
operations are performed in a fixed sequence, denoted by DBLÆADD. In other words, 
DBL and ADD operations are always performed in all iterations in the same order 
independently of the bit values of a scalar. The most important property of this algorithm 
is that in the i-th iteration of calculating KP, the selection of the input operand of DBL 
operation is dependant on the existence of a transition between bits ik  and 1+ik  of a scalar 
K and it is not dependant directly on the value of ik . The steps of the transition-based 
algorithm are shown in algorithm 9.8. 
 
INPUT K, P 
OUTPUT    KP 
1. Initialize Q[0] = P; Q[1] = 2P 
2. for i = n-2 down to 0 
3.      Q[2] = DBL(Q[1 – (ki ⊕ ki+1)]) 
4.      Q[0] = ADD(Q[1],Q[0]] 
5.      Q[1] = Q[2] 
6. end for 
            return Q[1- k0] 
Algorithm 9. 8: Transition-based algorithm 
 
The choice of input operand of DBL operation in step3 is based on existence of a 
transition between ik  and 1+ik  bits of the scalar. If there is a transition from 0 to 1 or from 
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1 to 0 between bits ik  and 1+ik , Q[0] is doubled and the result is stored in Q[2]; otherwise 
(i.e. ik  and 1+ik  are both 1’s or both are 0’s and hence no transition) Q[1] is doubled and 
the result is stored in Q[2]. 
Figure 9.2 presents two examples transition-based algorithm. The upper table of 
the Figure shows the values of Q[0], Q[1], and Q[2] in all iterations of calculating 173P. 
The lower table shows all iterations of calculating 155P. 
 
K 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Q[2]   2 6 10 22 44 86 174 
Q[0] 1 3 5 11 21 43 87 173 
Q[1] 2 2 6 10 22 44 86 174 
         
K 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Q[2]   2 4 10 20 38 78 156 
Q[0] 1 3 5 9 19 39 77 155 
Q[1] 2 2 4 10 20 38 78 156 
Figure 9. 2: Two examples Transition-Based algorithm.  
Upper table calculates 173P. Lower table calculates 155P. 
 
Transition-based algorithm resists ABDPA in the sense that the same location 
(address) is accessed either on a transition from 1 to 0 or from 0 to 1.  Therefore, it is 
difficult to detect whether this transition is from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0. The same argument 
can hold in the absence of a transition. In this case, an attacker cannot know whether the 
previous bit was 1 and remains 1 or was 0 and remains 0 since the same address is used in 
both cases.  
Transition-based algorithm resists DA in the same scenario described above since 
the operand of the doubling operation is chosen based on the existence/absence of a 
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transition. The same operand is doubled either on a transition from 1 to 0 or from 0 to 1.  
Therefore, it is difficult to detect whether this transition is from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0. On 
the other hand, in the case of transition absence, the same operand is doubled whether the 
previous bit was 1 and remains 1 or was 0 and remains 0. 
 
Countermeasure4: Combining Add-Add and Transition-based Algorithms  
The first iteration of  transition-based algorithm is weak against ABDPA since the 
most significant bit of the key, 1−nk , is always known to be 1. In this case, an attacker can 
find the value of the second most significant bit 2−nk  depending on whether the input 
operand of DBL operation is Q[1] or Q[0] as stated in step 3 of the algorithm. To 
overcome this difficulty we use the Add-Add algorithm to perform the initial iteration. 
This is because it has the property that its initial step is independent of the content of Q[0] 
and Q[1] which could be either the points P and 2P or 2P and P respectively. In other 
words, when using Add-Add algorithm in the first iteration, an attacker can not detect the 
value of the next most significant bit,   2−nk , even though the value of the most significant 
bit, 2−nk , is always known to be 1. It is this property of Add-Add algorithm that is used to 
overcome the possible leaking of information about 2−nk  in the first iteration of transition-
based algorithm. This combination of Add-Add and transition-based algorithms is used to 
prevent any leakage of information about 2−nk . Once the value of 2−nk  is protected against 





This chapter discussed the security of DPC. We have proposed and analyzed 
countermeasures for operation-and-data dependent and address-dependent attacks.  
All the proposed countermeasures are based on using the DPC system as the 
coordinate system since it has the ability to lends itself to randomization simply by 
randomizing the projecting parameters xL  and yL  and/or d-parameter. We conclude that 
by randomizing the projecting parameters xL  and yL  and/or d parameter in any addition 
and doubling DPC formula, both the data being manipulated and the number of operations 
being performed are randomized. 
Also, we conclude that all the proposed countermeasures can be applied to both 









The main objective of this chapter is to summarize the results obtained in this 
thesis. Another aim is to provide some suggestions for future work that may be carried out 
based on the results obtained.  
This chapter is subdivided as follows. Section 10.2 summarizes the work 
undertaken in the thesis. Section 10.3 presents some suggestions for future research.  
 
10.2 Overview and Summary of The Work in The Thesis 
The work undertaken in this thesis is mainly in three parts: first, proposing the 
new Dynamic Projective Coordinate (DPC) system. Second, analyzing performance of the 
proposed DPC and discussing how it can be used. Third, developing DPC-based 
countermeasures and algorithms that can cover all the classes of the side channel attacks 





10.2.1 DPC System 
10.2.1.1 Overview 
In this thesis, a new approach, called Dynamic Projective Coordinate (DPC) 
system was proposed. It allows the computing/encrypting device to select the projective 
coordinate system either at random, or according to a certain rule. 
DPC automates the selection of the projective coordinate system and uses a single 
mathematical formulation/software code to implement different projective coordinate 
systems. Different projective coordinates can be implemented by using two parameters 
where one parameter defines the projection of the x-coordinate and a second parameter 
defines the projection of the y-coordinate of an elliptic curve point. This allows different 
projective coordinates to be used within the same mathematical formulation in calculating 
the scalar multiplication. 
 
10.2.1.2 Summary of The Results 
In this part of the thesis, we obtained the following formulas for elliptic curve 
defined over finite fields GF(p) and GF(2m): 
1. General dynamic addition and doubling formulas that allow different projective 
coordinate systems to be used within the same mathematical formulation. In these 
formulas, xL  and yL  can be selected without any restriction. In other words no 
relation between them. 
2. Optimized dynamic addition and doubling formulas that use DPC system and 
minimize the computation time through reducing the required number of filed 
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operations. In these formulas, xL  and yL  are selected according to certain rules to 
minimize the number of required operations. 
3. Mixed dynamic addition and doubling formulas in which each coordinate can be 
projected using its own projecting parameter resulting in the most mixing degree 
of coordinates ever. In this way, coordinates of the same point can be represented 
in different coordinate systems 
 
10.2.2 Performance of DPC System  
10.2.2.1 Overview 
The performance of DPC for addition and doubling operations in both E/GF(p) 
and E/GF(2m) has been analyzed. We conclude that the number of field operations 
required is a function of the projecting parameters xL  and yL  and the d-parameter. 
Various tables that show the number for required operations for several coordinate 
systems were presented.  
 
10.2.2.2 Summary of The Results 
In this part of the thesis, we obtained the following results: 
First, in case of E/GF(p) 
1. Addition using DPC-HHH has exactly the same number of computations as in 
HHH.  
2. Addition using DPC-JJJ is faster than JJJ by one squaring operation.  
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3. Addition using DPC-MMM is faster than MMM by one multiplication and 2 
squaring operations.  
1. Doubling using HH is faster than DPC-HH by one multiplication  
2. Doubling using JJ has less multiplications and more squaring than DPC-JJ. 
Second, in case of E/GF(2m) 
1. Addition using DPC-HHH has exactly the same number of computations as in 
HHH 
2.  Addition using DPC-JJJ is faster than JJJ by one multiplication and two squaring 
operations.  
3. Doubling using DPC-HH is higher than HH by one multiplication but lower by 3 
squaring.  Hence by considering S = 0.8M, as in [23], DPC-HH is in total faster 
than HH.  
4. Doubling using DPC-JJ is higher than JJ by two multiplications but lower by 3 
squaring.  Hence by considering S = 0.8M, as in [23], DPC-JJ is in total faster than 
JJ. 
5. Various dynamic mixed coordinates for E/GF(2m) for addition and doubling 
operations. Note that the conventional mixed coordinates for E/GF(2m) are not 
existed in the literature. 
 
10.2.3 Using DPC System 
In this thesis, we studied how the DPC can be used. DPC uses a single 
mathematical formulation/software code to implement different projective coordinate 
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systems. Hence, we conclude that DPC system can be plugged into any scalar 
multiplication algorithm. However, two possible modes for using DPC with any scalar 
multiplication algorithm were discussed. First, initializing the coordinate system and 
selecting the projecting and d parameters in the beginning of the scalar multiplication and 
fixing that system for all scalar multiplication iterations. Second, is allowing projective 
coordinates hopping at any time during the scalar multiplication.  
 
10.2.4 Scalar Multiplication Security in Presence of DPC System 
10.2.4.1 Overview 
In this thesis, we proposed DPC-based countermeasures for each class of the 
classes of attacks presented in chapter 6. A common property among the proposed DPC-
Based countermeasures is that the scalar multiplication can be randomized by simply 
varying one of the projecting parameter used. We conclude that by randomizing xL , yL  
and d parameters, we randomize both the data being manipulated and the number of 
operations being performed in the scalar multiplication.  
 
10.2.4.2 Summary of The Results 
In this part of the thesis, we obtained the following results: 
First, Proposed Countermeasures 
Countermeasure 1: This countermeasure uses the DPC system with randomly initialized 
projecting parameters, xL , yL  and d. It randomizes xL , yL  and d in the beginning of each 
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run of the scalar multiplication. Hence, each execution of the scalar multiplication has its 
own coordinate system with different data values and different number of field operations. 
Countermeasure 2: This countermeasure is based on using DPC in conjunction with 
exponent (scalar) splitting (ES) method.  ES splits the scalar K into two parts r and (K – r) 
using a random number r . The scalar multiplication is then computed as, 
21 PPKP += , where rPP =1 , PrKP )(2 −=  
1P  and 2P   are computed using DPC with randomly initialized projecting 
parameters. These parameters could be the same for both points (i.e. for 1P  and 2P ) or 
be different. 
Countermeasure 3: A third countermeasure uses the ability of DPC to dynamically hop 
from one coordinate system to another half the way in the scalar multiplication. This 
hopping can be achieved by using general or optimized mixed addition and doubling 
formulas which have the ability to perform the addition and doubling operations in totally 
different projective coordinates. 
 
Second, proposed algorithms 
 1.  Add-Add Algorithm 
It is a ML algorithm. It performs one ADD operation followed by another ADD 
operation in each iteration of a scalar multiplication. In any iteration of the scalar 
multiplication, the first ADD and the second ADD operations are performed in a fixed 
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sequence. The second ADD operation works as follows: If the current bit ik  is 1, P will 
be added. Otherwise (i.e. for ik  = 0), –P is added.  
 
2. Transition-based Algorithm 
It is a ML algorithm. In this algorithm, DBL and ADD operations are always 
performed in all iterations in the same order independently of the bit values of a scalar. 
The most important property of this algorithm is that in the i-th iteration, the selection of 
the input operand of DBL operation is dependant on the existence of a transition between 
bits ik  and 1+ik  of a scalar K and it is not dependant directly on the value of ik . 
 
Countermeasure 4: This countermeasure is based on Combining the Add-Add and 
Transition-based Algorithms. The Add-Add algorithm is used to perform the initial 
iteration of the scalar multiplication because the first iteration of the transition-based 
algorithm is weak against ABDPA. It is this property of Add-Add algorithm that is used 
to overcome the possible leaking of information about 2−nk  in the first iteration of 
transition-based algorithm. This combination of Add-Add and transition-based algorithms 
is used to prevent any leakage of information about 2−nk . Once the value of 2−nk  is 






10.3 Suggestions for Future Work 
 Since the proposed DPC enables the ECC designers to choose from many 
combinations of DPC systems and/or various scalar multiplication algorithms, we propose 
the following future work 
1. This thesis provides dynamic addition and doubling formulas for E/GF(p) based 
on the DPC system where these formulas are separate. A suggested future research 
is to provide a unified dynamic formula for E/GF(p) that can be used for both 
addition and doubling operations. i.e. getting one dynamic formula that can be 
used for both addition and doubling operations at the same time. This unified 
formula should be developed using the DPC transformation functions. 
2. This thesis provides dynamic addition and doubling formulas for E/GF(2m) based 
on the DPC system where these formulas are separate. A suggested future research 
is to provide a unified dynamic formula for E/GF(2m) that can be used for both 
addition and doubling operations. i.e. getting one dynamic formula that can be 
used for both addition and doubling operations at the same time. This unified 
formula should be developed using the DPC transformation functions. 
3. Study the security-performance tradeoffs of the unified dynamic formula 
suggested in (1) for different scalar multiplication algorithms for E/GF(p). 
4. Study the security-performance tradeoffs of the unified dynamic formula 






Appendix A-I: Derivation of DPC General Addition Formula for E/GF(p) 
Transformation functions 7.1 are used to get the dynamic projective coordinates 
),,,( 3333 yx
LL ZZYX  of the point R according to addition formula 3.4 (section 3.3 in chapter 
3). The following subsections present the derivation of dynamic projective addition 
formulas. 
A-I.1 Derivation of Dynamic projective x-coordinate, 3X . 
Let ),,,( 1111 yx
LL ZZYXP = , ),,,( 2222 yx LL ZZYXQ =  and ),,,( 3333 yx LL ZZYXR = . Then the 
dynamic projective coordinate 3X  of the point R = P + Q  can be derived as follows: 
































































































































































)()()( +−=    
Let )( 21 yy
LL ZVZR =  and xxxx LLLL ZXRZXRZZUX 2121223212'3 )( −−= , then the above equation 










3 =         A-I.1 
A-I.2 Derivation of Dynamic projective y-coordinate, 3Y . 
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3 )( −−=      A-I.2 
A-I.3 Choosing Common 3Z . 
 































=         A-I.3 
Substitute for 3X = 2'3
















Since xxxx LLdLL ZZRZ 213 = , xLZ3  can be taken as a common factor in the numerator and 














































According to the selection of 213 ZZRZ d=  which result in yy LdL ZZRZ )( 213 = , multiply the 


























3 )( −−=  













Y −=         A-I.4 
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Appendix B-I: Derivation of DPC General Doubling Formula for E/GF(p) 
Transformation functions 7.1 are used to get the dynamic projective coordinates 
),,,( 3333
yx LL ZZYX  of the point R according to doubling formula 3.5 (section 3.3 in chapter 




B-I.1 Derivation of Dynamic projective x-coordinate, 3X . 
Let ),,,( 1111 yx
LL ZZYXP = and ),,,( 3333 yx LL ZZYXR = . Then the dynamic projective 
coordinate 3X  of the point R = 2P  can be derived as follows: 
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Let xLaZXW 21
2












































































=          B-I.1 
B-I.2 Derivation of Dynamic projective y-coordinate, 3Y . 
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2))(( −−=  
















3 )( −−=     B-I.2 
B-I.3 Choosing a common 3Z  
Let 13 ZSZ


























































Take xLZ3  as a common factor in the numerator and cancel it with xLZ3  in the denominator. 








































3 )( −−=  
Take xLZ1  as a common factor in the numerator and cancel it with x






















3 )(2 −−=  
Let yLWZT 21= . Then rearrange the numerator of the above equation to exploit the 





































=         B-I.4 
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Appendix C-I: Derivation of DPC Optimized Addition Formula for E/GF(p) 
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Take 221 )( yy


























3 )( VZXVZXZZUX xxyx










3 =         C-I.1 














)( −−=      C-I.2 
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=         C-I.3 
















)( −−−=  
Since xxxx LLdLL ZZVZ 213 = , xLZ3  can be taken as a common factor in the numerator and 
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Y −=         C-I.4 
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From equations C-I.3 and C-I.4, we get the following set of optimized dynamic addition 
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Appendix D-I: Derivation of DPC Optimized Doubling Formula for E/GF(p) 
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=          D-I.1 
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)2( −−=     D-I.2 


























=         D-I.3 
Substitute for 2'33
























)2( −−−=  
Take xLZ3  as a common factor in the numerator and cancel it with xLZ3  in the denominator. 
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)2( −−=  
Take yx LL ZZ 1
2
1  as a common factor in the numerator and cancel it with 
yx LL ZZ 1
2
1  in the 

































WZXZYWZXSY xyyxxy LLLLLL −−− −−=  
Let xy LLWZT −= 1 . Then rearrange the numerator of the above equation to exploit the 






























=         D-I.4 




















































































Appendix A-II: Derivation of DPC General Addition Formula for E/GF(2m)  
Transformation functions 7.1 are used to get the dynamic projective coordinates 
),,,( 3333 yx
LL ZZYX  of the point R according to addition formula 3.7 (section 3.4 in chapter 
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3). The following subsections present the derivation of dynamic projective addition 
formulas. 
 
A-II.1 Derivation of projective x-coordinate, 3X . 
Let ),,,( 1111 yx
LL ZZYXP = , ),,,( 2222 yx LL ZZYXQ =  and ),,,( 3333 yx LL ZZYXR = . Then the 
projective coordinate 3X  of the point R = P + Q  can be derived as follows: 
By applying the transformation functions 7.1 to the affine x-coordinate equation, 
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X =         A-II.1 
A-II.2 Derivation of projective y-coordinate, 3Y . 
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By applying the transformation functions 7.1 to the affine y-coordinate equation, 




























































































































⎛=       

















13312 +++=  








2121321213 +++=  
Finally, 












3 +++=     A-II.2 
A-II.3 Choosing Common 3Z . 





































=        A-II.3 





−− xxxx LLLdL ZZRX , obtained from A-II.3, in A-II.2 to get, 



















Since xxxx LLLdL ZZRZ )( 213 = , xLZ3  can be taken as a common factor in the numerator and 
canceled with xLZ3  in the denominator to get,  
















3 )(  
Multiply the right hand side by )(/)( 21
2
21
2 xxxx LLLL ZZRZZR  to get,  


















Y +++=  
According to the selection of )( 213 xx
LLd ZZRZ =  which result in yxxy LLLdL ZZRZ )( 213 = , the 
above equation can be written as, 






















Let ( ) ( )RZUZXZVYZUXZZRY xxyxxx LLLLLL +++= 21'32121212'3 )( , then the above equation can 




















=        A-II.4 
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Appendix B-II: Derivation of DPC General Doubling Formula for E/GF(2m) 
 Transformation functions 7.1 are used to get the dynamic projective coordinates 
),,,( 3333
yx LL ZZYX  of the point R according to doubling formula 3.8. The following 
subsections present the derivation of projective doubling formulas. 
B-II.1 Derivation of projective x-coordinate, 3X . 
Let ),,,( 1111 yx
LL ZZYXP =  and ),,,( 3333 yx LL ZZYXR = . Then the projective coordinate 3X  
of the point PR 2=  can be derived as follows: 
By applying the transformation functions 7.1 to the affine x-coordinate equation, 
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=          B-II.1 
B-II.2 Derivation of projective y-coordinate, 3Y . 
By applying the transformation functions 7.1 to the affine y-coordinate equation, 
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1131331 +++=   
Finally,  














3 +++=      B-II.2 
B-II.3 Choosing a common 3Z  
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=          B-II.3 
Substitute for 2'33
−= xdLSXX , taken from B-II.3, in B-II.2 to get, 



















Since xx dLL SZ =3 , xLZ3  can be taken as a common factor in the numerator and canceled 
with xLZ3  in the denominator to get,  



















Multiply the right hand side by 2S / 2S  to get, 


















3 +++=  
Take xLZ1  as a common factor in the numerator and cancel it with x
LZ1  in the denominator. 
(we expand 2S  to  ))( 111 yx
LL ZZXS )  












































=         B-II.4 
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Appendix C-II: Derivation of DPC Optimized Addition Formula for E/GF(2m) 
From equation A-II.2 in appendix A-II, we have, 























X +++=  
Take 221 )( yy
LL ZZ  as a common factor from the numerator and simplify,  
















































Let ( ) 3212212321'3 )()( VZZaVZZVUZZUX xxxyyx LLLLLL +++= −− , then the above equation 










X =         C-II.1 
From equation A-II.2 in appendix A-II, we have, 












3 +++=    C-II.2 
Let 213 ZZVZ































=         C-II.3 
Substitute for 3X  from C-II.3 in C-II.2 to get, 

















Since xxxx LLdLL ZZVZ 213 = , xLZ3  can be taken as a common factor in the numerator and 
canceled with xLZ3  in the denominator to get,  















−− +++=  
Multiply the right hand side by 22 /VV ,  
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Y −=         C-II.4 























































































Appendix D-II: Derivation of DPC Optimized Doubling Formula for 
E/GF(2m) 

























X ++++=  
Take yLZ 21  as a common factor in the numerator and cancel it with y





























Let xLZXS 11=  , yx LLZYXW −+= 21121  and  '3X  = numerator of the above equation, then we 
can write, 











=           D-II.1 
From equation B-II.5 in appendix B-II, we have:  






















3 +++++= D-II.2 
































−= xdLSXX , taken from D-II.3, in D-II.2 to get, 



























Since xx dLL SZ =3 , xLZ3  can be taken as a common factor in the numerator and canceled 
with xLZ3  in the denominator to get,  



























Multiply the right hand side by 2S / 2S  to get, 


























3 +++++=  
Take xLZ1  as a common factor in the numerator and cancel it with x
LZ1  in the denominator. 
(recall that xLZXS 11= )  



























3 +++++=  
Take yLZ1  as a common factor in the numerator and cancel it with y
LZ1  in the denominator.  






































SWXZYWSX yx LL +++=
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=         D-II.4 
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